Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case involves TBL Licensing, LLC, commonly known as Timberland, and its attempt to register certain features of its popular boot design as trade dress under the Lanham Act. The United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) refused to register the design, concluding it was not distinctive. Timberland appealed to the federal district court, which agreed with the USPTO and added that the design was impermissibly functional. The district court granted the USPTO's motion for summary judgment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the district court did not err in concluding that the subset of design features that Timberland sought to register lacked distinctiveness in the public's view. The court did not decide on the issue of functionality. The court emphasized that the question was not whether the public recognizes the entire product as Timberland's boot, but whether the specific design features that Timberland sought to register have acquired a distinctive meaning in the public's view. View "TBL Licensing, LLC v. Vidal" on Justia Law

In 2018, Maryland State Trooper Kevin Caraballo used force while arresting 15-year-old Cameron Lewis. Lewis sued Caraballo for excessive force and battery. Caraballo sought summary judgment, arguing he was entitled to qualified and statutory immunity. The district court denied his motion, leading to this appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that there were disputes of material fact that precluded summary judgment. Specifically, a reasonable jury could find that Caraballo struck Lewis when the teenager did not pose a threat, was not actively resistant, and was subdued. The court held that Lewis’s constitutional right to be free from excessive force in the form of head strikes was clearly established at the time of his arrest. Furthermore, the court held that there was a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Caraballo’s actions amounted to gross negligence or malice, precluding summary judgment in his favor on his statutory immunity defense. View "Lewis v. Caraballo" on Justia Law

The case involves Jerod Montrel Askew, who was convicted of various crimes related to drug trafficking, including two counts of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. Askew appealed his convictions on several grounds, including erroneous jury instructions, insufficient evidence to support a guilty verdict for the firearm-related convictions, an abuse of discretion in offering a sua sponte jury instruction about the legality of the search warrants, and an abuse of discretion in denying his motion for a mistrial after the prosecution referred to his invocation of the right to counsel during closing arguments.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia had previously denied Askew's motions for a new trial and for a judgment of acquittal. Askew was sentenced to a total term of 198 months of imprisonment and five years of supervised release.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed Askew’s conviction. The court found no error in the jury instructions, no insufficiency in the evidence supporting the firearm-related convictions, no abuse of discretion in the district court's sua sponte jury instruction about the legality of the search warrants, and no abuse of discretion in denying Askew's motion for a mistrial. The court concluded that the prosecution's brief remark about Askew's invocation of his right to counsel did not amount to impermissible exploitation. View "United States v. Askew" on Justia Law

The case involves Vanda Pharmaceuticals, a drug manufacturer, and the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS). Vanda challenged a 2020 regulation by CMS that expanded the definition of a "line extension" drug under the Medicaid Drug Rebate Program. This program requires drug manufacturers to reimburse Medicaid if they increase their prices faster than inflation. A "line extension" drug, which is a new formulation of an existing drug, can also be liable for price increases of the original drug. Vanda argued that the regulation expanded the definition of a line extension beyond what the Medicaid statute permitted.Previously, the district court granted summary judgment to CMS, disagreeing with Vanda's argument. The court held that the agency's regulation was within the bounds of the Medicaid statute.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that the agency's definitions of "line extension" and "new formulation" were within the Medicaid statute's ambit. It also held that the agency's interpretation of the oral-solid-dosage-form requirement was not contrary to law. The court rejected Vanda's argument that the agency's rulemaking process was arbitrary and capricious, finding that the agency had reasonably considered the relevant issues and explained its decision. View "Vanda Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services" on Justia Law

The case involves Darryl Colton Frazer, who was convicted and sentenced on drug and firearm offenses in 2023 in the District of Maryland. The charges stemmed from an incident in 2019 when Frazer was stopped by police officers who had reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop. Frazer had thrown away a black bag just before he was apprehended, which was later found to contain a firearm and approximately 100 grams of marijuana. Frazer unsuccessfully moved to suppress this evidence, arguing that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to stop him and that they needed a warrant to search the bag.The District Court rejected Frazer's suppression effort, ruling that the police officers had reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop and could constitutionally search the bag that Frazer had discarded. Frazer was subsequently convicted for three offenses and sentenced to 72 months in prison. He appealed, challenging the denial of his suppression motion and the court’s failure to give a reasonable doubt instruction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop Frazer, based on his headlong flight and noncompliance with the officers' commands. The court also ruled that Frazer had voluntarily abandoned his bag, and thus lacked Fourth Amendment standing to challenge the search. Regarding the reasonable doubt instruction, the court held that the district court was not required to define reasonable doubt to the jury, and thus did not abuse its discretion by declining to give the instruction. View "United States v. Frazer" on Justia Law

The case involves six non-citizens who were indicted for illegally reentering the U.S. following their prior removal, a violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. They moved to dismiss their indictments on the ground that § 1326 is unconstitutional because it was enacted with a racially discriminatory purpose. The district court rejected their argument, finding that they had not shown racial discrimination was a motive for enacting § 1326.The defendants argued that the 1929 Act, which was one of § 1326’s predecessor offenses, was enacted with racial animus against Mexican and Central American immigrants, and this animus carried forward to the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA” or “1952 Act”) which enacted § 1326. The district court disagreed, stating that even if the 1929 Act had racist motivations, the case for racial bias with respect to the 1952 Act and § 1326 was much weaker, as they were focused on economic factors, labor market factors, and national security factors.Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court, holding that the defendants had not shown that § 1326 violates the equal protection guarantee of the Fifth Amendment because it was enacted with a racially discriminatory purpose. The court found that the defendants had not carried their burden of showing that racial bias against Mexican and Central American immigrants was “a motivating factor” for Congress when it enacted § 1326 in 1952. View "United States v. Sanchez-Garcia" on Justia Law

