Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In this case, the defendant, Guy Bowman, was convicted of distributing methamphetamine and conspiring to do so. Law enforcement officers executed a search warrant on Bowman's property, where they found evidence of drug distribution. Bowman was later located and arrested at a hotel, where he made incriminating statements to officers. He was subsequently indicted on two counts related to drug distribution.Prior to his trial, Bowman filed a motion to suppress his initial statements to the officers, arguing that they were made before he was read his Miranda rights. The district court denied the motion without holding an evidentiary hearing, determining that Bowman had not been interrogated before making the statements in question. Bowman also objected to the jury selection process, arguing that the district court had refused to ask his proposed questions and had provided him with less information about the jurors than was provided to the government.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed Bowman's convictions. The court found that the district court had not erred in denying Bowman's motion to suppress without an evidentiary hearing, as there were no material factual disputes warranting a hearing. The court also found that the district court had not violated Bowman's Sixth Amendment rights during jury selection, as it had asked sufficient questions to uncover bias and had not denied Bowman his peremptory strikes. Finally, the court found that the district court had not abused its discretion in refusing to play the entirety of Bowman's jail calls with a co-defendant during closing arguments. View "United States v. Bowman" on Justia Law

A group of plaintiffs sued multiple defendants, including white nationalists, white supremacists, and neo-Nazis, for their roles in the violent "Unite the Right" rally in Charlottesville, Virginia, in 2017. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants conspired to commit racially motivated violence. A jury awarded the plaintiffs over $26 million in damages, including a historic $24 million in punitive damages. However, the district court reduced the punitive damages to $350,000, applying Virginia's punitive damages cap across all plaintiffs.The defendants appealed, challenging the district court's decision to hold them jointly and severally liable for the compensatory damages award. The plaintiffs cross-appealed, challenging the district court's application of Virginia's punitive damages cap.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's imposition of joint-and-several liability for the compensatory damages. However, the court held that Virginia's punitive damages cap applies on a per-plaintiff basis, not across all plaintiffs. Therefore, the court vacated the district court's ruling on the punitive damages cap and remanded the case with instructions to apply the cap accordingly. View "Sines v. Hill" on Justia Law

Willie Slocum, Jr. appealed the denial of his motion to correct, vacate, or set aside his convictions and sentences based on ineffective assistance of counsel. Slocum was indicted on two counts of drug conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. § 846, but argued that the two charged conspiracies were actually one. He claimed that he was punished twice for the same conspiracy in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause, and that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to raise a double jeopardy challenge before the trial court. The district court denied his motion without ordering a response from the government or holding an evidentiary hearing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found that the district court erred in its decision. The appellate court determined that Slocum was indeed punished twice for a single conspiracy in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause. However, the court noted that it was unclear whether trial counsel had a strategic reason for failing to raise a double jeopardy challenge. The court concluded that Slocum was entitled to an evidentiary hearing under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b) where the performance of his trial counsel could be assessed. Therefore, the court vacated the district court’s denial of Slocum’s § 2255 motion and remanded for an evidentiary hearing on Slocum’s ineffective assistance claim. View "United States v. Slocum" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over the award of black lung benefits to the surviving wife of the late Bruce E. Goode, who worked for American Energy as a coal miner and suffered from a severe chronic obstructive pulmonary disability. American Energy disputed the cause of his impairment, arguing that it was due to his long-term cigarette smoking, not his coal mine employment. An administrative law judge (ALJ) found that Mr. Goode’s disability arose from his coal mine employment and awarded black lung benefits. The Benefits Review Board affirmed the award.American Energy appealed, arguing that the ALJ applied an incorrect legal standard. The company contended that the Black Lung Benefits Act and its implementing regulations require a miner to prove that coal dust caused the lung disease or made it worse. American Energy argued that the ALJ reversed the burden of proof by finding that the company had not proven why Mr. Goode’s lung disease was not at least partially due to coal dust exposure.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit agreed that the ALJ applied the wrong legal standard in determining that Mr. Goode had legal pneumoconiosis. However, the court noted that the ALJ also concluded that Mr. Goode’s clinical pneumoconiosis entitled him to benefits. The court granted American Energy’s petition and vacated and remanded the Board’s order for further proceedings. View "American Energy, LLC v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs" on Justia Law

