Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant was sentenced to 330 months in federal prison for the use of a firearm to facilitate a drug offense and for a drug conspiracy. After serving eleven years in prison, Defendant filed his first motion for compassionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 3582(c)(1)(A). Defendant argued that his significant health decline and advanced age justified his release. The district court denied his motion, relying solely upon a now in applicable policy statement, United States Sentencing Guidelines (“Sentencing Guidelines”). The following year, the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) deemed Defendant severely at risk of contracting COVID-19 and placed him in home confinement through authority granted by the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (“CARES Act”). Defendant filed a subsequent motion for compassionate release reiterating his advanced age and severe health conditions. In addition, Defendant presented supplementary arguments that focused on the COVID-19 pandemic, relevant 18 U.S.C. Section 3553(a) factors, the “extreme” nature of his sentence, and his inability to receive government benefits while in home confinement. The district court again denied Defendant’s motion for compassionate release. 
The Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded the district court’s decision with instructions to grant Defendant’s motion for compassionate release. The court concluded that the district court abused its discretion by failing to properly assess the following factors which would warrant Defendant’s compassionate release: his ailing health, advanced age, and relevant 18 U.S.C. Section 3553(a) factors. Had it addressed that evidence, as more fully discussed below, its analysis of whether Defendant is entitled to compassionate release would have likely merited a different outcome. View "US v. Lonnie Malone" on Justia Law

These consolidated cases involve a dispute between Antero Resources Corporation (“Antero”) and a group of landowners (“Lessors”) over the payment of natural gas royalties under several oil and gas leases. The leases permit Antero to extract and sell natural gas owned by the Lessors in exchange for royalty payments. Antero appealed from the district court’s summary judgment order, which held that Antero breached the terms of the leases by deducting certain “post-production costs” from the royalties it paid Lessors and awarded damages. Lessors cross-appeal the district court’s earlier dismissal of their fraud and punitive damages claims against Antero.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment order in part and vacated in part. The court concluded that some of the leases prohibit Antero from deducting any post-production costs from Lessors’ royalties, but other leases—namely, those that contain a “Market Enhancement Clause”—do authorize deductions in certain circumstances. Separately, the court affirmed the dismissal of the fraud and punitive damages claims because Lessors did not plead them with sufficient particularity. View "Gerald Corder v. Antero Resources Corporation" on Justia Law

A real estate development company PEM Entities LLC (PEM), asserts a North Carolina county violated the Federal Constitution and state law by imposing new rules for getting water and sewage services. The district court dismissed the complaint, concluding the company lacked standing to bring its takings and due process claims, its equal protection claim was too insubstantial to raise a federal question, and the court should not exercise jurisdiction over the state law claims once the federal claims were dismissed.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that without a constitutionally protected property interest, PEM’s takings and due process claims fail as a matter of law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of PEM’s takings and due process claims because they fail to state a claim on which relief can be granted. Further, the court concluded the district court was right to dismiss PEM’s equal protection claim but should have done so for failure to state a claim rather than lack of jurisdiction. Thu, having concluded the district court correctly dismissed all of PEM’s federal claims, the court saw no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. View "PEM Entities LLC v. County of Franklin" on Justia Law

Defendant, facing at least 1,054 months in prison for a string of armed robberies, reached a plea agreement and instead was sentenced to 384 months. Soon after, Congress passed the First Step Act, changing the calculations of relevant mandatory minimums. Had Defendant been sentenced after the Act became law, his minimum sentence would have been 168 months, less than half of his current sentence. Yet the district court denied Defendant’s motion for compassionate release in part because it “declined to disturb the parties’ carefully negotiated [plea] agreement.” Defendant appealed, arguing the district court improperly considered the plea deal.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court acted well within its discretion in denying Defendant’s motion for compassionate release. The court agreed with the district court that (1) considering the plea agreement in this context reflected a “respect for the law” and (2) reducing Defendant’s sentence so far below the initial Guidelines range wouldn’t be “just punishment” for Defendant’s crimes.  Accordingly, the district court did not err in refusing to modify Defendant’s sentence. View "US v. Keanan Bond" on Justia Law

Defendant facing at least 1,054 months in prison for a string of armed robberies, reached a plea agreement and instead was sentenced to 384 months. Soon after, Congress passed the First Step Act, changing the calculations of relevant mandatory minimums. Had Defendant been sentenced after the Act became law, his minimum sentence would have been 168 months, less than half of his current sentence. Yet the district court denied Defendant’s motion for compassionate release in part because it “declined to disturb the parties’ carefully negotiated [plea] agreement.” Defendant appealed, arguing the district court improperly considered the plea deal.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed, finding that the district court acted well within its discretion in denying Defendant’s motion for compassionate release. The court explained that the original stacked sentence was properly calculated when imposed. And in any event, the district court’s task in weighing compassionate release “was not to assess the correctness of the original sentence it imposed. Rather, its task was to determine whether the Section 3553(a) factors counseled against a sentence reduction in light of the new, extraordinary circumstances identified.” The district court considered the relevant factors and concluded that the original sentence remained appropriate. Thus, the court wrote, that given its highly deferential standard of review, the district court was well within its purview to deny Defendant’s motion. View "US v. Keanan Bond" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, seeks a review of the denial of his petition for cancellation of removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals determined that Petitioner was ineligible for cancellation of removal because he was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude: identity theft under Virginia law, which explicitly includes “intent to defraud” as an element. Va. Code Ann. Section 18.2-186.3(A)(2). On appeal, Petitioner contends the statute could be—and in his case, was—applied to crimes that don’t involve moral turpitude.   The Fourth Circuit denied the petition for review. The court concluded that subsection (A)(2) of the Virginia identity-theft statute qualifies as a crime involving moral turpitude under 8 U.S.C. Section 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), and that the Board didn’t abuse its discretion in deciding Petitioner’s case in a single-member opinion. The court explained that it found no abuse of discretion in the Board’s decision to assign this case to a single-member panel. The issue was not “complex, novel, or unusual”: It was squarely resolved by the Board’s precedent for crimes with “intent to defraud” as an element. The Board considered (and was unpersuaded) by the argument that Petitioner’s offense was “more akin to deception than fraud,” and the court agreed with its conclusion. Nor is there evidence that the relatively narrow issue of whether subsection (A)(2) of the Virginia statute involved moral turpitude is a “recurring” question before the Board. View "Jose Salazar v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law

