Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Susan Carpenter, as trustee for the H. Joe King, Jr. Revocable Trust, sold two properties in North Carolina in April 2020. Both properties were part of homeowners’ associations managed by William Douglas Management, Inc. Carpenter paid fees for statements of unpaid assessments required for the sales, which she claimed were excessive under North Carolina law. She filed a class action lawsuit against William Douglas and NextLevel Association Solutions, Inc., alleging violations of state laws, including the prohibition of transfer fee covenants, the Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act, and the Debt Collection Act, along with claims of negligent misrepresentation, unjust enrichment, and civil conspiracy.The case was initially filed in North Carolina state court but was removed to the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina. The district court dismissed Carpenter’s complaint for failure to state a claim, concluding that the fees charged were not transfer fees as defined by state law and that the companies were not deceptive or unfair in charging them.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal, holding that the fees charged for the statements of unpaid assessments did not qualify as transfer fees under North Carolina law. The court also found that the fees were not unfair or deceptive under the Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act. Consequently, Carpenter’s additional claims of unjust enrichment, violation of the Debt Collection Act, negligent misrepresentation, and civil conspiracy were also dismissed, as they were contingent on the success of her primary claims. View "Carpenter v. William Douglas Management Inc" on Justia Law

In late 2008, the IRS assessed Arthur and Gigi Stover a significant tax bill, which they could not pay. The Government waited until 2020 to initiate a collection suit, nearly twelve years later. Generally, the Government has ten years to sue for unpaid taxes, but this period can be extended if the taxpayer requests an installment agreement. The IRS records indicated that the Stovers requested such an agreement on December 12, 2008. However, Arthur Stover testified that they did not contact the IRS about a payment plan until 2009 through their CPA.The United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina granted summary judgment to the Government, finding no genuine issue of material fact regarding the date of the installment agreement request. The court held that the request tolled the statute of limitations, making the Government's collection action timely.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and found that there was a genuine dispute of material fact regarding the date of the installment agreement request. Arthur Stover's deposition testimony suggested that the request could not have been made until 2009, contradicting the IRS records. The court concluded that summary judgment was improper because the conflicting evidence created a genuine issue of fact that should be resolved by a factfinder.The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. The main holding was that summary judgment is not appropriate when there is a genuine dispute of material fact regarding the date that dictates the timeliness of the Government's suit. View "United States v. Stover" on Justia Law

Real Time Medical Systems, LLC provides analytics services to skilled nursing facilities by accessing health records from PointClickCare Technologies, Inc., which operates a system hosting patients’ electronic health records. Real Time uses automated bots to access these records. PointClickCare, citing security and performance concerns, blocked users suspected of using bots. Real Time sued to stop PointClickCare from restricting its access, and the district court granted a preliminary injunction in favor of Real Time.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland granted Real Time a preliminary injunction, finding that PointClickCare’s actions likely constituted information blocking under the 21st Century Cures Act. The court concluded that Real Time was likely to succeed on the merits of its claims for unfair competition and tortious interference with contracts. The court also found that Real Time would suffer irreparable harm without the injunction, that the balance of equities favored Real Time, and that the public interest supported granting the injunction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The Fourth Circuit agreed that Real Time was likely to succeed on the merits of its unfair competition claim, as PointClickCare’s actions likely violated the Cures Act’s prohibition on information blocking. The court found that PointClickCare failed to demonstrate that any exceptions to the information-blocking provision applied. The court also agreed that Real Time would suffer irreparable harm without the injunction, that the balance of equities favored Real Time, and that the public interest supported the injunction. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the preliminary injunction. View "Real Time Medical Systems, Inc. v. PointClickCare Technologies, Inc." on Justia Law