The case involves Douglas Damon Whitley, who was convicted of Hobbs Act robbery, federal carjacking, and a firearm offense in connection with his theft of a Peloton delivery van and its contents. Whitley was sentenced to concurrent 84-month prison terms for the robbery and carjacking convictions. On appeal, Whitley argued that his convictions and sentences for both offenses violated the Double Jeopardy Clause, as he believed Hobbs Act robbery to be a lesser included offense of carjacking. He also contended that there was insufficient evidence of the specific intent needed to convict him of federal carjacking.The case was first heard in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Whitley and his co-defendant, Kindal Robinson, pleaded not guilty and proceeded to a joint jury trial. The jury found them both guilty of all charges. Whitley then filed a motion for judgment of acquittal, arguing that his convictions for both Hobbs Act robbery and federal carjacking violated the Double Jeopardy Clause. He also argued that the government failed to produce sufficient evidence of his specific intent to cause death or serious bodily harm, an essential element of federal carjacking. The district court denied Whitley’s motion, determining that Hobbs Act robbery is not a lesser included offense of carjacking and that a reasonable jury could have found that Whitley had the specific intent to kill or seriously injure the van driver.The case was then reviewed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. The court disagreed with Whitley's arguments and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court found that the jurisdictional elements of Hobbs Act robbery and federal carjacking differed, meaning that the two offenses were not the same under the Blockburger test. The court also found that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that Whitley had the specific intent to cause death or serious bodily harm, thus rejecting Whitley's sufficiency challenge. View "US v. Whitley" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Dedre Feyijinmi, who filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy and sought to discharge a restitution debt. In 2006, Feyijinmi was found guilty of welfare fraud in Maryland state court and was sentenced to three years' probation. The court also ordered $14,487 in restitution, which was recorded as a civil judgment. After Feyijinmi's probation ended, the outstanding balance was transferred to the State's Central Collection Unit. Later, Feyijinmi's criminal records were expunged, but her restitution obligation remained, leading to the garnishment of her wages.The bankruptcy court and the district court both rejected Feyijinmi's arguments that her restitution debt was dischargeable. Feyijinmi argued that the Bankruptcy Code's provision excluding a debt "for restitution...included in a sentence on the debtor's conviction of a crime" did not apply to her because she was not formally convicted under Maryland law. She also contended that the debt was discharged because the state of Maryland identified the debt as dischargeable court fees on its proof of claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that Feyijinmi's probation before judgment qualified as a conviction under federal law, as it was based on a finding of guilt. The court also ruled that the restitution was part of a sentence, even without a formal judgment. The court rejected Feyijinmi's claim that the State waived its right to collect the debt post-discharge by labeling it as "Court Ordered Fees" on its proof of claim. The court also dismissed Feyijinmi's claim of prejudice, finding no evidence of bad faith or unreasonable delay in filing the amendment, impact on other claimants, reliance by the debtor or creditors, or change of the debtor's position. View "Feyijinmi v. State of Maryland Central Collection Unit" on Justia Law

The case involves Koppers Performance Chemicals, Inc., a New York-based corporation that manufactures wood preservation chemicals, and Argonaut-Midwest Insurance Company. In 2014, Phillip H. Riley and his wife sued Koppers and other lumber industry entities in South Carolina state court, alleging that Riley developed cancer from exposure to a chemical used in the lumber provided by Koppers. Koppers sought coverage under four commercial general liability policies issued by Argonaut. Argonaut, however, disclaimed any duty to defend or indemnify Koppers, arguing that the policies limited coverage to Koppers' Hawaii operations and did not cover the claims in the Riley lawsuit.The case was initially heard in the District of South Carolina, where the court granted Argonaut's motion for summary judgment and denied Koppers' motion for partial summary judgment. The court found that the insurance policies were limited to Koppers' Hawaii operations and that the original complaint did not allege a potential for coverage under the policies, thus Argonaut had no duty to defend.Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the lower court's decision. The appellate court found that the insurance policies did not unambiguously limit coverage to Koppers' Hawaii operations. Furthermore, the court held that Argonaut was required to consider extrinsic evidence it specifically requested from Koppers when assessing its duty to defend. The court vacated the district court's order granting Argonaut's summary judgment motion and denying Koppers' partial summary judgment motion on the issue of Argonaut's duty to defend, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Koppers Performance Chemicals, Inc. v. Argonaut Midwest Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute between the Estate of Ke Zhengguang and Stephany Yu, concerning the enforcement of an arbitral award issued in Hong Kong. The award was the result of a business dispute involving real estate in China. The arbitration panel ordered Yu and her two sisters to pay the Estate and Xu Hongbiao a sum of money for the losses they sustained. After Yu paid Xu his share, the Estate sought to collect the remaining half from Yu, a U.S. citizen residing in Maryland.Yu challenged the enforcement of the award in the District Court of Maryland, arguing that the court was an inconvenient forum, that necessary parties were not included in the proceedings, and that enforcing the award would violate Chinese currency control laws, thereby violating U.S. policy favoring international comity. She also argued that the judgment should be in Renminbi (RMB), as provided in the arbitral award, not in U.S. dollars. The district court rejected all of Yu's arguments and confirmed the award under the New York Convention, entering judgment in favor of the Estate against Yu in a total amount of $3.6 million.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found none of Yu's arguments persuasive and held that the district court was correct in confirming and enforcing the arbitral award. The court also held that the district court did not err in entering the judgment in U.S. dollars, as it was within its discretion to do so. View "In re Estate of Ke Zhengguang v. Yu" on Justia Law

