Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A mother and her three children, all citizens of El Salvador, entered the United States without admission or parole in 2015. The Department of Homeland Security charged them as removable. The mother conceded removability but sought asylum and statutory withholding of removal, claiming persecution based on her membership in two particular social groups: her immediate family and single Salvadoran women. She described two incidents in El Salvador: threats made to her son by a classmate allegedly joining a gang, and an incident where armed gang members forced entry into her home to hide from police, which she believed was due to her status as a single woman.An Immigration Judge denied her applications, finding that the threats to her son did not amount to persecution and that the home invasion, even if it constituted persecution, was not shown to be on account of a protected ground. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed, agreeing that the threats lacked specificity and immediacy and that the home invasion was motivated by the gang members’ need to hide rather than her membership in a particular social group. The BIA also found that the proposed group of single Salvadoran females was not a cognizable social group under asylum law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court determined that it had jurisdiction to consider the petition, following recent Supreme Court guidance that the 30-day filing deadline for petitions for review is not jurisdictional. On the merits, the Fourth Circuit held that substantial evidence supported the BIA’s findings: the incidents described did not establish persecution on account of a protected ground, and the record did not compel a contrary conclusion. The court denied the petition for review, holding that the petitioner was not eligible for asylum or withholding of removal. View "Rivas De Nolasco v. Bondi" on Justia Law

A prisoner at Eastern Correctional Institution was suspected of possessing a knife, prompting two correctional officers to search him. The officers escorted the prisoner and his cellmate to a recreation area, where a strip search occurred. The parties dispute the events that followed: the officers claimed the prisoner was noncompliant and bit one of them during a struggle, while the prisoner alleged he complied with orders and was then violently assaulted without justification, suffering injuries to his head, neck, and back. Medical records documented a bruise and other injuries, and the prisoner sought treatment over several months. An internal investigation cleared the officers of wrongdoing.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland dismissed the prisoner’s state law claims and claims against a supervisory official, then granted summary judgment to the correctional officers on the remaining Eighth Amendment excessive force claim. The district court found that the undisputed evidence did not support a finding that the officers acted maliciously or sadistically, and characterized the prisoner’s injuries as minor. The court also denied the prisoner’s requests for discovery and for appointment of counsel.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the grant of summary judgment de novo. The Fourth Circuit held that genuine disputes of material fact remained regarding the amount and justification for the force used, as well as the officers’ intent. The court found that the prisoner’s verified complaint and medical evidence could support a finding of more than de minimis force and potentially malicious conduct. The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, allowing the prisoner to renew his motion for counsel and proceed to trial. View "Escobar-Salmeron v. Moyer" on Justia Law

A woman from El Salvador, after her husband fled to the United States due to gang threats, was subjected to repeated extortion and threats of violence, including sexual extortion, by gang members who targeted her because she was a woman living alone with her children. Despite seeking help from local police, she was told to comply with the gang or flee. After enduring escalating threats and payments, she eventually fled to the United States with her children.Upon arrival, she retained an attorney to represent her in her asylum proceedings. She informed her attorney of both the financial and sexual extortion she faced, but he failed to include the sexual extortion in her application and proposed a legal theory for asylum based on a particular social group (PSG) that was foreclosed by existing precedent. The immigration judge, sitting in the Immigration Court, found the proposed PSG not cognizable and denied her claim, concluding the gang’s motivation was financial rather than based on group membership. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed, adopting the immigration judge’s reasoning and denying her appeal.Represented by new counsel, she moved to reopen her case before the Board of Immigration Appeals, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) and proposing alternative, plausible PSGs. The Board denied the motion, finding no IAC and concluding her harm was not due to a protected characteristic. She then petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit for review.The Fourth Circuit held that noncitizens who retain counsel in removal proceedings have a Fifth Amendment right to a fundamentally fair hearing, which can be violated by ineffective assistance of counsel. The court found her original attorney’s performance objectively unreasonable and prejudicial, as alternative PSGs could have led to a different outcome. The court granted the petition for review, reversed the Board’s denial of her motion to reopen, vacated the denial of her asylum and withholding claims, and remanded for a new hearing. View "Guandique-De Romero v. Bondi" on Justia Law

