Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff was on active duty with the United States Army. He bought a car from Select Cars of Thornburg in Fredericksburg, Virginia, and financed his purchase with a loan from United Auto Credit Corporation. The loan financed not only the car’s cost but also the cost of Guaranteed Asset Protection. Guaranteed Asset Protection is like extra insurance, covering any amount still due on the car loan after auto insurance is paid out if the car is totaled or stolen. Plaintiff’s claims arise from this single loan. This loan, Plaintiff alleged, violated the Military Lending Act because the loan agreement mandated arbitration and failed to disclose certain information. The district court dismissed the case, holding that the loan was not covered by the Act at all.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that a statutory provision must be given the ordinary meaning it had when it was enacted. Relevant dictionaries, carefully considered, sometimes shed light on that ordinary meaning. Yet here, dueling dictionaries provide more than one linguistically permissible meaning.  But by examining the relevant phrase in its statutory context. This context shows that while “the express purpose” can be used in different senses, it is best read in Section 987(i)(6) to mean the specific purpose. This loan was offered for the specific purpose of financing Plaintiff’s car purchase. And that satisfies Section 987(i)(6)’s relevant condition and the Act is inapplicable. View "Jerry Davidson v. United Auto Credit Corporation" on Justia Law

A superseding indictment charged two defendants, husband and wife, with conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to distribute one kilogram or more of heroin and five kilograms or more of cocaine and conspiracy to commit money laundering. To address safety concerns, prior to their trial, the district court ordered Defendants to file a joint position as to whether they were vaccinated against COVID-19 or intended to be by the start of the trial. The district court further ordered the government and Defendants to inform the court as to whether they would agree to strike unvaccinated individuals from the jury. Defendants responded that they were not vaccinated and did not intend to be vaccinated. However, they agreed they would test for COVID-19 and provide the test results to the court. Defendants objected to the court’s suggestion of striking unvaccinated jurors for cause. At issue on appeal is whether a district court’s sua sponte decision to strike unvaccinated prospective jurors for cause from a properly assembled venire during the COVID-19 pandemic violates the Sixth Amendment’s fair-cross-section requirement.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that Defendants do not have a Sixth Amendment fair-cross-section challenge. The court explained that the fair-cross-section requirement applies to jury venires, not petit juries. And the district court’s decision to strike unvaccinated jurors based on their perceived inability to serve without creating unnecessary safety risks affected the composition of the petit jury for this particular case, not the individuals represented in the venire from which the petit jury is selected. View "US v. Jose Colon" on Justia Law

Appellants challenged the appointment of Social Security Administration Acting Commissioner Nancy Berryhill under the Federal Vacancies Reform Act (FVRA). They argue that no one may serve as an acting officer under 5 U.S.C. Section 3346(a)(2), which allows acting service while a nomination is pending in the Senate unless that nomination occurred during the initial 210-day period of acting service allowed by 5 U.S.C. Section 3346(a)(1). Appellants assert that Section 3346(a)(2) serves only to toll Section 3346(a)(1)’s time limit and does not authorize an independent period of acting service.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court rejected Appellants’ argument because Section 3346(a)(1) and Section 3346(a)(2) are, by their plain text, disjunctive and independent. Because Berryhill was legally serving as Acting Commissioner, her appointments of the ALJs who decided Appellants’ cases were valid. The court explained that Appellants’ reading of the statute would shift the balance against the President. It would prevent him from designating anyone to serve as an acting officer if he submits a nomination after the 210-day period has elapsed, thus leaving the office vacant for as long as the Senate takes to consider it. View "Barbara Rush v. Kilolo Kijakazi" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a claim under 42 U.S.C 405(g), believing the Social Security Administration miscalculated his benefits. He filed his claim more than one year after the SSA verbally denied his request for review, and after he did not receive the requested written documentation of the SSA's denial.The SSA filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Sec. 405(g)’s waiver of sovereign immunity applied only with respect to judicial review of a “final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security” and that Plaintiff had not obtained a final decision, having refused to exhaust the four-step administrative process. The district court granted SSA’s motion.Finding that Sec. 405(g)’s exhaustion requirement is not jurisdictional, the Fourth Circuit nonetheless concluded that exhaustion is a mandatory requirement of the Social Security Act that may be excused only in a narrow set of circumstances, which were not present in this case. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal. View "L.N.P. v. Kilolo Kijakazi" on Justia Law

