Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In consolidated appeals, Plaintiff challenged the district court’s award of summary judgment to defendant Liberty University, Inc. (“Liberty”) on Palmer’s claim of age discrimination, pursued under provisions of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (the “ADEA”)  (the “Statutory Ruling”). On the other hand, Liberty, by cross-appeal, challenged an earlier award of summary judgment that was made to Plaintiff, in which the court ruled that Plaintiff was not a “minister” for purposes of the First Amendment’s so-called “ministerial exception” (the “Constitutional Ruling”).   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the Statutory Ruling, dismissed Liberty’s cross-appeal, and vacated the Constitutional Ruling. The court explained that it agreed with the district court that Plaintiff failed to produce sufficient evidence of age-based discrimination to overcome Liberty’s summary judgment motion on that issue. Accordingly, the court was satisfied to affirm the Statutory Ruling in favor of Liberty. Moreover, in light of that disposition — and pursuant to the constitutional avoidance doctrine — the court refrained from resolving whether Plaintiff was a minister for purposes of the First Amendment’s ministerial exception. As a result, the court wrote it was obliged to dismiss Liberty’s cross-appeal and vacate the Constitutional Ruling. View "Eva Palmer v. Liberty University, Incorporated" on Justia Law

While Respondent was employed as a truck driver at Greatwide Dedicated Transport II, LLC (“Greatwide”), he witnessed certain drivers receive additional driving assignments in violation of 49 C.F.R. Section 395.3, which regulates the maximum driving time for property-carrying vehicles. After collecting evidence related to the violations, Respondent submitted anonymous letters to management reporting his findings. Soon thereafter, Respondent revealed to management personnel that he was the author of the letters. The following month, Respondent was assigned to deliver two trailers filled with merchandise to two Nordstrom store locations in Manhattan, New York and Paramus, New Jersey. However, when Respondent returned from this assignment, he was suspended for—what Greatwide claimed to be—violations of company policy. Greatwide subsequently terminated and dismissed Respondent without a more explicit explanation. Respondent promptly filed a whistleblower complaint with the U.S. Department of Labor’s (“DOL”) Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”). Following several lengthy delays, the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) ruled in Respondent’s favor, ordering Greatwide to pay both back pay and emotional distress damages. The Administrative Review Board (“ARB”) affirmed.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that substantial evidence supports the ARB’s conclusion that Respondent engaged in protected activity, that his activity was a contributing factor in his termination, and that Greatwide failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent would have been terminated absent his protected conduct. Nor was Greatwide prejudiced by the proceeding’s delays. Finally, the court declined to enforce the alleged settlement agreement because the company failed to challenge the ALJ’s decision before the ARB. View "Greatwide Dedicated Transport II, LLC v. United States Department of Labor" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Zurich American Life Insurance Company of New York∗ (“Zurich”) in district court challenging Zurich’s denial of long-term disability (“LTD”) benefits under the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”). The parties cross-moved for judgment on the record, and the district court awarded judgment to Zurich. Plaintiff appealed.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court held that Zurich’s decision to deny benefits followed a principled reasoning process and was supported by substantial evidence. The court explained that Plaintiff insists that Zurich abused its discretion by failing to evaluate his particular job responsibilities in determining his disability status. The court explained that Plaintiff misunderstands what the Plan requires. The Plan defines “Regular Occupation” as “the occupation [the employee is] routinely performing when [his] disability begins.” And the Plan explains that Zurich “will look at [the employee’s] occupation as it is normally performed in the national economy, instead of how the work tasks are performed for a specific employer or at a specific location.” Of note, Zurich completed and considered a “Physical Requirements and Job Demand Analysis” that evaluated Plaintiff’s job responsibilities. That analysis concluded that his writer/editor position was a sedentary one that required minimal physical exertion. Under the Plan, it was Plaintiff’s burden, not Zurich’s, to provide “written proof of [his] claim for disability benefits.” Thus, Zurich did not abuse its discretion by not obtaining additional vocational evidence, as neither the Plan nor case law affirmatively requires it to have done so. View "Kevin Geiger v. Zurich American Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Petitioner sought review of the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) order denying his motion to reconsider the dismissal of his requests for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). In its order denying reconsideration, the Board affirmed the Immigration Judge’s (IJ) finding that Petitioner, a Salvadoran national whose entire family had fled to the United States, had not established a nexus between his family membership and the threat of persecution as required for his asylum and withholding of removal claims. The Board also affirmed the IJ’s finding that Petitioner had not shown acquiescence by public officials as required for his CAT claim.   The Fourth Circuit granted in part and denied in part the petition for review, vacated in part the Board’s order denying reconsideration, and remanded for further proceedings. The court explained that the Board abused its discretion by applying an incorrect legal standard in its nexus analysis for the Petitioner’s asylum and withholding of removal claims. The court also held with regard to these two claims that the Board abused its discretion by arbitrarily disregarding Petitioner’s testimony about the threat of future persecution. However, the court rejected Petitioner’s argument that the Board abused its discretion with regard to his CAT claim. The Board provided specific reasons for finding the Petitioner’s testimony insufficient to meet his burden of proof and appropriately evaluated the evidence under the futility exception. View "Marvin A.G. v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law

