Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

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Between September 2021 and January 2022, agents from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, along with local law enforcement in Sanford, North Carolina, coordinated controlled buys of narcotics using a confidential informant (CI). The CI purchased drugs from various individuals, including the appellant, Brian Thomas Bright. The CI primarily interacted with Keyonta McDougald, who facilitated drug buys from Bright. Bright also directed William Samuel Pergerson to assist in drug transactions. Bright and seven others were indicted for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute fentanyl, methamphetamine, heroin, and cocaine.The United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina sentenced Bright to 97 months of imprisonment after he pled guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute fentanyl. The Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) calculated Bright’s base offense level as 26, with a three-point enhancement for a managerial role under the United States Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines) § 3B1.1(b). Bright objected to the enhancement, arguing that his criminal activity involved fewer than five participants. The district court overruled the objection, finding that the three-level enhancement was appropriate due to the extent of Bright’s involvement in the conspiracy.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and found that the district court committed procedural error by not making the necessary findings regarding the scope of the criminal activity and the number of participants involved, as required by Guidelines § 1B1.3 and United States v. Evans. The Fourth Circuit vacated Bright’s sentence and remanded the case for resentencing, instructing the district court to make the requisite particularized findings or determine if the criminal activity was "otherwise extensive." View "US v. Bright" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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Plaintiffs, representing West Virginia Parents for Religious Freedom and others, filed a lawsuit challenging West Virginia's mandatory vaccination requirement for children, claiming it violates the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. The law mandates immunizations for children attending public, private, or parochial schools, with medical exemptions but no religious exemptions. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief against state health officials.The United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia applied the Pullman abstention doctrine, deciding not to resolve the Free Exercise claim and staying the case. The court reasoned that a recent state law, the Equal Protection for Religion Act (EPRA), might impact the vaccination mandate and should be interpreted by state courts first. The district court denied the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and granted the defendants' motion to abstain.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court erred in applying the Pullman abstention doctrine because the plaintiffs' claim did not present an unclear issue of state law requiring interpretation. The court emphasized that federal courts have a duty to exercise their jurisdiction and that abstention is only appropriate in special circumstances. The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's abstention ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings, including addressing the defendants' arguments regarding Ex Parte Young and Article III standing, and if necessary, resolving the Free Exercise claim. View "West Virginia Parents for Religious Freedom v. Christiansen" on Justia Law

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Felix Jacobo Salomon-Guillen, a native of El Salvador, entered the United States in 2009 on an O-3 visa as the spouse of Lucia Parker Salomon, a recording artist who later became a naturalized citizen. Salomon-Guillen became a permanent resident and managed his wife's music career. In 2013, he began working as a marketing director for a book publisher and engaged in a fraudulent scheme that cost the company $1.4 million. He was indicted for wire fraud, pleaded guilty, and was sentenced to 18 months in prison.The government sought to remove Salomon-Guillen from the country due to his aggravated felony conviction. He conceded removability and applied for adjustment of status and an inadmissibility waiver. The immigration judge denied his applications, finding that he failed to demonstrate that his removal would cause "extreme hardship" to his wife or mother, both U.S. citizens. The judge also concluded that Salomon-Guillen did not merit a waiver or adjustment of status as a matter of discretion due to the severity of his fraud offense.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the immigration judge's decision. The BIA, with Temporary Appellate Immigration Judge Denise G. Brown participating, found that Salomon-Guillen failed to show that his wife would suffer extreme hardship if she accompanied him to El Salvador. The BIA also agreed that he did not merit a waiver or adjustment of status as a matter of discretion.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the regulation allowing temporary Board members to serve six-month terms did not preclude their reappointment for additional terms. The court also found that it lacked jurisdiction to review the BIA's discretionary denial of the inadmissibility waiver. Consequently, the petition for review was denied in part and dismissed in part. View "Saloman-Guillen v. Garland" on Justia Law