This case involves a student named J.M. A psychologist diagnosed J.M. with autism spectrum disorder. Based in part on that diagnosis, J.M.’s mother—Plaintiff—asked the local school district to evaluate J.M. for an IEP. Plaintiff disagreed with the IEP team’s conclusion and asked the school district to pay for additional evaluations in five areas it had considered before (adaptive behavior, educational, speech-language, occupational therapy, and autism). Without waiting for another decision from the IEP team, Plaintiff launched the administrative review process by petitioning for a contested case hearing. Plaintiff’s initial filing alleged seven violations of the IDEA. Plaintiff then filed a complaint in federal district court, seeking seven forms of relief.   The Fourth Circuit denied the school district’s motion to dismiss this appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. However, the court saw no basis for disturbing the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the school district. The court explained that beyond making a bare allegation that the ALJ issued an incompetent decision, Plaintiff does not explain how any of the alleged procedural defects she identified corrupted any administrative findings. The court also rejected Plaintiff’s claim that the IEP team acted wrongfully in failing to follow the recommendations of private evaluators in determining J.M.’s eligibility for an IEP. The IDEA does not require school districts to defer to the opinions of private evaluations procured by a parent. To the contrary, the IDEA instructs school districts to rely on diverse tools and information sources in making an eligibility assessment. View "Cheri Miller v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools" on Justia Law

A confidential informant tipped off law enforcement that Defendant was dealing drugs out of his residence in Henderson, North Carolina. In the span of a week, officers used the informant to make two controlled purchases of crack cocaine from Defendant at his residence. Officers presented the informant with a photo of Defendant following the buys, and the informant confirmed Defendant sold him the crack cocaine. A jury convicted Defendant of possessing a firearm and ammunition as a felon, possessing cocaine and marijuana with intent to distribute, and maintaining a place for the purpose of distributing, manufacturing, or using cocaine and marijuana. On appeal, Defendant challenged his convictions on numerous grounds.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that contrary to Defendant’s argument, probable cause did not require the officers to test the crack cocaine after the buys to confirm its illicit nature. In the warrant application, the lead officer stated that he had eight years of law enforcement experience, was assigned to investigate “the possession and sale of illegal controlled substances,” and had received training about controlled substances. The magistrate could reasonably conclude the officer visually identified the substance the informant purchased from Defendant as crack cocaine, even though the warrant application did not say whether the officer tested it.   Further, the court found that here, there was no plain error. The warrant authorized law enforcement to search the duplex and a silver Mercedes. It also authorized officers to seize “Vehicles” and “all 14 electronics.” Officers had an objectively reasonable belief that both the BMW and the cell phone fell within the warrant’s scope. View "US v. Kacey Hicks" on Justia Law

Along with her husband, Plaintiff initiated a civil action against Ethicon, Inc. — the manufacturer and seller of the TVT mesh — and its parent company, Johnson & Johnson. Plaintiffs pursued numerous claims for relief, including a strict product liability claim alleging a design defect in the TVT, as well as a claim for negligent design thereof. Plaintiff’s husband joined in the lawsuit by suing for loss of consortium. Plaintiffs filed their lawsuit in the Southern District of West Virginia as part of a multidistrict litigation captioned (the “MDL”).   The Fourth Circuit availing itself of the privilege afforded by the State of West Virginia through the Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act requested that the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia exercise its discretion to resolve the following certified question of law:Whether Section 411 of the West Virginia Pattern Jury Instructions for Civil Cases, entitled “Design Defect — Necessity of an Alternative, Feasible Design,” correctly specifies Plaintiff’s burden of proof for a strict liability design defect claim pursued under West Virginia law. More specifically, whether a plaintiff alleging a West Virginia strict liability design defect claim is required to prove the existence of an alternative, feasible product design — existing at the time of the subject product’s manufacture — in order to establish that the product was not reasonably safe for its intended use. And if so, whether the alternative, feasible product design must eliminate the risk of the harm suffered by the plaintiff or whether a reduction of that risk is sufficient. View "Judith Shears v. Ethicon, Inc." on Justia Law

