Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case involves Austin Kyle Lee, who was found guilty of several federal drug and firearm offenses. After serving over four years in a New York prison for selling cocaine, Lee was released in late 2015 and moved to North Carolina, where he resumed selling drugs. A search of his residences revealed distribution quantities of a fentanyl–heroin mixture, cocaine, and marijuana; handguns and ammunition; packaging material; and over $200,000 in cash. A federal grand jury returned a superseding indictment charging Lee with multiple offenses, including conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute one kilogram or more of heroin, five kilograms or more of cocaine, and a quantity of marijuana, among others.The district court found Lee guilty on all counts. The court also found additional facts that increased Lee’s mandatory minimum sentence for those crimes. Lee appealed, arguing that this judicial factfinding violated his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. The Government agreed but contended that the district court’s procedural error was harmless because proof of the relevant facts was overwhelming and uncontroverted.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court agreed with the Government that any procedural error in the district court’s determination that the serious drug felony enhancement applied to increase Lee’s statutory sentencing range was harmless. The court noted that Lee conceded that, under existing law, the judge could decide the fact of his prior conviction without a jury. Furthermore, the Government’s proof of the other two elements—concerning the duration and recency of his incarceration for that offense—was overwhelming and uncontroverted. View "United States v. Lee" on Justia Law

The case involves Donald Herrington, who was charged with multiple counts of perjury, obtaining money by false pretenses, filing false or fraudulent income tax returns, failure to file an income tax return, and drug possession. Herrington chose to represent himself in court, waiving his right to counsel. He was eventually convicted on several charges and sentenced to twelve years' imprisonment. Herrington appealed his conviction, arguing that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated and that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to bring two meritorious arguments on direct appeal.The case was initially heard in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, which rejected Herrington's arguments and denied his petition. Herrington then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions. The court found that Herrington knowingly, unequivocally, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel, thus affirming that aspect of the district court's decision. However, the court agreed with Herrington that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that the jury was erroneously instructed on the requirements for a conviction for failure to file a tax return. The court reversed this part of the district court's decision and remanded the case with instructions to issue a writ of habeas corpus unless Herrington is afforded a new state court appeal in which he may raise this claim. View "Herrington v. Dotson" on Justia Law

The case involves Bestwall, LLC, a company that filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in November 2017. The company sought to establish a trust to pay current and future asbestos-related claims against it. As part of this process, Bestwall requested all persons with pending mesothelioma claims against it to complete a personal injury questionnaire. Several individual claimants and the Official Committee of Asbestos Claimants objected to this request. The bankruptcy court granted Bestwall's motion and ordered all current mesothelioma claimants to complete the questionnaire. Some claimants, represented by the law firm of Maune, Raichle, Hartley, French & Mudd, LLC, filed a lawsuit in Illinois seeking an injunction to prevent Bestwall from enforcing the questionnaire order. In response, Bestwall moved in the bankruptcy court to enforce the order.The bankruptcy court held the claimants and their law firm in contempt for violating the questionnaire order. The court later sanctioned them jointly and severally in the amount of $402,817.70 for fees and expenses Bestwall incurred in defending the Illinois lawsuit and enforcing the questionnaire order. The claimants and their law firm appealed both the contempt order and the sanctions order to the district court, which dismissed the appeals for lack of jurisdiction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. The court held that the contempt and sanctions orders were not final appealable orders because they did not terminate a procedural unit separate from the remaining bankruptcy case. The court noted that in normal civil litigation, a party may not immediately appeal a civil contempt order or attendant sanctions but must wait until final judgment to appeal. The same rule applies in bankruptcy, except the relevant final judgment may be a decree ending the entire case or a decree ending a discrete proceeding within the bankruptcy case. The court concluded that the contempt and sanctions orders did not terminate a procedural unit separate from the remaining bankruptcy case, and therefore, they were not final appealable orders. View "Blair v. Bestwall, LLC" on Justia Law

