Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, a native and citizen of El Salvador, has twice traveled unlawfully into the United States — first in 2012, and again in 2016. In both instances, Petitioner fled threats to his life, and attacks were carried out against him by the 18th Street Gang and the Salvadoran police. After seeking protection from removal before an immigration judge (the “IJ”) in 2016, Petitioner was afforded relief — in the form of asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (the “CAT”) — by three separate IJ rulings. On each occasion, the Board of Immigration Appeals (the “BIA”) reversed the IJ rulings. Petitioner, for his part, was removed to El Salvador in May 2022 and has awaited further developments in these proceedings from his home country. In this appeal, Petitioner challenged and sought reversal of three rulings made by the BIA.   The Fourth Circuit granted Petitioner’s petition for review and reverse the BIA rulings in part, affirm them in part, and vacate them in part. The court otherwise remanded to the BIA for such further proceedings. The court explained that the BIA declined to “interact seriously” with the record before it in reviewing Petitioner’s claim for CAT protection, and its failure in that regard requires a remand. Petitioner’s evidence, to be certain, is strongly supportive of his CAT claim — he has, after all, already been subjected to “cruel and inhuman treatment” after being initially removed to El Salvador. But the court declined to resolve whether Petitioner is entitled to CAT protection. Instead, the court vacated the BIA’s 2021 Reversal Order with respect to its CAT ruling and remanded for the BIA to fully and properly assess Petitioner’s CAT claim in the first instance. View "Christian Santos Garcia v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). The immigration judge (“IJ”) denied his application, explaining that while he had left El Salvador because of a genuine fear of gangs, neither he nor his family had had any encounters with gang members. Because the basis for his fear was simply a “generalized” fear of criminal gang members and violence in El Salvador, the IJ found that he was ineligible for relief.On appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), Petitioner argued that he had proceeded pro se before the IJ and that the IJ had failed to develop the record, as required by Quintero v. Garland, 998 F.3d 612, 622 (4th Cir. 2021). The BIA concluded, however, that the IJ had fulfilled the requirements of Quintero and affirmed.The Fourth Circuit affirmed, finding that the BIA's conclusions were not legally erroneous or lacked evidentiary support. View "Jose Trejo Tepas v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner is an alien who challenges Exxon Mobil Corporation’s hiring policy as discriminatory. Petitioner received deferred deportation and eligibility for temporary work authorization under the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrival program. While a student at North Carolina State University, Petitioner was recruited by ExxonMobil for an internship. Petitioner told ExxonMobil that he is not a United States citizen, but erroneously represented that he had permanent work authorization under federal law. Petitioner was hired on this basis. However, when he presented his paperwork, it showed he lacked permanent work authorization, and ExxonMobil rescinded its offer.Petitioner claims that ExxonMobil’s policy discriminates against aliens as prohibited by 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1981. ExxonMobil filed a motion to dismiss, which the district court granted.The Fourth Circuit affirmed. Section 1981 only protects against intentional discrimination, and Petitioner failed to allege that ExxonMobil intentionally discriminates against aliens. While ExxonMobil’s policy requiring that applicants have permanent work authorization will only exclude aliens, discriminatory impact is not enough. And, given ExxonMobil’s policy, Petitioner did not plausibly allege that ExxonMobil intended to discriminate against aliens. View "Aldo De Leon Resendiz v. Exxon Mobil Corporation" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a package delivery driver for United Parcel Service, Inc. (“UPS”), injured his hip and buttocks. He requested he be allowed to drive his route with a smaller truck that would have a softer suspension or, alternatively, that he be assigned to an “inside job.” However, UPS determined that Plaintiff's route required a larger truck and there were no openings for inside work; thus, UPS offered Plaintiff an unpaid leave of absence until he could return to work.Plaintiff filed a claim, asserting that UPS’s refusal to provide him with the accommodations he requested violated his rights under the ADA. The district court granted summary judgment to UPS, concluding, as a matter of law, that Plaintiff had not shown that the accommodations