Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2017, when Plaintiff was in elementary school, he was diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder, language disorder, and anxiety. Between 2017 and 2021, Plaintiff's parents asked Defendant School District at least four times to allow Plaintiff to be accompanied at school by an ABA therapist, at no cost to the school district. The school district denied the first three requests and did not respond to the fourth request.Plaintiff's father filed a three-count complaint against the school under the Rehabilitation Act on behalf of his child. The complaint did not mention the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act. The district court denied Plaintiff's claim based on his failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Plaintiff appealed.The Fourth Circuit held that the district court erred in concluding Plaintiff needed to exhaust administrative remedies under the IDEA before bringing this suit because his complaint was not brought under the IDEA. View "Z. W. v. Horry County School District" on Justia Law

The IRS audited Plaintiff's and erroneously determined he owed tax for 2013 when he had actually overpaid. Plaintiff sought a timely 2012 tax refund based on the discovered miscalculation. Plaintiff claimed that, in the same envelope, he also requested a refund for the 2013 tax year, although the IRS claims it did not receive the 2013 refund request. Ultimately, the IRS awarded Plaintiff the requested 2012 refund, but denied the 2013 refund based on Plaintiff's failure to provide a timely request.Plaintiff sought enforcement of his 2013 refund, which the district court denied. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit held that Plaintiff failed to meet the required elements of the Mailbox Rule but plausibly alleged physical delivery of his refund request. Thus, the Fourth Circuit reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Stephen Pond v. US" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed the district court’s dismissal, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), of their Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) claims. The district court held that Plaintiffs failed to allege that Defendants Global Tel*Link Corp. (“GTL”); Securus Technologies, LLC; and 3Cinteractive Corp. (“3Ci”) proximately caused Plaintiffs’ injuries.   The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s ruling and held that Plaintiffs have pleaded facts that satisfy RICO’s proximate-causation requirement, as explained in Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indemnity Co., 553 U.S. 639 (2008). The court explained that RICO proximate causation is lacking when (1) there is a “more direct victim” from whom (or intervening factor from which) the plaintiff’s injuries derive, or (2) the alleged RICO predicate violation is “too distinct” or logically unrelated from the cause of the plaintiff’s injury. Plaintiffs’ complaint suffers from neither deficiency. As Plaintiffs point out, the governments’ injuries could be cured if Defendants paid higher site commissions—even if Plaintiffs paid the same inflated price. So Plaintiffs’ injuries aren’t derivative of those suffered by the governments. Rather, Plaintiffs and the governments are both direct victims. View "Ashley Albert v. Global TelLink Corp." on Justia Law

After committing or attempting to commit thirteen robberies, Defendant was indicted on twenty-two counts of robbery-related activity and one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. Before a jury could return a verdict in Defendant’s original trial, it was deemed a mistrial. Before a retrial the district court severed Defendant’s charges into two trials—one for the felon in possession of a firearm charge and another for the robbery-related charges. After both trials resulted in guilty verdicts on all counts, Defendant filed motions for a judgment of acquittal in each case, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions. The district court denied the motions. Defendant appealed, contesting the district court’s decisions on both motions for acquittal, the district court’s enforcement of a stipulation in the retrial, and the district court’s use of certain jointly proposed jury instructions, and alleging a speedy trial violation.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the parties entered into an open-ended stipulation in which they both agreed that Defendant’s alleged robberies affected commerce. That Defendant later regretted entering into the stipulation is not sufficient to relieve him of its continuing effect. Further, there was sufficient evidence supporting Defendant’s conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm. Defendant stipulated that he was previously convicted of a felony and knew of his status as a felon. As to the possession element, the relevant firearm was purchased by Defendant’s on-again-off-again girlfriend. Finally, the court held that Defendant waived his right to assert a speedy trial violation. View "US v. Christopher Robertson" on Justia Law

At issue is whether the admissions policy (hereinafter the “challenged admissions policy” or the “Policy”) adopted by Virginia’s Fairfax County School Board (the “Board”) in 2020 for use at Thomas Jefferson High School for Science & Technology (“TJ”) purposefully discriminates against Asian American students, in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. In March 2021, the Coalition for TJ (the “Coalition”) — an advocacy organization of Fairfax County public school parents — commenced this litigation against the Board in the Eastern District of Virginia, seeking to have the challenged admissions policy invalidated as unconstitutional. In February 2022, following the submission by the parties of cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court ruled that the challenged admissions policy violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection.   The Fourth Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded for entry of summary judgment in favor of the Board. The court held that it is satisfied that the challenged admissions policy does not disparately impact Asian American students and that the Coalition cannot establish that the Board adopted its race-neutral policy with any discriminatory intent. Moreover, the court wrote that it is satisfied that the policy passes constitutional muster under a rational basis standard of review. Accordingly, it is the Board — not the Coalition — that is entitled to summary judgment on the Equal Protection claim. View "Coalition for TJ v. Fairfax County School Board" on Justia Law

