Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a tenured psychology professor at George Mason University (GMU), appealed the district court’s dismissal of his Title IX, procedural due process, and First Amendment claims against GMU and other defendants sued after he was disciplined for creating a hostile educational environment that amounted to sexual harassment.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the district court correctly dismissed Plaintiff’s erroneous-outcome claim. Such a claim requires a plaintiff to plausibly allege that (1) he was subjected to a procedurally flawed or otherwise flawed proceeding; (2) which led to an adverse and erroneous outcome; and (3) involved particular circumstances that suggest ‘gender bias was a motivating factor behind the erroneous finding. Here, Plaintiff does not connect these generalized pressures to his case in a way that creates a reasonable inference that anti-male bias-motivated GMU’s finding that he sexually harassed his students. Thus, as the district court explained, Plaintiff “has provided no basis from which to infer the existence of bias in his specific proceeding.” Further, Plaintiff’s “allegations of selective enforcement are not supported by any well-pled facts that exist independent of his legal conclusions.” Finally, the court explained that while Plaintiff’s research, publishing, and teaching about sex may qualify as matters of public concern, his contested speech veered well outside his teaching and scholarship into areas of private, personal interest. View "Todd Kashdan v. George Mason University" on Justia Law

Defendant a citizen and resident of New Zealand, carried on an online relationship with a thirteen-year-old girl in Virginia that involved several sexually explicit video calls. A federal grand jury charged him with nine counts of producing child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 2251(a). He entered a conditional guilty plea to one of the counts and was sentenced to twenty-one years in prison. Defendant challenged both his conviction and sentence on appeal. He first argued that his conviction involves an impermissible extraterritorial application of Section 2251(a) because he was in New Zealand when the unlawful images and videos were produced. Second, he contends that his conviction violates the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause because he lacked adequate notice that the victim was underage. Third, and finally, he challenges his sentence on the grounds that the district court improperly applied a two-level enhancement for offenses involving “sexual contact.”   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court held that Defendant’s conviction stands as a permissible domestic application of Section 2251(a) because the conduct relevant to the statute’s focus occurred in Virginia, where the visual depiction that forms the basis of Defendant’s conviction was produced and transmitted. Further, the court held that although Defendant argued otherwise, the fact that a violation of Section 2251(a) carries a fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence does not give him a due process right to a reasonable-mistake-of-age defense. Finally, the court held that because Defendant admitted to masturbating during the video calls,it was appropriate for the sentencing court to apply the two-level enhancement. View "US v. Troy Skinner" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sought disability benefits from the Social Security Administration in 2018. He primarily based his application on pain in his lower back, hips, legs, knees, and feet, as well as on hypertension. Throughout the administrative process and upon review in federal district court, Plaintiff was denied benefits. He appealed.   The Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded the district court’s ruling affirming the ALJ’s final decision denying Plaintiff’s application for disability benefits. The court explained that nothing in the record expressly reconciles the differing mobility conclusions between 2018 and 2019, but it seems reasonable to believe that perhaps Plaintiff’s objective ailments worsened during that time, thereby impacting his mobility. To be sure, neither this Court nor an ALJ may infer a medical diagnosis—like symptom progression. But when insufficient evidence prevents an ALJ from soundly determining whether providers’ opinions are consistent, a Section 404.1520b(b)(2) inquiry by the ALJ could remedy the uncertainty with relative ease. Second, the court held that the ALJ improperly considered Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. Third, the court found that the ALJ improperly considered whether Plaintiff’s daily activities were inconsistent with his claim of disability. View "Renard Oakes v. Kilolo Kijakazi" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a federal inmate, brings claims under the Fifth Amendment for money damages against federal prison officials for alleged violations of procedural due process and equal protection. Plaintiff contended his claims are authorized by Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), and its progeny.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The court held that “the Supreme Court has all but closed the door on Bivens remedies” that do not fit within the precise confines of its prior Bivens cases. The court explained that Plaintiff’s claims are brought against a “new category of defendants”—prison officials, as opposed to a former Congressman in Davis—operating in a different legal and factual context (prisoner litigation). Expanding Bivens to these types of claims would likely have “systemwide consequences” for the BOP in the form of increased litigation, and Congress has so far declined to create a damages remedy for these types of actions against federal prison officials.   Further, the court explained that special factors also counsel against extending the Bivens remedy to cover Plaintiff’s claims. First, the court wrote, Plaintiff’s claims would “require scrutiny of new categories of conduct and a new category of defendants—namely, BOP employees involved in transferring inmates and managing the agency’s housing system” and BOP employees involved in inmate discipline and employment, such as through the UNICOR program. Second, Plaintiff’s claims “intersect with the statutory scheme delegating authority over prison designation, transfer, and housing decisions to the BOP,” as well as those governing prison discipline and inmate employment. View "Joseph Mays v. T. Smith" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Wudi Industrial (Shanghai) Co., Ltd. Challenged two adverse rulings made by the district court in favor of defendant Wai L. Wong and his business entity, GT Omega Racing, Ltd. (collectively “GTOR”). Wudi and GTOR are Asian-centered business entities that compete in the marketing of video gaming chairs and other products. In March 2017, Wudi obtained from the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) a registration for the stylized word mark “GTRACING.” For its part, GTOR claimed that it already owned an earlier use of a similar word mark — that is, “GT OMEGA RACING” — and challenged Wudi’s registration of the “GTRACING” word mark in cancellation proceedings before a USPTO component called the Trademark Trial and Appeals Board (the “Board”). In June 2020, the Board ruled in favor of GTOR, concluding that Wudi’s use of the “GTRACING” word mark encroached on GTOR’s earlier use of its own “GT OMEGA RACING” word mark.   The Fourth Circuit vacated the challenged rulings and remanded. The court agreed with Wudi’s primary contention that the district court’s challenged rulings constitute awards of injunctive relief in favor of GTOR and against Wudi. Secondly, the court also agreed that the challenged rulings failed to comport with the applicable Rules of Civil Procedure and controlling precedent. The court emphasized that the First Order possesses all of the necessary attributes and thus qualifies as an injunction order. That is, the First Order contains “clear, enforceable directives” and threatens Wudi with contempt for noncompliance. View "Wudi Industrial (Shanghai) Co., Ltd. v. Wai Wong" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Terra Renewal Services, Inc. and its parent company Darling Ingredients, Inc. after an accident atop a pressurized tanker left him a paraplegic. He alleged that their negligence led to the accident that injured him. The case went to trial, where the jury found that, though Terra and Darling were negligent, Plaintiff was contributorily negligent, thus barring his recovery. Plaintiff appealed, alleging that the district court committed several reversible errors. His main contention is that the district court erroneously rejected his “sudden emergency” contention and his claim for gross negligence as a matter of law.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to admit under the business records exception to hearsay the full report that the North Carolina Department of Labor investigator developed during her investigation. The court reasoned that the report is chock full of statements from LJC employees and others, which the district court reasonably anticipated might pose problems of admissibility. The report repeatedly says that such-and-such says one thing, and someone else says another. Many of these statements themselves were hearsay, and the district court rightly refused to accord them a significant role in the trial. View "Anthony Mathis v. Terra Renewal Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff contends that First Connecticut Bancorp, Inc. and its directors violated the securities laws by misleading shareholders like him about the true value of their shares ahead of a stock-for-stock merger. To comply with Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Plaintiff claims, First Connecticut needed to disclose specific cashflow projections—and particularly an earlier, rosier set of projections—in the proxy statement, it circulated to investors. The district court granted First Connecticut’s motion for summary judgment, holding that Plaintiff hadn’t shown that (1) the cash-flow projections were material; (2) their omission caused him any economic loss, or (3) the directors acted negligently in approving the proxy statement.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Plaintiff’s evidence doesn’t establish that he or any other shareholder suffered an economic loss because the cash-flow projections weren’t in the proxy statement. So the district court correctly granted summary judgment on this basis as well. Further, the court reasoned that Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act provides that “controlling persons” can be vicariously liable for violations of the securities laws. But a claim “under Section 20(a) must be based upon a primary violation of the securities laws,” and the court agreed that Plaintiff has established no such violation here. View "Selwyn Karp v. First Connecticut Bancorp, Inc." on Justia Law

