Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After Defendant pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to possession of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 2252A(a)(5)(B) and (b)(2), the district court sentenced him to 120 months imprisonment, the bottom of the advisory guidelines range. That range was determined, in part, by the district court’s conclusion that Defendant was subject to the mandatory minimum sentence of 120 months imprisonment that is required by Section 2252A(b)(2) when a defendant has a prior conviction for a qualifying sex offense. The district court found that Defendant’s prior conviction under Maryland law for a sexual offense in the third degree qualified as a predicate for the Section 2252A(b)(2) enhancement. Defendant then sought a review of the district court’s ruling that his prior Maryland conviction qualified as a predicate conviction under Section 2252A(b)(2), which triggered the 120-month mandatory minimum sentence.   The Fourth Circuit dismissed Defendant’s appeal. The court agreed with the government that Defendant waived his right to appeal that issue in his plea agreement. The court explained the indictment’s allegation that a 120-month minimum sentence applied because of Defendant’s prior Maryland conviction and the limitations that Defendant’s plea agreement placed on his right to challenge that allegation, as well as Defendant’s broad waiver of his right to appeal any determination that the district court made on that issue, preclude the present appeal. And this is confirmed by Defendant’s express waiver of the district court’s determination of the applicable sentencing guidelines range. View "US v. Bruce Sturtz" on Justia Law

Appellees filed a voluntary petition under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code. Appellees calculated their disposable income using Official Form 122C-2. As the form instructs, Appellees entered the relevant “National and Local Standards” for their monthly costs for food, clothing, utilities, out-of-pocket healthcare, and vehicles. The bankruptcy trustee objected to Appellees’ proposed Chapter 13 plan. The trustee acknowledged the Cooks followed the instructions on Official Form 122C-2. The trustee maintained, however, that the form was wrong because the Bankruptcy Code only allowed Appellees to claim the relevant Local Standards amount for their “Mortgage/Rent” deduction ($1,098) rather than their actual monthly payment ($2,233.34). The trustee asked the bankruptcy court to certify an appeal directly to the Fourth Circuit under 28 U.S.C. Section 158(d)(2)(A).   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained disposable income, in turn, means “current monthly income received by the debtor” minus “amounts reasonably necessary to be expended.” Clause Three says the Appellees’ “average monthly payments on account of ” that mortgage “shall be calculated” based on the amounts “contractually due to secured creditors,” that is, what Appellees owe under their mortgage agreement. Performing that calculation, the Appellees reached an average monthly payment of $2,233.34. Then, Clause One tells Appellees to “reduce” their “current monthly income” “by the amount determined under” Clause Three. Thus, Appellees subtracted $2,233.34 (and other uncontested amounts) from their current monthly income to reach a disposable income of $253.27. Accordingly, the court concluded Appellees were entitled to use their average monthly mortgage payments when calculating their disposable income. View "Joseph Bledsoe, III v. Cheryl Cook" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the district court’s denial of his habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. Section 2254. He claimed that his guilty plea wasn’t voluntary because he didn’t know that Maryland’s sentencing guidelines were merely advisory. But a Maryland court denied his request for postconviction relief, finding that he understood the terms of his plea agreement, including his maximum sentencing exposure. The district court held that the Maryland court’s decision denying Defendant postconviction relief was reasonable.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that AEDPA forecloses habeas relief unless the PCR court’s decision was “based on” an erroneous finding, 28 U.S.C. Section 2254(d)(2), and Defendant doesn’t make that showing. Further subsection (d)(1) corrects only the most “extreme malfunctions.” Here, the PCR court’s decision wasn’t “contrary to” or an “unreasonable application of” Supreme Court precedent because it didn’t “arrive at a result different from” a Supreme Court case with “materially indistinguishable” facts. Nor was the PCR court’s decision an “unreasonable application” of principles announced by the Supreme Court. Here, the PCR court concluded that Defendant couldn’t reasonably believe that the guidelines were mandatory or that he was entitled to a sentence between 30 and 51 years. That’s because the plea court correctly advised him that each of his charges carried a possible sentence of 30 years. So this isn’t a case in which Defendant was clueless about the endpoints of his sentencing exposure. View "Calvin Currica v. Richard Miller" on Justia Law