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Matthew Ryan Hunt was charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which prohibits individuals convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year from possessing firearms. Hunt's 2017 conviction for breaking and entering in West Virginia served as the predicate offense. In May 2022, Hunt pleaded guilty without raising a Second Amendment challenge. On appeal, Hunt argued that § 922(g)(1) violated the Second Amendment both facially and as applied to him. He also contended that the district court erred in applying a four-point enhancement to his offense level under the federal sentencing guidelines.The United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia accepted Hunt's guilty plea and applied the four-point enhancement, finding that Hunt had fired a gun inside an apartment building during a domestic violence incident, which constituted wanton endangerment under West Virginia law. Hunt appealed the decision, arguing that the statute was unconstitutional and that the district court's factual findings were erroneous.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court reaffirmed that § 922(g)(1) is facially constitutional, consistent with its prior decision in United States v. Canada. The court also rejected Hunt's as-applied challenge, holding that neither the Supreme Court's decisions in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen nor United States v. Rahimi abrogated the Fourth Circuit's precedent foreclosing as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(1). Additionally, the court concluded that § 922(g)(1) would survive Second Amendment scrutiny even if decided anew.The Fourth Circuit also upheld the district court's application of the four-point enhancement, finding no clear error in the factual determination that Hunt fired a gun in the apartment. Consequently, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "US v. Hunt" on Justia Law

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The case involves a class action lawsuit against Bojangles’ Restaurants, Inc. by several plaintiffs who allege that the company required them to perform unpaid off-the-clock work and made unauthorized edits to their time records. The plaintiffs, who worked as shift managers, claim that Bojangles violated its own policies and the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) by not compensating them for all hours worked, including overtime.The United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina conditionally certified a collective action for the FLSA claims and later certified class actions for state wage-and-hour law claims in North Carolina and South Carolina. The district court found that the proposed classes met the requirements for numerosity, commonality, and predominance under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. The court relied on the fact that most class members worked opening shifts and were subject to Bojangles’ Opening Checklist, which allegedly required pre-shift work. The court defined the classes broadly to include all shift managers who worked at Bojangles in North Carolina or South Carolina within three years of the complaint.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s certification order. The appellate court found that the district court abused its discretion by employing an overly general approach in identifying the policies that allegedly unified the class members’ claims and by creating overly broad class definitions. The Fourth Circuit held that the district court failed to provide specific evidence of a common policy that mandated off-the-clock work and time-record edits for all class members. The court vacated the certification order and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the district court to refine the class definitions and ensure that common questions predominate over individualized issues. View "Stafford v. Bojangles' Restaurants, Inc." on Justia Law

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In early 2022, Abel Gaspar, Jr. and his co-defendant, Sergio Emmanuel Cervantes Moran, sold methamphetamine to undercover officers on multiple occasions. On January 26, Gaspar delivered 111 grams of methamphetamine to a confidential source in a Walmart parking lot. On February 15, Gaspar sold 419 grams of methamphetamine to a DEA officer in Raleigh. On February 25, Gaspar was pulled over for speeding and fled, leaving behind 2,002 grams of methamphetamine, a firearm, and other drugs. On May 4, officers arrested Moran and searched Gaspar’s home, finding more drugs, cash, and firearms.The United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina sentenced Gaspar after he pled guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine. The presentence investigation report recommended a downward variance to 210 months’ imprisonment. Gaspar requested a further reduction to 120 months, arguing he participated in the conspiracy out of fear for his family’s safety due to threats from Moran. The district court sentenced Gaspar to 188 months, considering the seriousness of the offense, his criminal history, and mitigating factors including his family support and childhood exposure to drugs.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed Gaspar’s appeal, in which he argued that the district court failed to adequately address his claim of duress. The Fourth Circuit found that the district court had considered Gaspar’s argument, noting the court’s acknowledgment of the presentencing memorandum and the bench conference where Gaspar’s concerns were discussed. The court concluded that the district court’s explanation was sufficient and affirmed the 188-month sentence, finding it procedurally reasonable. View "United States v. Gaspar" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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Jerry L. Blankenship applied for living miner benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act, claiming he suffered from coal dust-induced pneumoconiosis and was totally disabled. An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found Blankenship entitled to a rebuttable presumption of total disability due to pneumoconiosis under 30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(4) and determined that his former employer, Island Creek Coal Company, failed to rebut this presumption. Consequently, Blankenship was awarded benefits. The Benefits Review Board affirmed the ALJ’s decision.Island Creek petitioned for review, arguing that the ALJ improperly conflated the presence of pneumoconiosis and disability causation with the separate total disability analysis. Additionally, Island Creek contended that the ALJ failed to adequately explain his decision to credit the opinions of Blankenship’s medical experts over those of Island Creek’s experts.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and agreed with Island Creek. The court found that the ALJ improperly relied on the presence of pneumoconiosis and the causation of Blankenship’s impairment in concluding that he was totally disabled. The court also determined that the ALJ failed to provide a sufficient explanation for crediting the medical opinions of Drs. Nader and Green over those of Drs. McSharry and Sargent, violating the duty of explanation under the Administrative Procedure Act.The Fourth Circuit granted Island Creek’s petition for review, vacated the decision of the Benefits Review Board, and remanded the case with instructions for the Board to return Blankenship’s case to the ALJ for reconsideration consistent with the court’s opinion. View "Island Creek Coal Co. v. Blankenship" on Justia Law