he requested were reasonable and that his unpaid leave of absence constituted a reasonable accommodation in the circumstances.The Fourth Circuit affirmed, finding Plaintiff failed to establish that UPS needed to allow him to drive a smaller vehicle on his existing route and that the leave of absence was not a reasonable alternative. View "Jay Hannah v. UPS" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed from the judgment of conviction and sentence entered against him in August 2020. Two years earlier, in August 2018, Defendant was indicted in that court for possession with intent to distribute fentanyl and oxycodone, (the “distribution offense”), plus possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, (the “firearm offense”). In December 2018, a jury convicted Defendant on both those offenses. During the sentencing proceedings, the court found Defendant to be a “career offender” under Sentencing Guidelines section 4B1.1(a), in that Defendant had seven prior South Carolina felony convictions supportive of such an enhancement (including, four South Carolina felony convictions for distribution of cocaine base). The court then sentenced Defendant to 120 months in prison for the distribution offense — plus 60 consecutive months for the firearm offense — for an aggregate prison term totaling 180 months. On appeal, Defendant pursued four challenges to his convictions and sentence.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that he “distribution” offense of South Carolina Code section 44- 53-375(B) does not criminalize the attempt offense of “attempted distribution,” but rather the completed offense of “attempted transfer.” Accordingly, the court ruled today that a section 44-53-375(B) distribution offense is not categorically disqualified from being treated as a Guidelines “controlled substance offense.” As a result of that ruling, Defendant’s contention that four of his prior drug distribution convictions — as punished by section 44-53-375(B) of the South Carolina Code — is without merit. The district court thus did not err by deeming Defendant to be a Guidelines career offender. View "US v. Quintin Davis" on Justia Law

Appellant filed suit alleging that he suffered adverse employment action in retaliation for unpopular protected speech. Appellant’s complaint alleges that he has been outspoken in recent years concerning the focus on “so-called ‘social justice’ affecting academia in general” and “his concern that the field of higher education study is abandoning rigorous methodological analysis in favor of results-driven work aimed at furthering a highly dogmatic view of ‘diversity,’ ‘equity,’ and ‘inclusion.’” In this vein, Appellant identified three statements or communications he made between 2016 and 2018, which, in his view, are protected speech. According to Appellant, he was eventually subject to adverse employment actions in retaliation for these three communications. The district court dismissed Appellant’s complaint.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal finding that Appellant has failed to allege a causal connection between the only communication that is arguably protected under the First Amendment and the alleged adverse employment action. The court held that the survey question incident and the faculty hiring email were not protected speech. Even assuming the “Woke Joke” blog post was protected speech, Appellant has failed to allege that it was a “but for” cause for any alleged adverse employment action. View "Stephen Porter v. Board of Trustees of N. C. State University" on Justia Law

Petitioner is a native of China admitted to the United States on a student visa in 2009. Petitioner sought review of a Board of Immigration Appeals order denying his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. If removed to China, Petitioner fears, he will be persecuted and tortured by Chinese authorities, who in 2008 allegedly imprisoned and violently beat him because of his Christian beliefs and practices.   The Fourth Circuit vacated the Board’s decision and remanded for further explanation. In denying relief on Petitioner’s withholding claim, both the IJ and the BIA relied at least in part on Petitioner’s failure to provide affidavits from his minister or fellow church members from China, attesting to his “activities as a Christian” and his arrest during home church services. But Petitioner repeatedly explained during his hearing why such evidence was not available: his minister and co-religionists feared reprisal from Chinese authorities if they came forward on his behalf. And neither the IJ nor the BIA made any finding as to the sufficiency of that explanation or the reasonable availability of the affidavits hypothesized by the IJ, or even noted Petitioner’s explanation in their opinions. The court left it to the agency on remand to evaluate Petitioner’s explanation and determine whether evidence from his co-religionists in China was “reasonably obtainable.” View "Zuowei Chen v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law