When a deputy sheriff in Lexington County, South Carolina, began to follow a vehicle because he thought the driver was behaving suspiciously, the vehicle sped away, failing to stop when the deputy activated his patrol car’s blue light and siren and leading the deputy on a high-speed chase. After the vehicle crashed, the driver, identified as Defendant, was arrested and a firearm and ammunition were recovered from the front floorboard of the driver’s side of the vehicle. Defendant pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and the district court sentenced him to 99 months imprisonment. The 99-month sentence included an enhancement under U.S.S.G. Section 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) for the use or possession of the firearm “in connection with another felony offense,” namely failure to stop for a blue light. At sentencing, Defendant objected to the enhancement on both procedural and substantive grounds.   The Fourth Circuit agreed. The court explained that the district court erred in relying on the blue-light offense to apply a Section 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) enhancement when Defendant received notice of that basis for the first time at the sentencing hearing. However, the court also concluded that the error was, in the circumstances of this case, harmless. Finally, the court concluded that the district court did not clearly err in applying the enhancement when the firearm was lying at Defendant’s feet while he failed to stop for a blue light. View "US v. Jason Dix" on Justia Law

Defendants Southern Coal Corporation and Premium Coal Company, Inc. (collectively, “Southern Coal”) asked the Fourth Circuit to reverse a district court’s order granting a motion to compel compliance with a consent decree (the “Decree”) to which they previously acquiesced. The Decree operated to resolve allegations of approximately 23,693 Clean Water Act violations, pre-litigation, levied against Southern Coal by Plaintiffs Alabama, Kentucky, Tennessee, Virginia, and the United States of America (collectively, the “government”).   The Fourth Circuit affirmed, concluding that the district court properly found the Decree’s plain language to mandate compliance with the Clean Water Act and derivative permitting obligations. The court explained that although the plain language of the Decree clearly supports the district court’s conclusion that Southern Coal was obligated to maintain National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits—and that alone is sufficient basis to affirm—the court may also consider the circumstances surrounding the Decree and the general nature of the remedy agreed upon. Here, the underlying dispute revolved around tens of thousands of NPDES-permitting and CWA violations. It cannot reasonably be argued that, in formulating the Decree, the parties contemplated undermining its efficacy by authorizing the exact conduct that it sought to remedy. If Southern Coal intended such a backdoor to compliance, then it likely did not negotiate the Decree in “good faith” to forge an agreement that was “fair, reasonable, and in the public interest,” as it purported to do as a Decree signatory. View "US v. Southern Coal Corporation" on Justia Law

Attorney and his law firm, Pesner Kawamato Conway, P.C. (collectively, Conway), appealed the district court’s order rejecting the bankruptcy court’s report and recommendation to enjoin Smith Development, Inc.’s legal malpractice suit against Conway and to impose sanctions for violating the Barton doctrine and the automatic stay.   The Fourth Circuit dismissed the appeal, finding that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction because the district court’s decision rests on the abstention principles. The court explained that Conway suggests the district court had no authority to enter an abstention order because, under Barton, the district court itself lacked jurisdiction over Smith Development’s malpractice claims. However, the court wrote that this argument fares no better than the first. Barton concerns subject-matter jurisdiction over a separate action, not jurisdiction over the proceedings in which a party seeks Barton protection in the first place. And even if the court accepted the argument’s doubtful premise, it fails on its own logic because the bankruptcy court issued a report and recommendation to the district court, thereby authorizing the district court to rule on the matter. Further, the court found that even if it recognized a narrow exception to Section 1334(d)’s clear jurisdictional bar, the district court’s order would not fall within it. View "Martin Conway v. Smith Development, Inc." on Justia Law