Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant pleaded guilty in 2011 to possessing a firearm in furtherance of a “crime of violence” in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c), with the underlying crime of violence being VICAR assault with a dangerous weapon. Since his conviction, the Supreme Court has narrowed the kinds of crimes that can support a Section 924(c) conviction. At issue is whether VICAR assault with a dangerous weapon is still one of them.   The Fourth Circuit upheld Defendant’s conviction and found that VICAR assault with a dangerous weapon remains a valid crime-of-violence predicate. The court explained that the VICAR statute makes it a crime to commit any of the statute’s enumerated offenses “in violation of the laws of any State or the United States.” The court explained that it has interpreted this language to mean that one element of a VICAR conviction is that the defendant committed the enumerated federal offense, and another is that the defendant’s conduct violated an independent state or federal law. The court wrote that the federal assault with a dangerous weapon easily qualifies as a crime of violence. That this element of VICAR assault with a dangerous weapon qualifies as a crime of violence is sufficient in and of itself to render the offense a crime of violence; we need not progress to the state-law predicates. The court explained that to require courts to “look through” the VICAR offense to the underlying state crimes in every instance would unnecessarily send them on a scramble through innumerable state laws across the circuit. View "US v. Dearnta Thomas" on Justia Law

Defendant was sentenced to 123 months’ imprisonment followed by a five-year term of supervised release after pleading guilty to drug distribution and firearms charges. At the sentencing hearing, the judge told Defendant that he would be “subject to the standard conditions” of supervised release “as adopted in the Eastern District of North Carolina.” However, the subsequent written judgment contained several special conditions of supervised release not mentioned in the oral pronouncement. These were no minor alterations. One special condition forbade Defendant from opening new lines of credit without permission. Another stipulated Defendant’s consent to warrantless searches of his person or his home whenever his probation officer saw fit. Defendant sent the district court a letter indicating his desire to appeal—223 days after the entry of judgment in his case and long after Rule 4(b)’s deadline had expired. The government promptly moved to dismiss his appeal as untimely.   The Fourth Circuit granted the government’s motion to dismiss. The court explained that in United States v. Rogers, 961 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2020), the addition of such unpronounced conditions is an error that violates the defendant’s right to be present at sentencing. When a defendant timely appeals a Rogers error, the court must vacate the sentence and remand for the defendant to be sentenced anew. However, here, Defendant filed his notice of appeal well outside the time limits imposed by Rule 4(b) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. The court held that defendants who raise Rogers errors are not excused from the usual timeliness rules for filing a notice of appeal. View "US v. Gregory Brantley" on Justia Law

Petitioner petitioned for a writ of mandamus, alleging that the district court has unduly delayed holding a consolidated trial on the merits of her claims and a hearing on her motion for preliminary injunction.   The Fourth Circuit denied the petition. The court explained that after reviewing the petition and the record of the district court proceedings, that either of these latter two factors support the granting of a writ of mandamus. The court explained that in the petition, Petitioner refered to her right to a “prompt evidentiary hearing” and, alternatively, to her “clear and indisputable right to expedited treatment of her PI motion” She asserted that this right is rooted in a statute, 28 U.S.C. Section 1657(a), as well as Rule 40 and Rule 65(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The court wrote that none of the sources entitle Petitioner to a trial prior to the currently scheduled trial date of December 11, 2023. To be sure, Section 1657(a) requires the district court in this case to “expedite the consideration of” Petitioner’s PI motion, and Rule 40 similarly requires the district court to “give priority” to that motion. But the record in this case, despite Petitioner’s protestations to the contrary, establishes that the district court has repeatedly attempted to do so. View "In re: Caryn Strickland" on Justia Law

After the district court denied Petitioner’s initial 28 U.S.C. Section 2254 petition, he obtained new counsel and filed a motion to reopen that judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). He argued that exceptional circumstances warranted this relief because his original Section 2254 counsel had, in effect, abandoned him by submitting a Section 2254 petition that omitted several potentially meritorious issues and inadequately presented the issues that had been raised. He asked the court to reopen the judgment and allow him to file additional briefings and new claims. The district court concluded that Petitioner’s motion was not a true Rule 60(b) motion. Rather, Petitioner was attempting to use Rule 60(b) to circumvent the statutory limits placed on second or successive Section 2254 petitions. Recognizing that it would lack jurisdiction to consider a second Section 2254 petition, the district court denied Petitioner’s motion without considering its merits. Petitioner appealed.   The Fourth Circuit agreed with the district court’s conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Petitioner’s Rule 60(b) motion because he effectively sought to file a second or successive Section 2254 petition, something that a district court cannot authorize. The court also wrote that because it also concludes that the district court should have dismissed Petitioner’s motion rather than deny it, it vacated the district court’s order and remanded with instructions to dismiss. View "Steven Bixby v. Bryan Stirling" on Justia Law