Sammy Lee Ellis, Jr. shot Lamar Gross, the son of his estranged fiancé Dionne Beatty, in the abdomen after a heated argument. Ellis, who had been drinking, was charged with illegally possessing a firearm and ammunition as a convicted felon. The U.S. Probation Office prepared a presentence investigation report that applied a cross-reference to attempted murder under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, which Ellis contested.The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina applied the attempted murder cross-reference over Ellis's objections, determining it to be the operative base offense level for sentencing. Ellis argued that the district court failed to consider a voluntary intoxication defense to attempted murder and that there was insufficient evidence to support the cross-reference. The district court found Gross's testimony credible and concluded that Ellis's actions amounted to attempted murder, sentencing him to 97 months' imprisonment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court correctly applied the attempted murder cross-reference, noting that under South Carolina law, voluntary intoxication is not a defense unless it results in permanent insanity, which was not the case here. The court also found substantial evidence supporting the district court's conclusion that Ellis intended to kill Gross, based on the circumstances and credible testimony. Consequently, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. View "United States v. Ellis" on Justia Law

A city ordinance criminalizes broadcasting obscene, profane, or vulgar language from commercial properties above certain volumes at specific times. A bar owner challenged the ordinance, claiming it violated the First Amendment. This appeal focuses on the restriction of "vulgar" language.The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina declined to enjoin the vulgar-language provision, interpreting it as only restricting speech that is obscene under constitutional standards, which can be entirely prohibited. The court upheld the obscene-language and vulgar-language provisions but enjoined the profane-language provision. The bar owner appealed, arguing that the vulgar-language provision, properly construed, is unconstitutional.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court disagreed with the district court's interpretation, concluding that the vulgar-language provision reaches some constitutionally protected speech and is not limited to obscene speech. The court held that the vulgar-language provision is content-based and fails strict scrutiny because it is not narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests. The court found that the provision is both overinclusive and underinclusive, affecting protected speech and not effectively serving the city's stated interests.The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment in part and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that the vulgar-language provision is unconstitutional. View "Moshoures v. City of North Myrtle Beach" on Justia Law

Tiffany Johnson and Tracy Crider, Maryland residents, obtained credit card accounts from Continental Finance Company, LLC and Continental Purchasing, LLC. They filed separate class-action lawsuits in Maryland state court, alleging that Continental violated Maryland usury laws by charging excessive interest rates through a "rent-a-bank" scheme. They sought statutory damages and declaratory judgments to void their loans. Continental removed the cases to the District of Maryland and moved to compel arbitration based on a cardholder agreement containing an arbitration provision.The District of Maryland consolidated the cases and denied Continental's motions to compel arbitration. The court held that it was responsible for determining whether the arbitration agreement was illusory, not the arbitrator. It also found that the choice-of-law provisions in the agreements could not be applied before establishing the existence of a valid contract. Finally, the court concluded that the arbitration agreement was illusory under Maryland law due to a "change-in-terms" clause allowing Continental to unilaterally alter any term at its sole discretion.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Fourth Circuit agreed that the court, not the arbitrator, should determine the contract's formation. It also concurred that the choice-of-law provisions could not be enforced before establishing a valid contract. Finally, the court held that the arbitration agreement was illusory under Maryland law because the change-in-terms clause allowed Continental to escape its contractual obligations, rendering the agreement non-binding. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Johnson v. Continental Finance Co., LLC" on Justia Law

Brian Farabee, who suffers from borderline personality disorder, has spent his adult life in hospitals or prison for crimes committed while hospitalized. He filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Dr. Robert Gardella, Dr. Christy McFarland, and Daniel Herr, alleging violations of his constitutional rights and the Americans with Disabilities Act. Farabee claimed that the defendants denied him clinically recommended treatment, unnecessarily restrained and isolated him, forcibly medicated him, and discriminated against him.The United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants without allowing Farabee to conduct discovery or ensuring he was informed of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 56’s requirements. The court concluded that there was no material dispute of fact and that the defendants were entitled to summary judgment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and found that the district court erred in granting summary judgment before allowing Farabee to conduct discovery. The appellate court emphasized that summary judgment should only be granted after adequate time for discovery and that the district court should have provided Farabee, a pro se litigant, with an opportunity to gather evidence. The Fourth Circuit reversed and vacated the district court’s summary judgment decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. The appellate court also recommended that the district court appoint counsel to assist Farabee in litigating the case due to its complexity and Farabee’s limited ability to conduct discovery on his own. View "Farabee v. Gardella" on Justia Law