The case involves David Thurston, a registered sex offender, who moved to Avery County, North Carolina, where Kevin Frye served as Sheriff and Lee Buchanan was the Deputy in charge of sex-offender registrations. Thurston informed Sheriff Frye that he had been invited to his nephew’s wedding in Spokane, Washington, and sought advice on how to comply with the law and asked for permission to attend the wedding. Sheriff Frye gave Thurston permission to travel and instructed him to email a copy of his Washington visitor-registration form within ten days of his arrival. However, while Thurston was away, the Sheriff’s Office mailed his verification form. Thurston contacted Sheriff Frye for guidance, but Sheriff Frye never responded. Deputy Buchanan began investigating Thurston and obtained a warrant alleging three different criminal violations. Thurston was arrested upon his return to North Carolina.The United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina denied the officers' motion for summary judgment, arguing that they were entitled to qualified immunity because their arrest of Thurston did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights. The officers appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that Thurston’s arrest was unconstitutional and that the officers failed to prove that they acted objectively reasonably in seeking Thurston’s arrest warrant. The court also concluded that the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity because Thurston’s right to be free from unlawful arrest was clearly established. View "Thurston v. Frye" on Justia Law

This case revolves around the appointment of a general registrar of elections in Lynchburg, Virginia. The plaintiff, Christine Gibbons, was appointed as registrar in 2018 by a board consisting of two Democrats and one Republican. Her term expired in 2023, at which point the board had two Republican members and one Democratic member. The board informed Gibbons that she would have to reapply for her position. Despite reapplying, the two Republican members voted to appoint a different candidate who was a registered Republican. Gibbons sued the board and its two Republican members, alleging that the decision not to reappoint her was based on her political affiliation, which she claimed violated the First Amendment.The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, asserting that sovereign immunity barred all of Gibbons’ claims. The district court dismissed Gibbons’ claims against the board itself as barred by sovereign immunity, but denied the individual board members’ motions to dismiss. The court concluded that the board members could be sued for equitable relief in their official capacities and for damages in their personal capacities. The board members appealed both orders.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the appellants’ motions to dismiss. The court rejected the board members’ argument that sovereign immunity bars Gibbons’ claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against them in their official capacities. The court also rejected the board members’ assertion that Gibbons’ damages claims against them are barred by sovereign immunity. The court concluded that individual members of Virginia electoral boards may be sued in their official capacities for equitable relief under Ex parte Young and that Gibbons’ claims for damages against the board members in their personal capacities are not barred by sovereign immunity. View "Gibbons v. Gibbs" on Justia Law