The case involves Saleh Shaiban, a Yemeni national who entered the U.S. in 1999 using a false passport and B-2 visitor visa. He was eventually granted asylum in 2006. He subsequently applied for adjustment of status to U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), which was denied on terrorism grounds. Shaiban appealed the decision but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over his appeal and dismissed it.Shaiban initially applied for asylum in December 2000, but his application was denied in 2002. He appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which also dismissed his appeal. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit remanded his case to a new Immigration Judge for a de novo hearing, which resulted in his asylum grant.In 2008, Shaiban applied for permanent residence. USCIS put his case on hold in 2013 due to terrorism-related grounds of inadmissibility under the Immigration and Nationality Act. In 2018, USCIS denied his application after determining that his participation in certain Yemeni organizations qualified as terrorist activities.Shaiban filed a suit under the Administrative Procedures Act to compel adjudication of his application for permanent residence. He argued that the government was collaterally estopped from denying his application since his previous asylum grant had determined that the terrorism bar did not apply. However, the district court granted the government’s motion for summary judgment, leading to Shaiban’s appeal to the Fourth Circuit.The Fourth Circuit declared that it lacked jurisdiction to hear Shaiban's case, pointing to 8 U.S.C. § 1252, which identifies when courts of appeals have jurisdiction to review claims from noncitizens, and 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b), which states that the decision to adjust the status of a noncitizen granted asylum lies in the discretion of the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Attorney General of the United States. The court determined that the plain language of the statutes and the Supreme Court’s precedential interpretation in Patel v. Garland led to the conclusion that the court did not have jurisdiction over Shaiban’s appeal. View "Shaiban v. Jaddou" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ruled on a case involving a plaintiff, Joann Ford, and a healthcare provider, Sandhills Medical Foundation, Inc. Ford, a former patient of Sandhills, alleged negligence, breach of implied contract, invasion of privacy, and breach of confidentiality against Sandhills for failure to protect her personally identifying information (PII). Her PII was stolen from Sandhills' third-party computer system in a cyberattack after she had ceased being a patient.The district court had previously granted Sandhills immunity from the suit, concluding that the theft of Ford's PII arose out of Sandhills' performance of “medical, surgical, dental, or related functions,” as per 42 U.S.C. § 233(a), thus substituting the United States as the defendant. However, the Fourth Circuit Court disagreed with the lower court's interpretation of § 233(a).The appellate court determined that data security does not fall under a “related function” within the meaning of the statute. The court emphasized that § 233(a) immunity applies when alleged damages arise from the provision of healthcare, which was not the case here. Ford’s injury did not arise from Sandhills’ provision of healthcare, but from a data security breach that occurred at least a year after she ceased being a patient at Sandhills.Therefore, the court concluded that Sandhills was not immune from the suit under § 233(a) and that the United States could not be substituted as the defendant. The case was vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Ford v. Sandhills Medical Foundation, Inc." on Justia Law

This case was heard in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and concerns the electoral boundaries of Senate Districts 1 and 2 in eastern North Carolina. The plaintiffs, two North Carolina voters, filed a lawsuit against the North Carolina State Board of Elections and state officials, alleging that the boundaries of these districts violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA). They sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the use of these districts in the 2024 elections and requested the adoption of new districts that they had drawn. The District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina denied the request for a preliminary injunction. The plaintiffs then appealed the decision.The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the district court. The appellate court concluded that the plaintiffs had not shown a clear likelihood of success on the merits of their VRA claim, nor had they demonstrated that they would suffer irreparable harm without the injunction. The court also found that the balance of equities favored the defendants, and that an injunction would not serve the public interest. Moreover, the court noted that granting the injunction would disrupt the ongoing 2024 Senate elections, which would not be in the public interest. As such, the court concluded that the plaintiffs had not met the high standard necessary for obtaining a preliminary injunction.The key holding of the case is that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a clear likelihood of success on their claim that the boundaries of Senate Districts 1 and 2 in North Carolina violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, and failed to show that they would suffer irreparable harm without a preliminary injunction. Furthermore, granting the injunction would disrupt the ongoing 2024 Senate elections and would not serve the public interest. View "Pierce v. North Carolina State Board of Elections" on Justia Law

In a case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, a private school, Concordia Preparatory School, was sued by a student and her mother for alleged violations of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, which prohibits sex-based discrimination in federally-funded educational programs. The plaintiffs claimed that the school's tax-exempt status under 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) constituted federal financial assistance, thus making it subject to Title IX.The school moved to dismiss the claim, arguing that it did not receive federal financial assistance and was therefore not subject to Title IX. The district court denied the school's motion, agreeing with the plaintiffs that the school's tax-exempt status constituted federal financial assistance for Title IX purposes. However, the court certified an interlocutory appeal on this issue.Upon review, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed with the district court's interpretation. The appellate court reasoned that while tax exemption is a benefit, it is not equivalent to "receiving Federal financial assistance" as required by Title IX. The court explained that the term "assistance" implies aid, help, or support, which suggests a grant of funds. Tax exemption, however, is merely the withholding of a tax burden rather than an affirmative grant of funds. Furthermore, the court distinguished tax exemption from the indirect receipt of federal funds as was the case in Grove City College v. Bell.As such, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's decision and held that tax-exempt status does not equate to "receiving Federal financial assistance" for purposes of Title IX. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Buettner-Hartsoe v. Baltimore Lutheran High School Association" on Justia Law