In 2020 and 2021, Rohan Dhruva and Joshua Stern, residents of California, created accounts and subscribed to CuriosityStream, an online streaming service. They later discovered that CuriosityStream was sharing their event data and other identifiers with Meta, which they claimed violated the federal Video Privacy Protection Act and California state law. Consequently, they filed a putative class action lawsuit in Maryland, where CuriosityStream is headquartered.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland denied CuriosityStream's motion to compel arbitration. The court acknowledged that the website provided adequate notice of the Terms of Use through a conspicuous hyperlink but concluded that users were not given clear notice that clicking the "Sign up now" button constituted agreement to the Terms of Use. CuriosityStream's motion for reconsideration was also denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that Dhruva and Stern had reasonable notice that registering for the streaming service would constitute assent to the website’s Terms of Use, which included an arbitration clause. The court held that the design and content of the website provided sufficient notice of the terms and that Dhruva and Stern manifested their assent by registering with the website. Consequently, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's order denying the motion to compel arbitration and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Dhruva v. CuriosityStream, Inc." on Justia Law

Gerald Wheeler was convicted in 2007 of various drug and firearm offenses and sentenced to 180 months of imprisonment. In 2018, one of his convictions was vacated, and he was resentenced to time served with a four-year term of supervised release starting in March 2019. In January 2023, Wheeler's probation officer filed a petition to modify his supervision conditions due to new charges of felony assault by strangulation and misdemeanor assault on a female. The district court ordered revocation proceedings instead.A United States Magistrate Judge found no probable cause for the felony assault charge but found probable cause for the misdemeanor assault charge. Wheeler remained on bond pending the final revocation hearing. During the hearing, the district court admitted hearsay evidence from the alleged victim, Nyasia Mobley, despite her absence. The court found that the government made sufficient efforts to secure her presence and deemed her statements reliable. The court ultimately found Wheeler violated his supervised release and sentenced him to six months of imprisonment followed by an additional year of supervised release.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court abused its discretion by not properly balancing Wheeler's interest in confronting Mobley against the government's reasons for not producing her. The court also found that the government did not provide a satisfactory explanation for Mobley's absence, as the probation officer made only a single attempt to serve her. The Fourth Circuit concluded that the district court's error was not harmless, as the hearsay evidence was essential to the finding of violation. The court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss the Revocation Petition. View "US v. Wheeler" on Justia Law

Tyzeem Kwazhon Nixon pleaded guilty to one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. While awaiting sentencing, he committed several violent acts, including multiple stabbings. The district court sentenced Nixon to more than double the Sentencing Guidelines range, primarily based on his violent behavior while incarcerated. The court also disregarded a report from a qualified medical expert, which attributed Nixon's violent conduct to his untreated mental health condition and suggested that proper treatment would mitigate his threat to society.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina sentenced Nixon to 114 months, significantly above the Guidelines range of 41 to 51 months. The court justified the upward departure by citing Nixon's violent acts while awaiting sentencing and his criminal history. The court rejected the expert's report without counterevidence, stating it did not find the report credible. Nixon appealed the sentence, arguing that the district court's reliance on dissimilar conduct, failure to consider intermediate categories, and rejection of expert testimony rendered the sentence procedurally unreasonable.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and found the district court's sentence procedurally unreasonable. The appellate court held that the district court improperly relied on dissimilar conduct for the upward departure, failed to consider intermediate criminal history categories, and erroneously rejected the expert testimony without justification. The Fourth Circuit vacated the sentence and remanded the case for resentencing, instructing the district court to recalculate Nixon's criminal history category without improper consideration of dissimilar conduct, to consider intermediate categories, and to properly evaluate the expert testimony. View "US v. Nixon" on Justia Law