Defendant s filed a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(3) motion for relief from the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. Section 2255 motion to vacate his conviction. The district court denied the Rule 60(b)(3) motion and Defendant appealed. He argued that the district court erred in finding that his Rule 60(b)(3) motion, filed three and a half years after the district court’s Section 2255 order, was not entitled to equitable tolling.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed, concluding that Rule 60(b)(3)’s one-year time limit cannot be equitably tolled. The court explained that it recognizes the gravity of the stakes in habeas proceedings. Yet the court does not believe that equitable tolling can apply to motions brought under Rule 60(b)(3). And because Defendant filed his motion more than three and a half years after the applicable district court order, the district court correctly held that his motion was untimely filed. View "US v. Roderick Williams" on Justia Law

Appellee filed suit against two Transportation and Security Administration (“TSA”) officers, (collectively “Appellants”), alleging they violated the First Amendment by prohibiting Appellee from recording a pat-down search and the Fourth Amendment by seizing Appellee and seizing and searching his cell phone. To state a cause of action for damages, Appellee brought his claims pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Appellants moved to dismiss, challenging Appellee’s reliance on Bivens and also asserting qualified immunity as to Appellee’s First Amendment claim. The district court denied Appellants’ motion, recognizing that both claims presented new Bivens contexts but finding that no special factor counseled hesitation in extending Bivens as to either claim.   The Fourth Circuit disagreed with the district court and concluded that Bivens remedies are unavailable in this case. The court explained that as “even a single sound reason to defer to Congress” will be enough to require the court refrain from creating a Bivens remedy, we decline to extend an implied damages remedy pursuant to Bivens against Appellants based on the existence of an alternative remedial structure and/or the interest of national security. And since Appellee has presented no cognizable claim for damages, we need not address Appellants’ qualified immunity defense as to Appellee’s First Amendment claim. Therefore, the court reversed the district court’s denial of Appellants’ motion to dismiss and remanded with instructions to dismiss. View "Dustin Dyer v. Shirrellia Smith" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought suit against Weinstein Management Co., Inc., and WMCI Charlotte XIII, LLC (collectively, Defendants). In relevant part, Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants violated the North Carolina Residential Rental Agreements Act (RRAA), and the North Carolina Debt Collection Act (NCDCA), by charging them out-of-pocket costs for summary ejectment proceedings, including filing fees, service fees, and attorney’s fees (collectively, out-of-pocket expenses). The district court granted Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings on these claims, and Plaintiffs appealed. At issue on appeal is whether he 2021 amendment applies retroactively without violating vested rights, thereby extinguishing Plaintiffs’ RRAA and NCDCA claims.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that here, the 2021 amendment’s text provides that it “is effective when it becomes law and is intended to apply retroactively to all pending controversies as of that date.” The court wrote that given this explicit language from the General Assembly, the intent of the legislature to apply the 2021 amendment retroactively could not be clearer. The North Carolina Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the General Assembly cannot retroactively invalidate common-law rights, which Plaintiffs do not seek to vindicate here. Therefore, the district court was not precluded from applying the 2021 amendment retroactively. View "Tiffany Bass v. Weinstein Management Co., Inc." on Justia Law

Section 20.5 of North Carolina’s 2017 Farm Act contains provisions making it illegal to enter into two types of contractual agreements: (1) any settlement agreement conditioned on an agricultural producer’s union affiliation (the Settlement Provision) and (2) any agreement that would require an agricultural producer to process dues checkoffs for its farmworker-employees (the Dues Provision). The Farm Labor Organizing Committee and others (collectively, FLOC) contend that these prohibitions violate the First Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, and 42 U.S.C. Section 1981. FLOC initiated this action against the Attorney General of North Carolina and the Governor of North Carolina (collectively, the State). The district court held that the Settlement Provision violated the Constitution and so enjoined it, but upheld the constitutionality of the Dues Provision, and then held that neither provision violated Section 1981.   The Fourth Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court as to the Settlement Provision and vacated the accompanying injunction, but affirmed in all other respects. The court explained that a rational basis supports Section 20.5. Agriculture is North Carolina’s largest industry, which makes it a subject of great interest for state legislators. The state also embraces its right-to-work policies and has worked repeatedly to strengthen them. In addition to these general bases for enacting Section 20.5, both challenged provisions respond to discrete legislative concerns. Further, the Settlement Provision prohibits parties from conditioning a settlement agreement on an agricultural producer’s union affiliation. Thus, the court rejected the broad reading advanced by FLOC and adopted by the district court that this statutory provision bars any settlement agreement between an agricultural producer and labor union. View "Farm Labor Organizing Committee v. Joshua Stein" on Justia Law