In 2009, a jury convicted Movant of knowingly possessing a firearm as a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sections 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). He was sentenced to 180 months imprisonment. His direct appeal and initial application for postconviction relief under 28 U.S.C. Section 2255 were unsuccessful. Now, he moved the Fourth Circuit for authorization to file a second or successive Section 2255 application premised on the Supreme Court’s decision in Rehaif v. United States. And he argued in the alternative that if his motion is denied, he will be authorized to file a traditional Section 2241 habeas application through Section 2255(e)’s savings clause.   The Fourth Circuit denied Movant’s motion for authorization to file a second or successive Section 2255 application because Rehaif did not announce a constitutional rule. But as a consequence of our determination that he may not file a Section 2255 application, the court held that he may file a Section 2241 application under the savings clause. The court explained that it is true that, after Rehaif, possessing a firearm as a felon remains criminal under Section 922(g). But the government did not charge Movant with simply “possessing” a firearm in violation of Section 922(g). It charged him with “knowingly” doing so under Sections 922(g) and 924(a). That his conviction might have survived Rehaif if the government had charged him under Section 922(g) alone is of no moment: the government chose not to do so. View "In re: Randolph McNeill" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of one count of acting as an unregistered agent of a foreign government and one count of criminal conspiracy. The district court granted a judgment of acquittal as to both charges and conditionally granted a new trial in the event the judgment of acquittal was reversed on appeal. On appeal, in Rafiekian I, the Fourth Circuit reversed the judgments of acquittal, vacated and remanded the court’s new-trial order, and noted that the district court “may have additional justifications for its decision” that it failed to explain. On remand, ordered a new trial. The government appealed.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that because the government’s case relied on the jury’s drawing inferences of guilt, the district court had no choice but to examine those inferences in considering the new trial motion. Barring the district court from granting a new trial based solely on disagreement with the jury’s inferences of guilt would place this class of cases beyond the reach of the new-trial standard. The government is entitled to rely on circumstantial evidence, but it is not entitled to special deference when it does so.   In this case, because the district court determined that a new trial was warranted based on the weight of the evidence, the court’s role is only to ask whether the court abused its discretion in doing so. Exercising “great deference” to the district court’s “discretionary assessments of the balance of the evidence,” the court held that it did not. View "US v. Bijan Rafiekian" on Justia Law

The law firm of Brown Goldstein Levy LLP (“BGL”) and one of its partners (collectively, “Appellants”) filed suit against their insurer, Federal Insurance Company (“Appellee”), when it refused to provide coverage for costs Appellants incurred after the Government investigated the partner, executed a search warrant at BGL’s office, and notified the partner that his representation of certain clients may present a conflict of interest. The district court dismissed Appellants’ complaint, holding that there was no “Claim,” as that term is defined in the insurance policy, and alternatively that any costs Appellants incurred were excluded from the policy’s definition of “loss.”   The Fourth Circuit affirmed, concluding that there is no “Claim.” Neither the search warrant application nor the resulting search warrant is “written demand[s] or written request[s] for . . . nonmonetary relief . . . against an Insured” as required by the Policy. Therefore, the Search Warrant Claim fails because Appellants cannot state a claim for relief. The Target Conflict Letter makes no demand or request for relief against an Insured. The Government’s request to be notified promptly as to how the partner intends to proceed is not a request for “the redress or benefit, esp. equitable in nature (such as an injunction or specific performance), that a party asks of a court.” The Conflict Letters are not “Claims.” The court explained that despite Appellants’ attempts to characterize them as “demands,” they are not. Therefore, Appellants cannot state a claim as to the Partner Claim. View "Brown Goldstein Levy LLP v. Federal Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to two counts of using a firearm to commit murder in the course of a “crime of violence,” in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 924(j). In 2016, he filed a pro se motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 2255. In the motion, he cited the Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015), which held that the “residual clause” in the Armed Career Criminal Act’s (“ACCA”) definition of “violent felony,” was unconstitutionally vague. The district court dismissed the motion. The court concluded that Johnson did not affect the validity of Defendant’s Section 924(j) convictions because they rested on predicate “crimes of violence”, not on the ACCA definition of “violent felony.” While Defendant’s appeal was pending, the Supreme Court held that the residual clause in Section 924(c)’s definition of a “crime of violence” was unconstitutionally vague, recognizing the specific right Defendant asserted in his Section 2255 motion.   The Fourth Circuit vacated Defendant’s conviction and sentence on the other Section 924(j) count because the conviction is unsupported by a valid predicate offense, and the Government concedes that he is entitled to relief. The court explained that because Defendant filed his motion within one year of Johnson and Davis extended the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Johnson, the court held that it was timely. Nevertheless, the court affirmed the dismissal of Defendant’s motion as to one of his Section 924(j) convictions because Defendant procedurally defaulted his claim challenging the conviction and cannot establish grounds for excusing the default. View "US v. Andra Green" on Justia Law

The North Carolina Occupational Safety and Health Hazard Association (“NC OSHA”) issued several itemized citations to Industrial Services Group (“ISG”) following the on-site deaths of two ISG employees. Soon thereafter, ISG filed for declaratory and injunctive relief against two North Carolina state officials, Josh Dobson, the North Carolina Commissioner of Labor and acting Chief Administrative Officer for the North Carolina Department of Labor (“NCDOL”), and Kevin Beauregard, the Director of NCDOL’s Occupational Safety and Health Division, (collectively “Defendants”). ISG alleged that the issued citations were unlawful because they stemmed from North Carolina’s occupational health and safety plan, which in their view, violates 29 U.S.C. Section 657(h) of the federal Occupational Safety and Health Act (“OSH Act”). The district court denied Defendants’ motions to dismiss and for judgment on pleadings, holding that they were not entitled to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity because ISG’s claims satisfied the Ex Parte Young exception.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision to deny Defendants Eleventh Amendment immunity and decline to exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction over Defendants’ newly-raised claims. Here, ISG’s Complaint alleges that the NC State Plan has and continues to violate the OSH Act. It also claims that Dobson and Beauregard, who in their official capacities are responsible for overseeing NCDOL’s implementation of the NC State Plan and its conformity with federal law, are accountable for the unlawful employee evaluation practices. Relying on that, the Complaint does not seek action by North Carolina but rather by the named Defendants who are at the helm of the NC State Plan’s operation. Thus, the individuals were properly named as such in this suit. View "Industrial Services Group, Inc. v. Josh Dobson" on Justia Law