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The American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of South Carolina (ACLU-SC) challenged the South Carolina Department of Corrections (SCDC) policy that prohibits personal contact interviews with inmates. ACLU-SC sought to record and publish interviews with death row inmate Marion Bowman, Jr., and another inmate, Sofia Cano, for a series of audio podcasts and written pieces. The SCDC policy, however, forbids such interviews. ACLU-SC filed a lawsuit alleging that the policy violates the First Amendment both facially and as applied to its planned interviews.The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina dismissed ACLU-SC’s complaint for failure to state a claim and denied its request for a preliminary injunction. The district court found that ACLU-SC has no First Amendment right to access prison inmates to conduct interviews for publication. The court relied on Supreme Court precedents that reject a claimed right to access and interview inmates, concluding that the Constitution does not mandate a right of access to government information or sources of information within the government’s control.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Fourth Circuit held that ACLU-SC has no First Amendment right to interview and record SCDC inmates, as the policy does not place the press in any less advantageous position than the public generally. The court also rejected ACLU-SC’s facial challenge to the policy, finding that the policy does not prohibit a substantial amount of protected speech relative to its plainly legitimate sweep. The court concluded that the district court correctly dismissed ACLU-SC’s complaint and did not abuse its discretion in denying the preliminary injunction. View "American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of South Carolina v. Stirling" on Justia Law

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The case involves Andris Pukke, Peter Baker, and John Usher, who were found liable for violations of the Federal Trade Commission Act, the Telemarketing Sales Rule, and a permanent injunction from a prior fraud case. They were involved in a real estate scam, selling lots in a development called "Sanctuary Belize" through deceptive practices. The district court issued an equitable monetary judgment of $120.2 million for consumer redress, imposed an asset freeze, and appointed a receiver.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland found the defendants liable after a bench trial and issued permanent injunctions against them. The court also held them in contempt for violating a prior judgment in a related case, ordering them to pay the same $120.2 million in consumer redress. The defendants appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, except for vacating the monetary judgment to the extent it relied on FTC Act Section 13(b).The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision to maintain the receivership and asset freeze. The court held that the receivership and asset freeze were necessary to effectuate the injunctive relief and ensure that the defendants did not continue to profit from their deceptive practices. The court also found that the contempt judgment supported maintaining the receivership and asset freeze until the judgment was satisfied. The court emphasized the defendants' history of deceptive conduct and the need for a professional receiver to manage and distribute the assets to defrauded consumers. The judgment was affirmed. View "Federal Trade Commission v. Pukke" on Justia Law

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The plaintiffs in this case are retail pet stores, a dog broker, and a dog breeder who want to sell dogs through physical retail stores in Maryland. However, a Maryland law restricts their ability to do so. The plaintiffs sued, alleging that the Maryland statute is preempted by the federal Animal Welfare Act (AWA) and violates the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint, concluding that they failed to state plausible claims. The plaintiffs then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.The Fourth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the AWA does not preempt the Maryland statute because the AWA expressly contemplates state and local regulation on the same subject. The court also found that the Maryland statute does not pose an impermissible obstacle to achieving the purposes and objectives of the AWA.Regarding the Commerce Clause claims, the court held that the Maryland statute does not discriminate against interstate commerce in purpose or effect. The statute applies equally to in-state and out-of-state breeders and brokers, and it does not prohibit the flow of interstate goods or place added costs upon them. The court also found that the statute does not violate the Pike balancing test because the plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege that the statute imposes a substantial burden on interstate commerce that is clearly excessive in relation to its putative local benefits.In conclusion, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' complaint, holding that the Maryland statute is not preempted by the AWA and does not violate the Commerce Clause. View "Just Puppies, Inc. v. Brown" on Justia Law