After a high-speed police chase in Colonial Heights, Virginia, Melvin Myrick abandoned a crashed vehicle and fled on foot. Law enforcement officers recovered significant quantities of methamphetamine and cocaine, drug paraphernalia, and three loaded firearms from the car. Documents in the vehicle linked Myrick to the scene, and he was later identified and arrested. A federal grand jury initially indicted him for possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, and a superseding indictment later added two firearms charges and expanded the drug charge to include cocaine.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia managed the pretrial proceedings, during which Myrick changed counsel, filed motions to suppress evidence, and requested continuances, resulting in various delays. On the day his trial began, Myrick moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the government violated the Speedy Trial Act by not commencing trial within the required 70 days. The district court denied the motion, finding that excludable periods of delay brought the trial within the statutory timeframe. The jury convicted Myrick on all counts, and the court sentenced him to 270 months’ imprisonment, at the bottom of the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed Myrick’s challenges to the denial of his Speedy Trial Act motion, aspects of his sentencing, and the sufficiency of the evidence for one firearms charge. The Fourth Circuit held that the district court correctly excluded certain periods of delay under the Speedy Trial Act, making the trial timely. The court also found no error in the application of sentencing enhancements, the calculation of criminal history points, or the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the firearms conviction. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Myrick" on Justia Law

Law enforcement in Onslow County, North Carolina, identified an individual as the leader of a White supremacist gang and conducted surveillance on his residence. After stopping vehicles leaving the residence and finding drugs, cash, and paraphernalia, officers obtained and executed a search warrant, recovering firearms, drugs, and related items. The individual was indicted for possession of a firearm by a felon and later for conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine and heroin. He pleaded guilty to these charges, first without a plea agreement and then with one. While detained awaiting sentencing, he was involved in smuggling drugs into jail and assaulted sheriff’s deputies, leading to an additional federal indictment for assaulting persons assisting federal officers.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina accepted his guilty pleas after thorough Rule 11 colloquies. After discovery revealed that the government had initially provided an incomplete copy of the search warrant affidavit, the defendant moved to withdraw his first two guilty pleas, arguing the omission rendered his pleas unknowing and involuntary and that he lacked competent counsel. The district court held an evidentiary hearing, found the missing pages immaterial, and denied the motion. At sentencing, the court also denied a reduction for acceptance of responsibility due to the defendant’s post-plea conduct and imposed a downward variant sentence of 300 months’ imprisonment, below the advisory Guidelines range.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s rulings. The court held that the incomplete search warrant affidavit was not material to the defendant’s decision to plead guilty, that he had the close assistance of competent counsel, and that the district court did not err in denying credit for acceptance of responsibility or in imposing the sentence. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "United States v. Milam" on Justia Law

The case concerns a challenge to an executive order issued by the President in January 2025, which established the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) and required federal executive agencies to create internal DOGE Teams with broad IT access to agency systems. Plaintiffs, consisting of several professional organizations and individuals, alleged that granting such access to DOGE-affiliated employees would expose their personally identifiable information in violation of the Privacy Act and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). They sought to enjoin the Department of Education, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), and the Department of the Treasury from providing this access.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland initially granted a temporary restraining order, and later a preliminary injunction, halting the agencies’ DOGE Teams from accessing the IT systems. The government appealed the preliminary injunction to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which stayed the injunction pending appeal. During the appeal, the Supreme Court stayed a similar injunction in a related case involving the Social Security Administration.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision under an abuse of discretion standard. The Fourth Circuit held that the district court erred in its analysis of the plaintiffs’ likelihood of success on the merits, particularly by failing to account for the cumulative difficulty plaintiffs faced in prevailing on multiple independent legal issues necessary for relief. The appellate court found that plaintiffs likely lacked standing, and even if standing existed, there were substantial unresolved questions regarding final agency action, the adequacy of remedies under the APA, and whether the Privacy Act’s exceptions applied. The Fourth Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "American Federation of Teachers v. Bessent" on Justia Law

The defendant, while incarcerated at a federal correctional institution in Petersburg, Virginia, created and possessed obscene visual depictions of the sexual abuse of children. Correctional officers discovered these materials during a routine search of his cell, and the defendant admitted to making and possessing them. He was charged under 18 U.S.C. § 1466A(a)(1) and (b)(1), which criminalize such conduct when committed within the special territorial jurisdiction of the United States.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia conducted a bench trial after the defendant waived his right to a jury. At trial, the government presented evidence that the defendant’s conduct occurred at FCI Petersburg and argued that the prison’s status as federal territory was a legal question for the court. The district court found the government had not established an interstate commerce basis for jurisdiction but concluded that FCI Petersburg was within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, relying on the federal government’s practical usage and dominion over the facility. The court took judicial notice of this status and convicted the defendant. The defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing insufficient proof of federal jurisdiction, but the court denied the motion and imposed a 180-month sentence.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that, while the government must prove to the factfinder where the offense occurred, the legal status of that location as within federal jurisdiction is a question for the court, based on legislative facts that may be judicially noticed. However, the Fourth Circuit found that the district court applied the wrong legal standard by not fully analyzing the statutory requirements for federal territorial jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 7(3). The appellate court vacated the conviction and remanded for the district court to properly determine FCI Petersburg’s jurisdictional status. View "United States v. Perez" on Justia Law

