Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) deported Petitioner, a permanent resident of the United States, since he was six years old, because the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA or the Board) deemed his altercation with the police an aggravated felony. Because of that designation, Petitioner was not allowed back into the United States. In 2018, the Supreme Court ruled that the type of offense Petitioner committed no longer qualified as an aggravated felony. Learning of that decision in 2019, Petitioner moved the BIA to reconsider its original removal order and to equitably toll the usual thirty-day deadline for filing such motions in view of the legal change. The BIA declined. It did not dispute that Petitioner is entitled to be readmitted into the country, but it rejected Petitioner’s request to toll the limitations period, believing him insufficiently diligent in discovering his rights.   The Fourth Circuit held that it has jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Court vacated the Board’s diligence determination, remanding to the BIA to consider the second prong of the equitable-tolling inquiry—whether the change in the law constituted an extraordinary circumstance—as well as the merits of Petitioner’s claim. The court explained that because the BIA determined Petitioner was not diligent, it did not consider whether Johnson and Dimaya presented an extraordinary circumstance that would warrant equitable tolling. View "Damien Williams v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought suit against Defendant the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (“Amtrak”), alleging that Amtrak suspended and subsequently terminated him based on his race in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. Section 1981. Following discovery, Amtrak moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted. Plaintiff appealed.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the district court properly granted summary judgment to Amtrak because Plaintiff failed to present a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Amtrak suspended and terminated him based on race. The court reasoned that Amtrak “considers insubordination a terminable offense due to its severity and adverse impact in the workplace.” As such, Plaintiff did not demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether he satisfactorily performed his job duties. Further, Plaintiff did not show that he was treated differently than other similarly situated employees outside his protected class. View "Duncan Giles v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation" on Justia Law

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) deported Petitioner Petitioner, a permanent resident of the United States since he was six years old, because the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA or the Board) deemed his altercation with the police an aggravated felony. Because of that designation, Petitioner was not allowed back into the United States, not even to visit. He would spend the next eleven years in Jamaica, working mostly for room and board, his U.S.-citizen mother, siblings, girlfriend, and children affording only a handful of trips to see him. In 2018, the Supreme Court ruled that the type of offense Petitioner committed no longer qualified as an aggravated felony. Learning of that decision in 2019, Petitioner moved the BIA to reconsider its original removal order and to equitably toll the usual thirty-day deadline for filing such motions in view of the legal change. The BIA declined. It did not dispute that Petitioner is entitled to be readmitted into the country, but it rejected Petitioner’s request to toll the limitations period, believing him insufficiently diligent in discovering his rights.   The Fourth Circuit held that it has  have jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision and that it must review it de novo. And the Court vacated the Board’s diligence determination, remanding to the BIA to consider the second prong of the equitable-tolling inquiry—whether the change in the law constituted an extraordinary circumstance—as well as the merits of Petitioner’s claim. View "Damien Williams v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law

A 90-year-old North Carolina law makes it a crime to publish a “derogatory report” about candidates for public office where the speaker “know[s] such report to be false or” acts “in reckless disregard of its truth or falsity.” N.C. Gen. Stat. Section 163-274(a)(9). Plaintiffs asserted this statute violates the First Amendment. The district court denied a preliminary injunction because it determined plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on the merits.   The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s order and remanded for further proceedings. The court reasoned that the district attorney offered no examples of this Act’s “legitimate applications”—much less applications unrelated to speech—nor has she shown any such applications should mitigate the Court’s concerns about the law’s chilling effects on truthful speech during political campaigns. Second, even assuming the Act reaches only false statements and that Garrison’s seeming approval of certain criminal libel statutes remains good law, the Court would still conclude this Act fails constitutional scrutiny because it draws impermissible content-based distinctions in identifying which speech to criminalize. View "Juliette Grimmett v. Nancy Freeman" on Justia Law

This case asks whether a town’s alleged policy that bans video livestreaming certain interactions with law enforcement violates the First Amendment. It also asks whether a police officer who, during a traffic stop, attempted to stop a passenger from livestreaming the encounter may be successfully sued under Section 1983. Plaintiff sued under Section 1983. He sued the officers in their official capacities—effectively suing the Town of Winterville—for allegedly having a policy that prohibits recording and livestreaming public police interactions in violation of the First Amendment. He also sued an Officer in his individual capacity. The district court awarded Defendants judgment on the pleadings after finding that the policy did not violate the First Amendment. The court dismissed the individual-capacity claim.   The Fourth Circuit vacated in part and affirmed in part. The court reasoned that Plaintiffs seeking redress under Section 1983 for a violation of their constitutional rights must walk through a narrow gate. The doctrines of qualified immunity and Monell liability for local governments substantially diminish their chances. Here, faithful application of the doctrines leads to divergent results. Plaintiff’s has sufficiently alleged that the Town has a policy barring livestreaming one’s own traffic stop that violates the First Amendment. He must now show this policy exists. And, if it does, the Town will have the chance to prove that it does not violate the First Amendment. On the other hand, although the Officer was allegedly acting under the policy that plausibly violates the First Amendment, Plaintiff’s claim against him in his personal capacity fails. View "Dijon Sharpe v. Winterville Police Department" on Justia Law