While representing a client, Jane Roe , Appellant attorney John Doe engaged in settlement negotiations with the University of Maryland Medical System (UMMS). The negotiations between Doe and UMMS proceeded poorly. Among other things, Doe also made any settlement between Roe and UMMS contingent on his personal receipt of an additional $25 million that would effectuate his retention by UMMS as a private consultant of sorts. A grand jury indicted Doe, charging him with attempted extortion in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sections 1951 and 1952. Shortly thereafter—at the government’s request—the grand jury issued multiple subpoenas duces tecum to the lawyers and firms that assisted in Doe’s representation of Roe—and in the formation of the alleged extortion scheme. Doe and Roe moved to quash the subpoenas. That court then granted in part a subsequent motion filed by the government to compel production. Doe and Roe now appealed asking the court to reverse the district court’s orders first denying their motions to quash and then compelling production.The Fourth Circuit dismissed the appeal as to Doe for lack of appellate jurisdiction and otherwise affirmed. The court held that it lacks jurisdiction to consider Doe’s arguments given the Supreme Court’s effective narrowing of the Perlman doctrine. The court otherwise affirmed discerning no reversible error and ordered the parties must proceed to comply with the disputed subpoenas duces tecum in accordance with the district court’s order compelling production and this opinion. View "In re: Grand Jury 2021 Subpoenas" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sought to enjoin the state from enforcing only this additional, preliminary handgun-licensure requirement. The district court originally dismissed that challenge for lack of Article III standing, but we reversed and remanded for a decision on the merits. On remand, the district court again rejected Plaintiffs’ claims, this time holding that Maryland’s handgun licensure law did not violate the Second Amendment. So Plaintiffs appealed once more.   The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision. The court explained that the challenged law restricts the ability of law-abiding adult citizens to possess handguns, and the state has not presented a historical analogue that justifies its restriction; indeed, it has seemingly admitted that it couldn’t find one. The court enjoined the enforcement explaining that under the Supreme Court’s new burden-shifting test for these claims, Maryland’s law fails. The court wrote that Maryland has not shown that this regime is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. There might well be a tradition of prohibiting dangerous people from owning firearms. But, under the Second Amendment, mechanism matters. And Maryland has not pointed to any historical laws that operated by preemptively depriving all citizens of firearms to keep them out of dangerous hands. View "Maryland Shall Issue, Inc. v. Wes Moore" on Justia Law

After committing armed robbery with an unidentified accomplice, Defendant pled guilty to Hobbs Act robbery and a firearm charge pursuant to an agreement with the government. At sentencing, the district court warned that Defendant’s decision to name his accomplice would be a “critical part” of its sentencing determination. When Defendant declined to name his accomplice, the district court imposed a sentence at the top of Carter’s Sentencing Guidelines range. On appeal, Defendant asserted that the district court violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination by imposing a harsher sentence due to his failure to identify his accomplice and drawing adverse inferences from that failure. He further alleged that this Fifth Amendment violation rendered his sentence procedurally and substantively unreasonable.   The Fourth Circuit granted the government’s motion to dismiss Defendant’s appeal to the extent he challenges the reasonableness of his sentence. The court explained that the district court had no substantial reason to believe that Defendant’s identification of his accomplice would be incriminating beyond the plea itself. Defendant was asked to name his accomplice in specific conduct for which he had already been convicted or received immunity in his federal case and for which his state charges were dismissed.   The court explained that Defendant’s self-incrimination concerns would have merited further analysis had he raised them before the district court. But he did not, and the district court was left without any substantial reason to believe that Defendant’s identification of his accomplice was likely to be incriminating. Defendant’s reliance on the Fifth Amendment privilege comes too late. Thus, his Fifth Amendment challenge fails. View "US v. Richard Carter" on Justia Law

After Petitioner illegally reentered the United States, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) reinstated the removal order previously entered against him. Petitioner expressed fear of returning to his native country and was placed in withholding only proceedings. The immigration judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals denied relief, and Petitioner petitioned the court for review within 30 days of the Board’s decision.   The Fourth Circuit dismissed the petition. The court held that the INA deprives the court of jurisdiction to resolve Petitioner’s petition for judicial review. The court wrote that Petitioner did not file his petition within 30 days of any final order of removal, and precedent dictates that the statutory filing deadline is jurisdictional. Further, the court noted that the pendency of his withholding-only proceedings did not extend his time to file. So his petition for review was untimely. View "Jose Martinez v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, former pretrial detainees in Prince George’s County, Maryland, appealed from the district court’s denial of their motion for a preliminary injunction. The detainees sought an injunction that would require the County to release them, and others similarly situated, on the ground that the County’s pretrial-release program violates the Due Process Clause. The district court denied the motion without stating its factual findings and legal conclusions.   The Fourth Circuit vacated. The court explained that the detainees’ motion for a preliminary injunction presented the district court with a disputed factual record and a difficult, fact-bound constitutional question. Thus, the district court had to explain the factual findings and legal conclusions that supported its determination that the preliminary injunction should be denied. Yet it only made generalized comments about the difficulty of deciding. So it violated Rule 52(a)(2). Further, the court wrote that it will disregard a Rule 52(a)(2) error and reach the merits of the district court’s preliminary-injunction order only if there is a record sufficient “to enable us to pass upon the questions involved.” However, there isn’t one here. View "Robert Frazier v. Prince George's County, Maryland" on Justia Law

Four inmates at the Buckingham Correctional Center in Dillwyn, Virginia, commenced this action pro se against agents of the IRS, alleging that the IRS unlawfully denied them all or part of their COVID-19 stimulus payments. The complaint alleged that the IRS was categorically denying payments to inmates on account of their incarcerated status. The four inmates contended that the IRS had “violated their Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and equal protection of the law,” and they sought an injunction requiring the IRS to disburse the proper payments to them. The four inmates filed a motion to amend it by adding five additional inmates with the same claims. The three inmates whose claims were severed from the original action filed these appeals, challenging the legal and factual underpinnings of the district court’s order. They contend that the district court erred both in applying Section 1915(b)(1) as they were not proceeding in forma pauperis and in making factual findings that were not supported by the record.   The Fourth Circuit vacated the court’s order severing Plaintiffs’ claims and its order denying amendment and remanded. The court explained that Section 1915(b)(1), by its explicit terms, is restricted to in forma pauperis actions. The court wrote that because Plaintiffs here did not proceed in forma pauperis, the court should not have construed Section 1915(b)(1) and applied it to them, and it was an error to have done so. View "Aaron Ellis v. Daniel I. Werfel" on Justia Law