Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, an Air Force veteran, appeals from a decision of the Physical Disability Board of Review (“Board”) declining to increase his disability rating, which would entitle him to greater benefits. The district court rejected Plaintiff’s arguments that the Board was required to conduct a physical examination before making its decision and that its decision was arbitrary and capricious.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court wrote that by arguing that he could not be taken off the List or have his temporary 50% rating lowered until the Air Force conducted a physical examination—an examination that necessarily could not occur until years after his retroactive placement on the List—Plaintiff pushes for an interpretation that would effectively grant a retroactive 50% rating for years to all individuals whose disabilities are reviewed by the Board and fall under Section 4.129. But that defies the purpose of the Board: to ensure accurate disability determinations at the time of a member’s discharge, “based on the records of the armed force concerned and such other evidence as may be presented to the” Board. The court, therefore, rejected Plaintiff’s argument that the Board was required to order a new physical examination before making its determination. Ultimately, the court concluded that its decision was supported by substantial evidence, with a “rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.” View "Blair Coleman v. Frank Kendall" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of violating 18 U.S.C. Section 1855 after he started a brush fire that burned 70 acres of the Nantahala National Forest in western North Carolina. Defendant asserted his innocence, claiming he did not act with a culpable mental state because he thought he was setting the fire on his family’s land, not on federal government property. His arguments required the Fourth Circuit to address the scope of Section 1855’s mens rea requirement.   The Fourth Circuit vacated Defendant’s sentence and remanded. The court concluded that specific knowledge of federal ownership is not required for conviction. Therefore, the Government did not have to prove that Defendant knew he was on federal land or intended to burn federal land. But the Government did have to prove that Defendant acted willfully, and an honest mistake of fact about whether he was burning brush on his own property would be a viable defense. The district court excluded testimony about Defendant’s belief that he was on his family’s property when he set the fire, thereby preventing him from presenting his primary defense to the jury. The court explained that the jury, not the Fourth Circuit, must assess the credibility of the proffered testimony and weigh it against the Government’s evidence to make the judgment regarding whether Defendant made a factual mistake sufficient to cast a reasonable doubt on the willfulness of his actions in setting the fire. View "US v. Casey Evans" on Justia Law

Plaintiff worked as a Telecommunications Network Coordinator for the Virginia Department of Corrections (VDOC). After VDOC fired Plaintiff for declining a random drug test, Garrett sued, alleging that VDOC employees violated his Fourth Amendment rights by applying VDOC’s drug testing policy to him. Defendants asserted qualified immunity and moved to dismiss. The district court denied the motion, concluding that general constitutional principles clearly establish Plaintiff’s right to be free from suspicionless drug testing.   The Fourth Circuit reversed. The court wrote that based on the facts as alleged in the complaint here, VDOC has some degree of government interest in drug testing Plaintiff. Whether that interest amounts to a “special need” within the meaning of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is a debatable legal question. By baking into its analysis the absence of a sufficient special need, the district court glossed over the central question for immunity purposes: whether every reasonable official in Defendants’ position would understand that VDOC’s proffered interests were not substantial enough to override Plaintiff’s privacy interest. In view of existing law, the constitutionality of Defendants’ drug testing is simply not “beyond debate.” View "Jacoby Garrett v. Harold Clarke" on Justia Law

In this appeal from the district court, Plaintiffs A.A. and Kirk Amos Delivery and Courier, LLC (“Kirk Delivery”) challenged an order of the district court compelling the arbitration of various claims that Plaintiffs seek to pursue against Amazon Logistics, Inc. (“Amazon”).  Conceding that each of their claims against Amazon falls within the scope of a binding commercial contract made between Kirk Delivery and Amazon in 2019 — and that an arbitration clause governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (the “FAA”) is set forth within that contract — Plaintiffs contend, in relevant part, that arbitration is not required due to the FAA’s exemption for “contracts of employment” with “transportation workers.”   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that the binding commercial contract is a business services deal struck between two corporate entities, not a “contract of employment” — the FAA’s so-called “transportation worker” exemption is inapplicable in these circumstances. The FAA thus mandates arbitration of all Plaintiffs’ claims. View "Ahaji Amos v. Amazon Logistics, INC." on Justia Law

This case arose when two companies merged in the biopharmaceutical market. Biopharmaceutical companies develop medicines from living cells. Those medicines must be tested and then approved by the Food and Drug Administration before they can be publicly marketed. The two companies here—INC Research Holdings, Inc. and inVentiv Health, Inc.—did not develop their own medicines, but helped other companies that did. Pre-merger, INC Research specialized in assisting biopharmaceutical companies conduct clinical trials as part of the Food and Drug Administration’s approval process. Wanting to break into the approved-drugcommercialization market, INC Research sought to merge with inVentiv in 2017. Plaintiffs claim that they relied on allegedly misleading statements that INC Research and its executives made in three different communications: (1) the press release announcing the merger; (2) an earnings call held on May 10; and (3) an earnings call held on July 27. The district court dismissed Plaintiffs’ case for failure to state a claim.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that INC Research’s investors have a right to be disappointed that their company’s performance did not meet its optimistic projections. But that does not mean that they also have a right to civil remedies under federal securities law. Securities fraud liability cannot be “predicated solely on an overly optimistic view of a future which may, in fact, encounter harsh economic realities down the road.” View "San Antonio Fire & Police Pension Fund v. Syneos Health Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant appeald his conviction for two counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm or ammunition under 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g)(1). He contends that his guilty plea was invalid and that his sentence was procedurally and substantively unreasonable.   The Fouth Circuit concluded that the district court did not plainly err when it accepted Defendant’s guilty plea. However, the court vacated Defendant’s sentence and remanded for resentencing based on the Government’s concession that Defendant should not have received two criminal history points for being on probation. The court rejected Defendant’s other contentions of sentencing error. The court explained that the district court did not err in accepting Defendant’s guilty plea, in applying the U.S.S.G. Section 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) enhancement at sentencing, in finding that Defendant’s state conviction supported a base offense level of twenty under U.S.S.G. Section 2K2.1(a)(4)(A), or in making certain factual findings at sentencing. View "US v. Montes Miller" on Justia Law