After receiving a flood of telemarketing phone calls concerning debt relief through lower interest rates on credit cards, Appellee brought suit pursuant to the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”), and the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act (“WVCCPA”), against several defendants. Throughout the course of the litigation, Appellants failed to respond fulsomely and accurately to discovery requests and to comply with court orders pertaining to those requests. As a sanction for their repeated discovery violations, the district court entered a default judgment against Appellants.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed, concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by finding that Appellants acted in bad faith and entered a default judgment against them. The court explained that because the damages consisted strictly of statutory penalties, the amount of which was readily discernable on the basis of undisputed evidence in the record, the district court did not abuse its discretion by entering judgment in favor of Appellee and awarding statutory damages without a trial. Further, because penalties under the TCPA and WVCCPA are not exclusive and the statutes separately penalize different violative conduct, damages under the WVCCPA may be awarded in addition to those under the TCPA for a single communication that violates both statutes. View "Diana Mey v. Judson Phillips" on Justia Law

Before his trial on child-pornography charges, Defendant moved to suppress evidence related to the search of his van. Defendant argued that the officers did not have an objectively reasonable belief that an emergency existed that required them to immediately enter the van without a warrant to see if anyone was in medical distress inside. He also argued that the officers did not have legal authority to tow the van. Last, he argued that the inventory search was a pretext for a warrantless criminal investigation. The district court held an evidentiary hearing. Defendant appealed the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence that police discovered while searching his van without a warrant.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that warrantless searches of vehicles carried out as part of law enforcement’s community caretaking functions do not violate the Fourth Amendment if reasonable under the circumstances. Accordingly, the court found no error in the district court’s determination that the officers searched Defendant’s van in exercising those community caretaking functions and not as a pretext for a criminal investigatory search. The court likewise concluded that the district court did not err in holding the search was reasonable. View "US v. Alexander Treisman" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an attorney, filed a civil rights action against two Orangeburg County, South Carolina sheriff’s deputies (collectively, the “Defendants”). As a pro se plaintiff, Plaintiff received repeated notice of the requirement to inform the court of any change in her address immediately. After Plaintiff failed to provide an updated address, she did not receive the magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendation filed in her case. Accordingly, she missed deadlines to file objections to the Report and Recommendation and to note an appeal of the district court’s summary judgment order. The district court granted Plaintiff’s motion to reopen the time to note an appeal, giving her fourteen days to do so. Yet, by the time Plaintiff re-filed her notice of appeal as permitted by the district court below, her appeal was already pending in the Fourth Circuit. At issue in this appeal is what it means to “receive notice” for purposes of a Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(6) motion to reopen the time to note an appeal to the Fourth Circuit.   The Fourth Circuit vacated the decision and remanded the case to the district court to consider whether the circumstances warrant the exercise of discretion to reopen the time for Plaintiff’s appeal. The court found that because Plaintiff did not receive actual notice of the entry of judgment in her case, the first of Rule 4(a)(6)’s three statutory requirements for reopening the time for appeal has been met. Further, the court found that the remaining requirements 4 of Rule 4(a)(6) have been satisfied as well. View "Melodie Shuler v. Orangeburg County Sheriff's Department" on Justia Law