Gilbert Devon Melvin, after serving over 20 years in federal prison for drug and firearm offenses, was released in March 2021 and began a five-year term of supervised release. In August 2023, Melvin's mental health deteriorated, and he was arrested for trespassing. At the revocation hearing, the district court initially agreed to terminate Melvin's supervised release and enter a time-served sentence. However, Melvin had an outburst in court, which led the court to conclude that he posed a danger to the public and his probation officers. As a result, the court withdrew its initial agreement to a time-served sentence and instead decided to maintain Melvin's supervised release with an additional mental health condition.The district court's decision was based on Melvin's behavior during the revocation hearing. The court initially agreed to terminate Melvin's supervised release and enter a time-served sentence. However, after Melvin's outburst, the court concluded that he posed a danger to the public and his probation officers. The court then withdrew its initial agreement and decided to maintain Melvin's supervised release with an additional mental health condition.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, Melvin argued that the district court lacked the authority to withdraw or modify the time-served sentence it had initially agreed to impose. The Fourth Circuit disagreed, affirming the district court's decision. The court held that a sentence is not imposed until it has been unequivocally pronounced during the sentencing hearing, and there has been a formal break in the proceedings from which to logically and reasonably conclude that sentencing had finished. The court found that the district court's initial acceptance of a time-served sentence was tentative and that the court had the authority to modify that sentence when Melvin addressed the bench only moments later, during the course of the same sentencing hearing. View "US v. Melvin" on Justia Law

Jake's Fireworks Inc., a large importer and distributor of consumer fireworks, sought judicial review of several warning notices it received from the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission. The notices were issued after the Commission's staff sampled fireworks imported by Jake's Fireworks and found that about one-third of those samples indicated that the fireworks were dangerously overloaded with explosive material, rendering them "banned hazardous substances" under the agency’s regulations. The Commission's Compliance Office accordingly sent Jake's Fireworks several “Notice[s] of Non-Compliance,” requesting that the distribution of the sampled lots not take place and that the existing inventory be destroyed.Jake's Fireworks first sued the Commission in federal court in 2019, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief from the agency’s enforcement of its fireworks regulations via the Notices. The district court dismissed the lawsuit, determining that the Notices did not constitute final agency actions under the Administrative Procedure Act because they did not consummate the Commission’s decisionmaking process. After the dismissal of its first lawsuit, Jake's Fireworks requested an informal hearing with the Compliance Office to contest the Notices. The Compliance Office declined to hold a hearing or to revisit its findings, and Jake's Fireworks filed a second lawsuit, which was also dismissed by the district court on the same grounds as the first lawsuit.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the Notices did not constitute final agency actions under the Administrative Procedure Act. The court reasoned that the Compliance Office’s Notices of Noncompliance did not mark the consummation of the agency’s decisionmaking process, as it is the Commission itself, not its Compliance Office, that makes final determinations on whether goods are banned hazardous substances. The court also found that the language of the Notices confirmed that they conveyed preliminary findings and advice from agency staff rather than a final determination from the Commission itself. View "Jake's Fireworks Inc. v. United States Consumer Product Safety Commission" on Justia Law