Appellant, a Maryland Capitol Police officer, appealed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity on several First and Fourth Amendment claims brought by picketers whom he arrested on the sidewalk outside the Maryland State House. Appellant arrested the picketers after they disobeyed his orders to back up off the sidewalk and protest instead from an adjoining square.   The Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded. The court held a reasonable officer in Appellant’s position could have believed that the orders constituted lawful time, place, or manner restrictions on the picketers’ First Amendment rights. Therefore, Appellant is entitled to qualified immunity. The court explained no law, clearly established or otherwise, required Appellant to wait for an imminent traffic accident. Preventive measures to promote public safety are a basic contribution of government. Appellant’s assessment of safety risks and attempts to mitigate them were informed by common sense and the facts on the ground, not animus or conjecture. It was at least reasonable for him to believe that his orders promoted a substantial governmental interest. View "Clayton Hulbert v. Brian Pope" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of illegally reentering the United States after an aggravated felony conviction. He challenged his conviction on numerous fronts, claiming vindictive prosecution and violations of his constitutional rights to a speedy trial, due process, and freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court held that Defendant failed to demonstrate that the presumption of vindictiveness applies. The presumption of regularity that attends a prosecutor’s pretrial charging decision, therefore, remains in place. Further, the court wrote that Defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial on the aggravated reentry charge attached when the government obtained the indictment charging him with that offense, the second indictment in this case. Because Defendant does not argue that the time between the second indictment and his trial—just short of 6 months—is presumptively prejudicial, he has not met the threshold requirement for evaluating the remaining Barker factors. Finally, the court held that Defendant has not shown that officers arrested and fingerprinted him for an investigative purpose; therefore, the court affirmed the district court’s denial of his second suppression motion. View "US v. Francisco Villa" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a tenured psychology professor at George Mason University (GMU), appealed the district court’s dismissal of his Title IX, procedural due process, and First Amendment claims against GMU and other defendants sued after he was disciplined for creating a hostile educational environment that amounted to sexual harassment.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the district court correctly dismissed Plaintiff’s erroneous-outcome claim. Such a claim requires a plaintiff to plausibly allege that (1) he was subjected to a procedurally flawed or otherwise flawed proceeding; (2) which led to an adverse and erroneous outcome; and (3) involved particular circumstances that suggest ‘gender bias was a motivating factor behind the erroneous finding. Here, Plaintiff does not connect these generalized pressures to his case in a way that creates a reasonable inference that anti-male bias-motivated GMU’s finding that he sexually harassed his students. Thus, as the district court explained, Plaintiff “has provided no basis from which to infer the existence of bias in his specific proceeding.” Further, Plaintiff’s “allegations of selective enforcement are not supported by any well-pled facts that exist independent of his legal conclusions.” Finally, the court explained that while Plaintiff’s research, publishing, and teaching about sex may qualify as matters of public concern, his contested speech veered well outside his teaching and scholarship into areas of private, personal interest. View "Todd Kashdan v. George Mason University" on Justia Law

Defendant a citizen and resident of New Zealand, carried on an online relationship with a thirteen-year-old girl in Virginia that involved several sexually explicit video calls. A federal grand jury charged him with nine counts of producing child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 2251(a). He entered a conditional guilty plea to one of the counts and was sentenced to twenty-one years in prison. Defendant challenged both his conviction and sentence on appeal. He first argued that his conviction involves an impermissible extraterritorial application of Section 2251(a) because he was in New Zealand when the unlawful images and videos were produced. Second, he contends that his conviction violates the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause because he lacked adequate notice that the victim was underage. Third, and finally, he challenges his sentence on the grounds that the district court improperly applied a two-level enhancement for offenses involving “sexual contact.”   