Clary Hood, Inc. (“Hood, Inc.”), a South Carolina corporation engaged in land excavation and grading, with revenue of $44 million in 2015 and $69 million in 2016, paid its CEO a $5 million bonus in both of those years, deducting the payments on its income tax returns as reasonable business expenses under 26 U.S.C. Section 162(a)(1). The Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) contended that the bonuses were excessive, with the excess amount actually representing a disguised payment of dividends from profits, which could not be deducted. The Tax Court mostly agreed with the IRS and determined that Hood, Inc. could only deduct roughly $3.7 million for 2015 and $1.4 million for 2016 as reasonable amounts for total compensation to its CEO. Accordingly, it assessed tax deficiencies for both years in the total amount of roughly $1.96 million, as well as a penalty for 2016 in the amount of $282,398.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court’s findings with respect to the amount of reasonable deductions and consequent tax deficiency but vacated the imposition of the penalty. The court explained that because the record indicates that Hood, Inc. anticipated remedying Mr. Hood’s past under compensation in installments over multiple years and discussed that plan with its tax advisors, who approved it as reasonable, the court concluded that the Tax Court’s finding regarding the reasonable-cause defense for the 2015 tax year should also have applied to the 2016 tax year. Further, Hood, Inc. used a consistent methodology to determine the amount of Mr. Hood’s bonuses for both 2015 and 2016 with the advice of independent accountants. View "Clary Hood, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native of Honduras, sought a review of an order from the Board of Immigration Appeals denying his application for cancellation of removal. The Fourth Circuit dismissed the petition for review. The court held that it lacks jurisdiction because Petitioner did not timely file his petition within 30 days of the Board’s final order of removal. The court explained that the availability of voluntary departure may have remained “up in the air,” but voluntary departure does not affect Petitioner’s removability – “it affects only the manner of his exit.” Further, the court wrote that its decision in Li to dismiss without prejudice a petition that was timely filed, however, has no bearing on the court's authority to act on a petition that was not. View "Williams Rodriguez Salgado v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law

Speech First, Inc., which identifies itself as a national organization committed to protecting the rights of college students, initiated this action against the President of the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (Virginia Tech or the University). Speech First asserts that two Virginia Tech policies — the Bias Intervention and Response Team Policy (the Bias Policy) and the Informational Activities Policy — violate the First Amendment rights of its student members. Speech First asked the district court to preliminarily enjoin both policies. The district court held that Speech First (1) lacked standing to challenge the Bias Policy because its members had suffered no injury in fact, and (2) failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits as to the Informational Activities Policy because the record was, at that time, inadequate as to that policy. Speech First appealed.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Speech First offers only speculation in support of its argument that it has suffered an injury in fact. Because the district court’s factual findings make clear that no record evidence establishes any such injury, the organization has failed to establish an injury in fact and so lacks standing to challenge the Bias Policy. The court explained that once this case is returned to the district court, and after further factual development has taken place, it will be for that court to determine in the first instance whether the Informational Activities Policy complies with the First Amendment. Without a developed record, the district court did not err in determining that Speech First has not yet shown that it is likely to succeed on the merits. View "Speech First, Inc. v. Timothy Sands" on Justia Law