Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Virginia police responded to a 911 call seeking help to locate Plaintiff, who they were told was potentially armed and suicidal. After failing to find Plaintiff in his house, two officers and a K-9 searched the surrounding woods. The dog quickly caught Plaintiff’s scent, leading officers to find him lying in a shallow ditch. Bodycam footage shows the subsequent heated encounter, with officers demanding Plaintiff turn around and Plaintiff angrily ordering them to leave. After a two-minute impasse, an officer twice released the dog, who bit Plaintiff and caused a severe injury. The officers ultimately discovered Plaintiff didn’t have a gun. Plaintiff sued under state law and 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, alleging, among other things, violations of his Fourth Amendment rights. The district court denied the K-9 officer’s summary-judgment motion asserting qualified immunity, holding that the undisputed facts didn’t establish whether the officer had a reasonable belief that Plaintiff was armed.   The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity to the K-9 officer on the excessive-force count and remanded with instructions that the court enters judgment for him on that count. The court explained that while the bodycam video alone may not illuminate whether the officer had a reasonable belief that Plaintiff was armed, the full record clarifies that this assumption was reasonable. Given that, the officer’s use of his dog to seize Plaintiff didn’t violate the Fourth Amendment. View "Dillard Putman v. Quentin Harris" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued the federal government under the FTCA, alleging one count of battery. A magistrate judge recommended dismissing Plaintiff’s suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction in a detailed memorandum devoted solely to whether the FTCA waives sovereign immunity for the type of claim Plaintiff brought. The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation. The district court concluded it need not review the recommendation de novo because Plaintiff failed to object with sufficient specificity and, in any event, “the Magistrate Judge’s proposed conclusions of law are correct and are consistent with current case law.   The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings. The court held that the district court erred in concluding Plaintiff did not adequately preserve her claim for review. The court explained that a party wishing to avail itself of its right to de novo review must be “sufficiently specific to focus the district court’s attention on the factual and legal issues that are truly in dispute.” The court concluded that Plaintiff cleared that bar.   Further, the court concluded that the district court erred in dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court held that the FTCA permits people who allege they were assaulted by TSA screeners to sue the federal government. View "Erin Osmon v. US" on Justia Law

Plaintiff signed a one-year contract to teach criminal justice courses at Spartanburg Methodist College (SMC). Less than a year later, SMC decided not to renew Plaintiff’s contract and terminated her shortly thereafter. Plaintiff brought a mix of state and federal law claims against SMC, essentially arguing that her contract nonrenewal and termination were unlawful. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of SMC on all federal claims and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. Plaintiff appealed. Under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), Plaintiff accused SMC of discrimination, retaliation, and engaging in an unlawful health inquiry. Under Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972 (Title IX), she accused SMC of retaliation.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that in analyzing the case, it becomes clear that Plaintiff’s retaliation claims cannot succeed. SMC offers nonretaliatory reasons for not renewing Plaintiff’s contract and terminating her employment, and she is unable to demonstrate that SMC’s reasons are pretextual. Further, the court explained that Plaintiff’s claim of pretext is undermined by the fact that the primary decision-makers at SMC were not aware of Plaintiff’s ADA or Title IX-protected activity. Second, any notion of pretext is further dispelled by the fact that SMC’s explanations have been consistent throughout. Moreover, the court explained that Plaintiff cannot show that SMC refused to make an accommodation because she cannot show that she ever properly requested one. Her failure-to-accommodate claim fails for this reason. View "Summer Lashley v. Spartanburg Methodist College" on Justia Law

The appeal is another installment in a series of disputes involving an enforcement action by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) against a group of fraudulent real estate developers (the Sanctuary Belize enforcement action). Appellants, a group of 14 individual investors and a family-owned corporation moved to intervene in an action brought by others and sought relief from the district court’s judgment. Appellants did not do so until after the district court had entered final judgment and that judgment had been appealed to the Fourth Circuit. Because the Sanctuary Belize enforcement action was already on appeal when Appellants filed their motions, the district court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain those motions. It held alternatively that the motions should be denied as meritless.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court held that a district court lacks jurisdiction over a motion to intervene while an appeal is pending, regardless of who noted the appeal. Further, the court explained that because the district court correctly determined it lacked jurisdiction on a matter that had been appealed to the Fourth Circuit, the court held that it only has jurisdiction to review that decision, not to entertain the underlying merits. View "Federal Trade Commission v. Yu Lin" on Justia Law