Suspecting that Defendant was engaged in drug-trafficking activity, law enforcement officers in Chesapeake, Virginia, stopped the vehicle he was driving to investigate. After a drug dog alerted to the presence of drugs, the officers searched the vehicle and recovered methamphetamine and related evidence. After Defendant was charged with drug trafficking offenses, he filed a motion to suppress the evidence recovered from his vehicle (and later from his apartment), contending (1) that the officers did not have a reasonable suspicion to make the stop and (2) that, in any event, they unduly prolonged the stop — all in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The district court denied his motion.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that the totality of the circumstances supported a reasonable suspicion of ongoing criminal activity, justifying a brief stop to allay the officer’s suspicion. In this case, the investigatory stop did not allay that suspicion but confirmed it. Shortly after the stop, a drug dog alerted to the presence of drugs in Defendant’s vehicle, leading to the recovery of drugs and other evidence used in this case. Further, the mission of the stop was to investigate potential drug-trafficking activity, and there is no evidence in the record to suggest that the officers failed to “diligently pursue” their investigation to confirm or allay that suspicion. View "US v. Xavier Howell" on Justia Law

While living in Japan, Defendant sexually abused a young girl. The government brought charges under the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act. The government’s theory was that Defendant was employed by the Armed Forces because he worked for a Department of Veterans Affairs subcontractor. Or, the government argued, he was accompanying a member of the Armed Forces because he lived with his wife, who worked at the Kadena Air Base in Japan. Defendant pleaded guilty to two charges in exchange for the government’s dropping the rest. As part of the deal, he also agreed to waive any right to appeal. The district court accepted the plea agreement and sentenced Defendant to 420 months imprisonment. But, despite his waiver, Defendant appealed.   The Fourth Circuit dismissed the appeal. The court explained that Defendant attempted to get around his appeal waiver by arguing that jurisdiction cannot be waived, and thus he has every right to proceed. The court reasoned that Defendant confuses a crime’s jurisdictional element with federal courts’ subject-matter jurisdiction. Here, Defendant is not challenging the district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. He’s challenging the sufficiency of the evidence on his crimes’ jurisdictional element. Sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge falls under his appeal waiver, and thus the court dismissed his appeal. View "US v. Emilio Moran" on Justia Law

The district court affirmed a bankruptcy court order that entered a preliminary injunction preventing thousands of third-party asbestos claims from proceeding against debtor Bestwall LLC’s affiliates, including affiliate and non-debtor Georgia-Pacific LLC (“New GP”). The Official Committee of Asbestos Claimants (“Committee”) and Sander L. Esserman, in his capacity as Future Claimants’ Representative (“FCR”) (collectively “Claimant Representatives”), appealed. They argued that the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction to enjoin non-bankruptcy proceedings against New GP and, alternatively, that the bankruptcy court erred in entering the preliminary injunction because it applied an improper standard.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court agreed with the district court that the bankruptcy court had “related to” jurisdiction to issue the preliminary injunction and applied the correct standard in doing so. The court explained that the Claimant Representatives asserted that, under the first prong of the preliminary injunction test, the district court should have determined whether Bestwall would ultimately be able to obtain permanent injunctive relief. The court wrote that requiring a party to show entitlement to a permanent channeling injunction this early in the bankruptcy proceeding puts the cart before the horse; Section 524(g) does not require such proof until the plan confirmation stage. Contrary to the express intent of Congress as shown through the Bankruptcy Code, the position of Claimant Representatives would effectively eliminate reorganization under Chapter 11 as 27, an option for many debtors. Therefore, the court rejected the Claimant Representatives’ argument that the bankruptcy court needed to find that it would likely enter a permanent injunction in order to grant a preliminary injunction. View "Bestwall LLC v. Official Committee of Asbestos Claimants" on Justia Law