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court held that Defendant’s conviction stands as a permissible domestic application of Section 2251(a) because the conduct relevant to the statute’s focus occurred in Virginia, where the visual depiction that forms the basis of Defendant’s conviction was produced and transmitted. Further, the court held that although Defendant argued otherwise, the fact that a violation of Section 2251(a) carries a fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence does not give him a due process right to a reasonable-mistake-of-age defense. Finally, the court held that because Defendant admitted to masturbating during the video calls,it was appropriate for the sentencing court to apply the two-level enhancement. View "US v. Troy Skinner" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sought disability benefits from the Social Security Administration in 2018. He primarily based his application on pain in his lower back, hips, legs, knees, and feet, as well as on hypertension. Throughout the administrative process and upon review in federal district court, Plaintiff was denied benefits. He appealed.   The Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded the district court’s ruling affirming the ALJ’s final decision denying Plaintiff’s application for disability benefits. The court explained that nothing in the record expressly reconciles the differing mobility conclusions between 2018 and 2019, but it seems reasonable to believe that perhaps Plaintiff’s objective ailments worsened during that time, thereby impacting his mobility. To be sure, neither this Court nor an ALJ may infer a medical diagnosis—like symptom progression. But when insufficient evidence prevents an ALJ from soundly determining whether providers’ opinions are consistent, a Section 404.1520b(b)(2) inquiry by the ALJ could remedy the uncertainty with relative ease. Second, the court held that the ALJ improperly considered Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. Third, the court found that the ALJ improperly considered whether Plaintiff’s daily activities were inconsistent with his claim of disability. View "Renard Oakes v. Kilolo Kijakazi" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a federal inmate, brings claims under the Fifth Amendment for money damages against federal prison officials for alleged violations of procedural due process and equal protection. Plaintiff contended his claims are authorized by Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), and its progeny.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The court held that “the Supreme Court has all but closed the door on Bivens remedies” that do not fit within the precise confines of its prior Bivens cases. The court explained that Plaintiff’s claims are brought against a “new category of defendants”—prison officials, as opposed to a former Congressman in Davis—operating in a different legal and factual context (prisoner litigation). Expanding Bivens to these types of claims would likely have “systemwide consequences” for the BOP in the form of increased litigation, and Congress has so far declined to create a damages remedy for these types of actions against federal prison officials.   Further, the court explained that special factors also counsel against extending the Bivens remedy to cover Plaintiff’s claims. First, the court wrote, Plaintiff’s claims would “require scrutiny of new categories of conduct and a new category of defendants—namely, BOP employees involved in transferring inmates and managing the agency’s housing system” and BOP employees involved in inmate discipline and employment, such as through the UNICOR program. Second, Plaintiff’s claims “intersect with the statutory scheme delegating authority over prison designation, transfer, and housing decisions to the BOP,” as well as those governing prison discipline and inmate employment. View "Joseph Mays v. T. Smith" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Wudi Industrial (Shanghai) Co., Ltd. Challenged two adverse rulings made by the district court in favor of defendant Wai L. Wong and his business entity, GT Omega Racing, Ltd. (collectively “GTOR”). Wudi and GTOR are Asian-centered business entities that compete in the marketing of video gaming chairs and other products. In March 2017, Wudi obtained from the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) a registration for the stylized word mark “GTRACING.” For its part, GTOR claimed that it already owned an earlier use of a similar word mark — that is, “GT OMEGA RACING” — and challenged Wudi’s registration of the “GTRACING” word mark in cancellation proceedings before a USPTO component called the Trademark Trial and Appeals Board (the “Board”). In June 2020, the Board ruled in favor of GTOR, concluding that Wudi’s use of the “GTRACING” word mark encroached on GTOR’s earlier use of its own “GT OMEGA RACING” word mark.   The Fourth Circuit vacated the challenged rulings and remanded. The court agreed with Wudi’s primary contention that the district court’s challenged rulings constitute awards of injunctive relief in favor of GTOR and against Wudi. Secondly, the court also agreed that the challenged rulings failed to comport with the applicable Rules of Civil Procedure and controlling precedent. The court emphasized that the First Order possesses all of the necessary attributes and thus qualifies as an injunction order. That is, the First Order contains “clear, enforceable directives” and threatens Wudi with contempt for noncompliance. View "Wudi Industrial (Shanghai) Co., Ltd. v. Wai Wong" on Justia Law