In the summer of 2020, Maurice Wells participated in a protest outside the Alamance County courthouse in North Carolina, which focused on issues including solidarity with George Floyd and opposition to the local sheriff. During the protest, a confrontation occurred between Wells and counterprotestors over the ringing of a courthouse bell. Sheriff Terry Johnson, concerned about escalating tensions, ordered the crowd to disperse. When Wells refused to comply and continued shouting, Johnson arrested him. Wells was subsequently charged with failure to disperse and disorderly conduct. He was convicted in North Carolina District Court after the judge rejected his First Amendment defense, and his appeal of that conviction remains pending.While his state criminal appeal was ongoing, Wells filed a civil suit against Sheriff Johnson, alleging that his arrest was unconstitutional and constituted retaliation for protected speech. He sought only a declaratory judgment stating that the arrest violated his First Amendment rights, arguing that such a declaration would address both past and potential future harms. Johnson removed the case to the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina. The district court granted summary judgment for Johnson, holding that Wells’s state conviction established probable cause and precluded his claims, and that Wells lacked evidence for his alternative theory of viewpoint discrimination. The court dismissed the case with prejudice.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed whether Wells had standing to seek the declaratory relief requested. The Fourth Circuit held that Wells lacked standing because the declaratory judgment he sought would not provide constitutionally adequate redress for his alleged injuries, either past or future. The court vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case with instructions to return it to state court, as required when federal jurisdiction is lacking in a removed case. View "Wells v. Johnson" on Justia Law

A group of employees at a wealth management firm in Richmond, Virginia, decided to leave their employer and establish a competing business. These employees, who had access to proprietary client information, had signed employment agreements with their former employer that included non-solicitation and confidentiality clauses. The agreements also addressed the industry-wide Protocol for Broker Recruiting, which generally allows departing financial advisors to take certain client information and solicit former clients if specific procedures are followed. However, the agreements stated that their terms would control over the Protocol in the event of any conflict. After resigning, the employees formed a new firm and began contacting their former clients, resulting in the loss of hundreds of accounts and significant assets for their previous employer.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia granted a preliminary injunction in favor of the former employer, barring the former employees and their new firm from contacting former clients or using confidential information. The district court found a strong likelihood of success on the merits of the trade secrets claims against all defendants, reasoning that even under the Protocol, the defendants’ conduct constituted impermissible “raiding.” The court also found that the employer would likely suffer irreparable harm and that the balance of equities and public interest favored injunctive relief.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s interpretation of the Protocol and the employment agreements. The Fourth Circuit held that the Protocol’s “raiding” exception applies only to actions by outside firms targeting another firm’s employees, not to employees leaving to form their own business. The court concluded that the employment agreements, not the Protocol, governed the former employees’ conduct and supported the injunction against them. However, because the new firm was not a party to those agreements, the injunction as to the new firm was vacated. Thus, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the injunction against the former employees but vacated it as to the new firm. View "Salomon & Ludwin, LLC v. Winters" on Justia Law

Residents and businesses in Lumberton, North Carolina, experienced severe flooding during Hurricanes Matthew and Florence in 2016 and 2018. The flooding was exacerbated by a gap in the city’s levee system, which existed because a CSX Transportation rail line crossed the area. The City of Lumberton had previously entered into a licensing agreement, known as the Tri-Party Agreement (TPA), with CSX’s predecessor and a local drainage district. The TPA allowed the City to construct and maintain an earthen dike across CSX’s property and, under certain conditions, to close the dike in the event of imminent flooding. However, the City never built the dike. When the hurricanes approached, the City sought permission from CSX to close the gap with emergency sandbags, but CSX refused, resulting in significant flood damage.The plaintiffs, representing a putative class of affected residents and businesses, brought suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, asserting contract and tort claims against CSX. The district court dismissed the tort claims as preempted by federal law and initially dismissed the contract claim, finding the plaintiffs were not intended third-party beneficiaries of the TPA. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the dismissal of the contract claim, allowing it to proceed. After discovery, the district court granted summary judgment to CSX on three alternative grounds: federal preemption, lack of third-party beneficiary status, and failure to show breach of contract.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the grant of summary judgment de novo. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment on the ground that the plaintiffs could not show CSX breached the TPA. The court held that, because the earthen dike contemplated by the TPA was never constructed, CSX had no contractual obligation to allow closure of the gap by other means, such as sandbags. The judgment was affirmed. View "Edwards v. CSX Transportation, Inc." on Justia Law