Antonio Davis, who was serving a 210-month prison sentence for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute heroin, petitioned the district court for compassionate release due to his elevated risk of severe COVID-19 and a change in the law regarding his career offender status. The district court denied his request, concluding that Davis was not due compassionate release based on his susceptibility to COVID-19 and did not fully consider each of Davis’s arguments.Davis was indicted on charges of conspiracy to distribute and conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute heroin in January 2013. He pled guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute heroin in June of that year. Davis received a career offender enhancement because he had previously been convicted of certain other offenses and because the offense at issue here was a “controlled substance offense” at the time of conviction. In February 2021, Davis filed a pro se motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), arguing that he was uniquely susceptible to the potential spread of COVID-19 due to his type-2 diabetes and hypertension. He also argued that a recent court decision invalidated his career offender Guidelines designation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed in part, vacated and remanded in part the district court's decision. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Davis failed to show extraordinary and compelling reasons for release based on the pandemic. However, the court found that the district court did not properly address Davis’s arguments regarding intervening changes in law and rehabilitation. Therefore, the court vacated the district court’s denial of compassionate relief and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Davis" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a consent decree that was negotiated by the parties and previously approved by the district court. The decree prohibits the Receivership Estate of ERP Environmental Fund, Inc. from conducting surface coal mining at certain sites unless it is necessary for and incidental to reclamation of the site. The question presented is whether that prohibition also applies to a third-party permit transferee of a specific site—the Chestnut Oak Surface Mine in Lincoln County, West Virginia. The district court held that it did, stating that all third-party permit transferees are bound by the terms of the consent decree.The consent decree originated from a 2011 citizen suit under the Clean Water Act and the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act. The plaintiffs alleged that now-defunct Patriot Coal Corporation and three of its subsidiaries violated federal environmental laws by discharging excessive amounts of selenium in connection with its surface mining operations. To resolve the litigation, the parties negotiated a consent decree, which the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia approved.In 2020, ERP ran out of money and ceased all operations. As a result, a West Virginia state court appointed Doss Special Receiver, LLC to administer ERP’s Receivership Estate. In 2022, the Receiver sought to finance its administration of the Receivership Estate by authorizing third parties to surface mine at a former Patriot Coal facility—the Buck Fork Surface Mine. The Conservation Groups intervened, arguing that such surface mining would violate Paragraph 63 of the Decree. The district court agreed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's decision and remanded the case with instructions. The court held that the district court's interpretation of the consent decree could not be squared with the plain text of the decree. The court found that the consent decree's prohibition on surface mining did not apply to a third-party permit transferee of a specific site. The court concluded that neither Paragraph 24 nor Paragraph 25 of the decree would bind a third-party permit transferee of the Chestnut Oak Surface Mine to Paragraph 63's prohibition on surface mining, a prohibition that expressly applies only to ERP and its Affiliated Companies. View "West Virginia Highlands Conservancy v. ERP Environmental Fund, Inc" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Ronald Lee Morgan, who filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy in North Carolina. Morgan owned a home jointly with his wife as tenants by the entirety. He sought to exempt this home from the bankruptcy estate to the extent of his outstanding tax debt to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). However, the bankruptcy court disallowed the exemption. Morgan's wife did not jointly owe the debt to the IRS and did not file for bankruptcy. The trustee of the bankruptcy estate objected to Morgan's claim for an exemption, arguing that under North Carolina state law, tenancy by the entireties property is generally exempt from execution by creditors of only one spouse, but this rule does not apply to tax obligations owing to the United States.The bankruptcy court sustained the trustee's objection, and on appeal, the district court affirmed this decision. Morgan then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, arguing that for his IRS debt to override the entireties exemption, the IRS must have obtained a perfected tax lien on the property prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition.The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling. The court concluded that Morgan's interest in his home as a tenant by the entirety is not "exempt from process" under "applicable nonbankruptcy law." The court rejected Morgan's argument that the IRS must have actually obtained a lien prior to the bankruptcy filing, stating that the absence of a judgment or lien has no bearing on the hypothetical issue of whether the debtor's interest would be exempt from process. The court also dismissed Morgan's contention that the IRS must perfect a lien against his property before he filed for bankruptcy. The court concluded that nothing in the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Craft limits its holding to instances where the IRS has perfected a tax lien against the property. View "Morgan v. Bruton" on Justia Law

A West Virginia law, known as the "Save Women's Sports Act," stipulates that athletic teams or sports designated for females, women, or girls shall not be open to students of the male sex, with "male" defined as an individual whose biological sex determined at birth is male. The law was challenged by a 13-year-old transgender girl, B.P.J., who has been taking puberty-blocking medication and has publicly identified as a girl since the third grade. B.P.J. argued that the law violated the Equal Protection Clause and Title IX by preventing her from participating in her school's cross country and track teams.The United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia initially granted a preliminary injunction, allowing B.P.J. to participate in her school's sports teams. However, upon review of cross-motions for summary judgment, the court reversed its decision, rejecting B.P.J.'s claims and ruling that the law was constitutional and did not violate Title IX.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit disagreed with the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that the law could not lawfully be applied to prevent B.P.J. from participating in her school's sports teams. The court found that the law's sole purpose and effect were to prevent transgender girls from playing on girls' teams, which was not substantially related to an important government interest. The court also found that the law violated Title IX by treating B.P.J. worse than people to whom she was similarly situated, depriving her of any meaningful athletic opportunities, and doing so on the basis of sex. The court dismissed the cross-appeal, vacated in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case with instructions to enter summary judgment for B.P.J. on her Title IX claims. View "B.P.J. v. West Virginia State Board of Education" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the convictions of seven members of the "36th Street Bang Squad" gang. The gang members were charged with racketeering conspiracy, murder, attempted murder, and related crimes, following a string of murders, attempted murders, and assaults in 2015 and 2017. The defendants appealed, raising several issues including challenges to the classification of their racketeering offenses as crimes of violence, the denial of their motions to exclude testimony of three forensic experts, and the denial of their motions for judgment of acquittal and for a mistrial. The court found no reversible error and affirmed the convictions. The court also held that an attempt offense qualifies as a crime of violence if the completed offense invariably requires the use of physical force. View "United States v. Hunt" on Justia Law