Law firm Halscott Megaro, P.A. (“Halscott Megaro” or “the firm”) sued former clients and their guardians (collectively “former clients”), seeking to recover unpaid legal fees and expenses. A district court dismissed the action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The district court took judicial notice of a North Carolina State Bar Disciplinary Hearing Commission (“Commission”) decision that found the firm’s lead partner misled the former clients and engaged in other unethical conduct. The court then held the firm was precluded from relitigating issues decided by the Commission. It held that Halscott Megaro failed to plausibly plead claims for which relief could be granted. Halscott Megaro appealed, arguing the district court improperly considered matters outside the pleadings and failed to accept its allegations and all reasonable inferences from them as true in concluding that the Commission’s decision as to its lead partner bound the law firm.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed and held that the district court committed no reversible error in granting the former clients’ motion to dismiss or in denying the law firm’s motion for recusal. The court wrote that it agreed with the district court’s conclusion that the Commission was acting in a judicial capacity when it entered its discipline order against Megaro. The court also agreed that Megaro received a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues and due process protections. Further, the court held that the firm’s allegations of impartiality were not related to any particular facts, sources or statements. A presiding judge is not required to recuse himself simply because of unsupported or highly tenuous speculation. View "Halscott Megaro, P.A. v. Henry McCollum" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought a wrongful-termination action against her former employer—the North Carolina Department of Justice—and two former supervisors in their official and individual capacities. The district court dismissed some claims as barred by sovereign immunity and dismissed the entirety of the complaint as time-barred.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the uncontested dismissal of the North Carolina Department of Justice and the uncontested dismissal of the official-capacity claims against the individual Defendants for money damages. But because the statute of limitations for the remaining claims is four years and not three years as the district court found, the court explained it must otherwise vacate the district court’s grant of Defendants’ motion to dismiss the individual Defendants from the action.   The court explained that here, Plaintiff brought a Section 1983 action for wrongful termination in violation of Section 1981. A wrongful termination claim is based on post-contract-formation conduct. The court reasoned that as Defendants correctly recognized at oral argument, it would not have been possible for Plaintiff to bring this action prior to December 1, 1990, because, before that date, Section 1981 was limited to discrimination in contract formation and enforcement. In 1991, Congress expanded Section 1981 to include discrimination post-contract formation. Therefore, the 1991 amendment to Section 1981 “made possible” this Section 1983 action, and the four-year catchall statute of limitations provided by Section 1658 applies. View "Margaret Chambers v. North Carolina Department of Justice" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed from the sentence he received after pleading guilty to unlawfully possessing a firearm and ammunition in contravention of 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g)(1). Defendant contends that the district court erred by treating a federal drug offense on which he was convicted in 2014 — aiding and abetting in the distribution of a controlled substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. Section 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. Section 2 — as being a “controlled substance offense” that increased his Sentencing Guidelines offense level. Defendant has proffered two principal arguments as to why his 2014 offense is not a “controlled substance offense” under the Guidelines. First, he asserts that aiding and abetting in a drug offense cannot be treated as a “controlled substance offense” in Guidelines calculations. Second, Defendant maintains that, in any event, each and every Section 841(a)(1) distribution offense is disqualified from such treatment.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed and rejected Defendant’s challenge to his sentence. The court wrote that it must reject each of Defendant’s two principal arguments as to why his 2014 offense — aiding and abetting in a 21 U.S.C. Section 841(a)(1) drug distribution offense — is not a “controlled substance offense” under the Sentencing Guidelines. First, the Guidelines’ definition of a “controlled substance offense” includes aiding and abetting in a drug offense. Second, although the Guidelines exclude attempt offenses, Section 841(a)(1) does not criminalize attempt such that an  841(a)(1) distribution offense would be categorically disqualified from being treated as a “controlled substance offense.” View "US v. Patrick Groves" on Justia Law

The Loudoun County Public Schools (the “LCPS”) developed and implemented a “Student Equity Ambassador Program” “to amplify the voices of Students of Color and those who have experienced or witnessed injustices, marginalization, or discrimination.” In response, the parents of several children who attend the LCPS sued the Loudoun County School Board (the “School Board”) on behalf of their minor children, asserting Equal Protection and First Amendment claims, claiming their children are not eligible for the Program due to their race or viewpoint.The district court granted the School Board's motion to dismiss and the parents appealed.On appeal, the Fourth Circuit held that the parents did not have standing to challenge the Student Equity Ambassador Program because their children did not apply for the program or even express an interest in applying. However, the court also held that the parents plausibly alleged that implementing the Program chilled their children’s speech to support their First Amendment claims. Thus, the court vacated the district court's ruling on the parents' First Amendment claims. View "Patti Menders v. Loudoun County School Board" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was dismissed from the Univeristy of Virginia's doctoral program after receiving poor grades. Plaintiff sued, alleging national origin discrimination and retaliation based on interactions with his immediate supervisor. The district court granted the school's motion to dismiss and Plaintiff appealed.The Fourth Circuit affirmed, finding that although his supervisor made derogatory comments about Plaintiff's national origin, they were not made in close proximity to the school's decision to dismiss Plaintiff. The supervisor made a "handful" of comments over the course of four years, none of which were close in time to the Plaintiff receiving poor grades or being dismissed from the program. View "Andreas Alberti v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, who is serving a sentence for murder, filed a pro se § 1983 complaint in federal court, seeking damages for alleged constitutional violations committed by the State of South Carolina, various state entities and officials, and his defense attorney. Plaintiff, who was filing his first civil rights suit as a prisoner, moved for leave to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. Section 1915, and the district court granted his motion.A magistrate judge screened Plaintiff's case, finding it was barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), under which a § 1983 plaintiff seeking damages for an unconstitutional conviction must first show that his conviction was reversed or otherwise set aside. The court also found prosecutorial immunity and sovereign immunity precluded relief. The magistrate judge then recommended that Plaintiff's case be “designated a ‘strike’ pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1915(g).”The Fourth Circuit reversed, finding that the district court may not "contemporaneously rule that its dismissal of a complaint constitutes a strike." In so holding, the Fourth Circuit joined all other circuits that have considered the issue. View "Kevin Pitts v. State of South Carolina" on Justia Law