At issue is whether the Commonwealth of Virginia would recognize a divorce granted by a foreign nation to its own citizens when neither spouse was domiciled in that nation at the time of the divorce. The question arises from Petitioner’s marriage to a woman after the woman and another man — both Ghanaian citizens — divorced pursuant to Ghanaian customary law. At the time of the divorce, the woman and man were lawful permanent residents of the United States, and neither was present or domiciled in Ghana. Based on his marriage to the woman, Petitioner became a lawful permanent resident of the United States. But when Petitioner applied to become a naturalized citizen, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) determined that he and the woman were not validly married. USCIS reasoned that under controlling Virginia law, the Commonwealth would not recognize a divorce granted by a nation where neither spouse was domiciled at the time of the divorce. Petitioner sought a review of the decision in the district court, which granted summary judgment to USCIS. Petitioner then brought this appeal.   The Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded with instructions to grant Petitioner’s naturalization application. The court concluded as a matter of comity, Virginia would recognize this otherwise valid divorce granted by a foreign nation to its own citizens, regardless of the citizens’ domicile at the time. The court explained it rejected only USCIS’s argument that pursuant to present Virginia law, the Commonwealth would refuse to recognize a divorce granted by a foreign nation to its own citizens simply because neither was domiciled in the foreign nation at the time of the divorce. View "Michael Adjei v. Alejandro Mayorkas" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with numerous child pornography crimes. The district court denied Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized from his residence. After a jury later convicted Defendant on all counts, the court sentenced Defendant to a term of 240 months imprisonment and to a life term of supervised release. As part of Defendant’s supervised release, the court imposed special conditions, including prohibitions against (1) viewing sexually explicit images of minors, (2) engaging in employment or volunteer activities with access to computers, (3) viewing adult pornography, and (4) using any video game system that would allow communication with other people. On appeal, Defendant argued that the initial warrant authorizing a search of his residence was overbroad and that, therefore, the district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress the evidence seized from his residence. He also contends that the court procedurally and substantively erred by imposing a 240-month term of imprisonment and the above-stated special conditions of supervised release.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment with respect to the denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress, his term of imprisonment, and the special condition of supervised release that prohibits Defendant from viewing sexually explicit images of minors. However, the court held that the district court erred by failing to explain the other challenged special conditions of supervised release. The court, therefore, vacated these conditions as procedurally unreasonable, and remand that portion of Defendant’s sentence to the district court for further consideration. View "US v. Christopher Sueiro" on Justia Law

Plaintiff claimed Atlas Box and Crating Company, fired him because of his race. Allen filed charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission against Atlas and the staffing agency, and concedes he received right-to-sue letters by August 8, 2018. Plaintiff, acting pro se, delivered four documents to the clerk of the district court. The applications were stamped “filed” and entered as filed motions on the district court’s electronic docket. On November 8, 2018—92 days after Plaintiff received the right-to-sue letters—a magistrate judge recommended denying the motions for relief from the filing fee. Four days after Plaintiff paid the filing fee and 131 days after he received the right-to-sue letters—the district court directed the clerk to file Plaintiff’s complaint. Eight months later, the district court granted summary judgment for Defendants on the ground that Plaintiff’s action was time-barred. The district court concluded Plaintiff was not entitled to equitable tolling.   The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment. The court held that Plaintiff commenced this action within the statutory period by timely delivering a complaint to the district court clerk. Because he did so, no consideration of equitable tolling is necessary. The court held that an action under federal law is commenced for limitations purposes when a plaintiff delivers a complaint to the district court clerk—regardless of whether the plaintiff pays the filing fee, neglects to do so, or asks to be excused from the fee requirement. View "Andrew Allen v. Atlas Box and Crating Co., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was an inmate at Sussex I State Prison (SISP) in 2017. A female correctional officer at SISP charged Plaintiff with a disciplinary offense, alleging that he directed lewd behavior toward her in the prison showers. Plaintiff denied the allegation, contending that security-camera footage would vindicate him. Subsequent to what Plaintiff alleged was a defective disciplinary-hearing process, prison officials found that he committed the offense and transferred him to a maximum-security facility. Based on the defects that Plaintiff perceived in the hearing process and subsequent transfer, he commenced a pro se civil action, levying a procedural due process claim and a First Amendment retaliation claim against Defendants collectively, the “Prison Officials”). The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s procedural due process claim, then granted summary judgment—pre-discovery—in favor of the Prison Officials on the remaining First Amendment retaliation claim. Defendant appealed.   The Fourth Circuit reversed. The court held that the district court abused its discretion by granting summary judgment pre-discovery. Plaintiff properly received a Roseboro notice, explaining his rights to file competing affidavits and other evidence in response to the Prison Officials’ pre-discovery summary judgment motion. Plaintiff failed to respond with such evidentiary filings—or with a Rule 56(d) affidavit. But the district court was on fair notice of potential disputes as to the sufficiency of the summary judgment record. Accordingly, the court wrote that Plaintiff plausibly alleged a violation of his procedural due process rights such that dismissal at the pleading stage was inappropriate. Pre-discovery summary judgment on his First Amendment retaliation claim was likewise inappropriate. View "Emmanuel Shaw v. T. Foreman" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a cardiothoracic surgeon, sued another cardiothoracic surgeon, Defendant, alleging that his remarks about her performance during an aborted surgery defamed her. On summary judgment, the district court determined that Defendant’s statements—that Plaintiff “misread” or “failed to recognize” the findings on the patient’s echocardiogram before beginning surgery—were not false, as Plaintiff admitted she did not read the echocardiogram at all before operating. The district court, therefore, concluded the statements could not be actionable under North Carolina law.   The Fourth Circuit vacated the summary judgment order. The court disagreed with the district court’s appraisal on summary judgment. The court explained that to say that Plaintiff “misread” the echocardiogram presupposes that she read it in the first place, which she did not. And the defamatory sting of Defendant’s statements—that Plaintiff either lacked skill in applying her medical judgment to interpret the echocardiogram or deviated from the standard of care by failing to evaluate the echocardiogram results before operating—presents a conclusion about which the parties, and the evidence, sharply disagree. For these reasons, the district court erred in finding no dispute of material fact as to the falsity of Defendant’s statements. View "Barbara Robinson v. John Williams" on Justia Law