The United States’ war in Afghanistan required regional allies willing to aid the effort. One such ally was Petitioner, a Pakistani businessman who sold supplies to coalition forces. This invoked the wrath of the Pakistani Taliban, which demanded exorbitant payments from Petitioner under threat of death. Petitioner repeatedly refused, and the Taliban attempted to carry out its threat, promising to hunt him until it succeeded. After losing his business, home, and nearly his life, Petitioner fled to the United States seeking asylum. The Immigration Judge and Board of Immigration Appeals both recognized that Petitioner suffered past persecution, entitling him to a presumption that the Taliban would continue to target him if he returned to Pakistan. But they agreed with the government that because Petitioner lived in Islamabad (the capital of Pakistan) for a few weeks without the Taliban finding him, he could live in a new area of the country without fear of reprisal.   The Fourth Circuit granted Petitioner’s petition for review, reversed the Board’s denial of Petitioner’s preserved claims, and remanded with instructions that the agency grant relief. The court explained that Petitioner’s brief sojourn to Islamabad—where he never left the house— doesn’t rebut the presumption that a notorious terrorist organization continues to imperil his life. The court granted relief since the record would compel any reasonable adjudicator to conclude Petitioner faces a well-founded threat of future persecution. View "Shaker Ullah v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law

In these consolidated appeals, Plaintiff challenged the district court’s award of summary judgment to defendant Liberty University, Inc. (“Liberty”) on Palmer’s claim of age discrimination, pursued under provisions of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (the “ADEA”)(the “Statutory Ruling”). On the other hand, Liberty, by cross-appeal, challenged an earlier award of summary judgment that was made to Plaintiff, in which the court ruled that Plaintiff was not a “minister” for purposes of the First Amendment’s so-called “ministerial exception” (the “Constitutional Ruling”).   The Fourth Circuit dismissed Liberty’s cross-appeal and vacated the Constitutional Ruling. The court agreed with the district court that Plaintiff failed to produce sufficient evidence of age-based discrimination to overcome Liberty’s summary judgment motion on that issue. The court reasoned that Plaintiff failed to demonstrate that age was the but-for cause of her 2018 nonrenewal. Plaintiff was not meeting Liberty’s legitimate expectations at the time of her nonrenewal in that she repeatedly failed to develop a digital art skillset. And Plaintiff has failed to contend with the fact that the comments she characterizes as evidence of age discrimination — the retirement comments plus the resistant-to-change comment — were made subsequent to the Chair and the Dean having resolved not to renew her teaching contract for the 2018-19 school year. Accordingly, the court was satisfied to affirm the Statutory Ruling in favor of Liberty. Moreover, in light of that disposition — and pursuant to the constitutional avoidance doctrine — the court refrained from resolving whether Plaintiff was a minister for purposes of the First Amendment’s ministerial exception. View "Eva Palmer v. Liberty University, Incorporated" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of producing and possessing child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 2251(a) and 18 U.S.C. Section 2252A, respectively, and sentenced to fifty-five years in prison. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court erred by identifying him for a key government witness after the witness was initially unable to make the in-court identification herself. Defendant also contends that his sentence was grossly disproportionate to his offenses in violation of the Eighth Amendment.The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that it cannot infer that Defendant’s fifty-five-year sentence is grossly disproportionate to his offenses. The court reasoned that even if it assumes that his sentence is the functional equivalent of a life sentence without the possibility of parole,his child pornography offenses “are at least as grave as the drug offense in Harmelin, which the Supreme Court deemed sufficiently egregious to justify a similar sentence.” On multiple occasions, Defendant paid a woman in the Philippines not only to pose very young children in a pornographic manner, but also to molest them for his own sexual gratification. Defendant’s offenses, which directly facilitated the exploitation and sexual abuse of particularly vulnerable victims, are far from “one of the most passive felonies a person could commit.” View "US v. Jacob Ross" on Justia Law