Ramaco Resources suffered a coal silo collapse and submitted a claim for losses to Federal Insurance Company. When Federal denied the claim, Ramaco sued. After a twelve-day trial, a jury awarded Ramaco $7.6 million in contract damages and prejudgment interest. The jury also awarded $25 million under West Virginia’s Hayseeds doctrine, which permits an insured party to claim consequential damages when it prevails after suing to collect on its insurance policy. But post-trial, the district court reduced Ramaco’s contract damages and interest to $1.8 million and entirely rejected the Hayseeds damages as a matter of state law. The district court also conditionally granted a new trial on the Hayseeds award, reasoning that—even if Hayseeds damages were theoretically permissible—the jury’s $25 million award was punitive and thus invalid. Ramaco appealed.   The Fourth Circuit reversed in part and affirmed in part. The court reversed the district court’s reduction of contract damages and prejudgment interest because the insurance policy’s plain language and the trial evidence support the jury’s original $7.6 million award. And the court reversed the district court’s wholesale rejection of Hayseeds damages. But the court affirmed its conditional grant of a new Hayseeds damages trial. The court explained that West Virginia law requires courts to give insurance policies their plain, ordinary meaning whenever possible. Here, the policy’s plain language extended the period of restoration until Ramaco’s operations were restored to the level of generating the net profits that would have existed but for the collapse. To determine that level, a court must consider both throughput and expenses. The district court did not. View "Ramaco Resources, LLC v. Federal Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Defendant victimized over a million Americans by furthering a country-wide “scareware” scam that tricked innocent computer users into paying for unnecessary software to remedy entirely fabricated issues purported to plague their devices. An apparent fugitive—having sought for years to evade paying even a cent of the $163,167,539.95 in restitution ordered for her role in the scheme—Defendant sought vacatur of that aging monetary judgment. The district court denied Defendant’s motion.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court held that an arguable basis clearly supported the judgment imposed, and it cannot be said that there was a “total want of jurisdiction” or a “clear usurpation of power” such that any defect renders the judgment void under Rule 60(b)(4). Further, the court explained that Defendant’s aggregated circumstances are not extraordinary such that she is entitled to vacatur under Rule 60(b) catch-all, and the district court soundly exercised its discretion in denying her such relief. This outcome is wholly consonant with our directive to “delicately balance the sanctity of final judgments . . . and the incessant command of the court’s conscience that justice be done in light of all the facts.” Thus, the court held that the district court properly denied Defendant’s motion for vacatur under Rule 60(b)(4) and (b)(6). Accordingly, Defendant remained liable for $163,167,539.95 in restitution—an amount that would justly recompense the victims. View "FTC v. Kristy Ross" on Justia Law

The jury convicted Petitioner of the four murders, and the court sentenced him to death.3 Id. at 475. On July 1, 2021, however, his sentence was commuted to life without parole after Virginia abolished the death penalty by legislation. Petitioner appealed his convictions and sentences, but the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed, and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. On remand, the district court permitted the parties to engage in further discovery, during which Petitioner learned of additional evidence that he alleged was also Brady or Napue material. Petitioner appealed and sought a certificate of appealability on a single issue: “whether the suppression of evidence and knowing presentation of false and misleading testimony was cumulatively material” under a combined Brady and Napue analysis. The sole question on appeal is whether Petitioner can show that the evidence he cites as inappropriately suppressed under Brady and the testimony he cites as inappropriately offered under Napue was cumulatively material.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that Petitioner cannot satisfy the Brady standard. The Brady and Napue evidence noted herein would have weakened certain aspects of the prosecution’s case but would not have undermined the core of the evidence against Juniper. Accordingly, the court concluded that the Brady and Napue evidence cannot “reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict” and that there is not “a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” View "Anthony Juniper v. Melvin Davis" on Justia Law

Shortly after witnessing a person leave Defendant’s home, Kannapolis, North Carolina police officer Jeremy Page discovered 0.1 grams of cocaine base during a search of Johnson’s vehicle. Officer Page then confronted Defendant about the cocaine sale and instructed him to turn over any drugs still in his possession. In return, Officer Page assured Bailey that he was “going to take it and . . . leave,” and everything would still be “squared away.” Prompted by Officer Page’s offer, Defendant handed over 0.7 grams of cocaine base. Defendant helped Officer Page locate and arrest an individual for whom the police had an outstanding warrant but did not otherwise aid in Officer Page’s investigations. Then Officer Page obtained two warrants for Defendant’s arrest. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court should have granted his suppression motion because his arrest constituted a breach of Officer Page’s September 24 promise that all would be “squared away.”   The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s decision denying Defendant’s motion to suppress and the judgment of conviction and remanded. The court concluded that if Officer Page did breach a promise not to arrest Defendant for either quantity of drugs recovered on September 24 in exchange for his cooperation, Defendant could seek to enforce that promise against the government. Further, the court wrote that a police officer is not entitled to arbitrarily breach these agreements, which have become a central feature of the many drug-related prosecutions that occupy our criminal legal system each year. View "US v. Maurice Bailey" on Justia Law