Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The appeal is another installment in a series of disputes involving an enforcement action by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) against a group of fraudulent real estate developers (the Sanctuary Belize enforcement action). Appellants, a group of 14 individual investors and a family-owned corporation moved to intervene in an action brought by others and sought relief from the district court’s judgment. Appellants did not do so until after the district court had entered final judgment and that judgment had been appealed to the Fourth Circuit. Because the Sanctuary Belize enforcement action was already on appeal when Appellants filed their motions, the district court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain those motions. It held alternatively that the motions should be denied as meritless.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court held that a district court lacks jurisdiction over a motion to intervene while an appeal is pending, regardless of who noted the appeal. Further, the court explained that because the district court correctly determined it lacked jurisdiction on a matter that had been appealed to the Fourth Circuit, the court held that it only has jurisdiction to review that decision, not to entertain the underlying merits. View "Federal Trade Commission v. Yu Lin" on Justia Law

Law firm Halscott Megaro, P.A. (“Halscott Megaro” or “the firm”) sued former clients and their guardians (collectively “former clients”), seeking to recover unpaid legal fees and expenses. A district court dismissed the action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The district court took judicial notice of a North Carolina State Bar Disciplinary Hearing Commission (“Commission”) decision that found the firm’s lead partner misled the former clients and engaged in other unethical conduct. The court then held the firm was precluded from relitigating issues decided by the Commission. It held that Halscott Megaro failed to plausibly plead claims for which relief could be granted. Halscott Megaro appealed, arguing the district court improperly considered matters outside the pleadings and failed to accept its allegations and all reasonable inferences from them as true in concluding that the Commission’s decision as to its lead partner bound the law firm.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed and held that the district court committed no reversible error in granting the former clients’ motion to dismiss or in denying the law firm’s motion for recusal. The court wrote that it agreed with the district court’s conclusion that the Commission was acting in a judicial capacity when it entered its discipline order against Megaro. The court also agreed that Megaro received a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues and due process protections. Further, the court held that the firm’s allegations of impartiality were not related to any particular facts, sources or statements. A presiding judge is not required to recuse himself simply because of unsupported or highly tenuous speculation. View "Halscott Megaro, P.A. v. Henry McCollum" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought a wrongful-termination action against her former employer—the North Carolina Department of Justice—and two former supervisors in their official and individual capacities. The district court dismissed some claims as barred by sovereign immunity and dismissed the entirety of the complaint as time-barred.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the uncontested dismissal of the North Carolina Department of Justice and the uncontested dismissal of the official-capacity claims against the individual Defendants for money damages. But because the statute of limitations for the remaining claims is four years and not three years as the district court found, the court explained it must otherwise vacate the district court’s grant of Defendants’ motion to dismiss the individual Defendants from the action.   The court explained that here, Plaintiff brought a Section 1983 action for wrongful termination in violation of Section 1981. A wrongful termination claim is based on post-contract-formation conduct. The court reasoned that as Defendants correctly recognized at oral argument, it would not have been possible for Plaintiff to bring this action prior to December 1, 1990, because, before that date, Section 1981 was limited to discrimination in contract formation and enforcement. In 1991, Congress expanded Section 1981 to include discrimination post-contract formation. Therefore, the 1991 amendment to Section 1981 “made possible” this Section 1983 action, and the four-year catchall statute of limitations provided by Section 1658 applies. View "Margaret Chambers v. North Carolina Department of Justice" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed from the sentence he received after pleading guilty to unlawfully possessing a firearm and ammunition in contravention of 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g)(1). Defendant contends that the district court erred by treating a federal drug offense on which he was convicted in 2014 — aiding and abetting in the distribution of a controlled substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. Section 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. Section 2 — as being a “controlled substance offense” that increased his Sentencing Guidelines offense level. Defendant has proffered two principal arguments as to why his 2014 offense is not a “controlled substance offense” under the Guidelines. First, he asserts that aiding and abetting in a drug offense cannot be treated as a “controlled substance offense” in Guidelines calculations. Second, Defendant maintains that, in any event, each and every Section 841(a)(1) distribution offense is disqualified from such treatment.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed and rejected Defendant’s challenge to his sentence. The court wrote that it must reject each of Defendant’s two principal arguments as to why his 2014 offense — aiding and abetting in a 21 U.S.C. Section 841(a)(1) drug distribution offense — is not a “controlled substance offense” under the Sentencing Guidelines. First, the Guidelines’ definition of a “controlled substance offense” includes aiding and abetting in a drug offense. Second, although the Guidelines exclude attempt offenses, Section 841(a)(1) does not criminalize attempt such that an  841(a)(1) distribution offense would be categorically disqualified from being treated as a “controlled substance offense.” View "US v. Patrick Groves" on Justia Law

The Loudoun County Public Schools (the “LCPS”) developed and implemented a “Student Equity Ambassador Program” “to amplify the voices of Students of Color and those who have experienced or witnessed injustices, marginalization, or discrimination.” In response, the parents of several children who attend the LCPS sued the Loudoun County School Board (the “School Board”) on behalf of their minor children, asserting Equal Protection and First Amendment claims, claiming their children are not eligible for the Program due to their race or viewpoint.The district court granted the School Board's motion to dismiss and the parents appealed.On appeal, the Fourth Circuit held that the parents did not have standing to challenge the Student Equity Ambassador Program because their children did not apply for the program or even express an interest in applying. However, the court also held that the parents plausibly alleged that implementing the Program chilled their children’s speech to support their First Amendment claims. Thus, the court vacated the district court's ruling on the parents' First Amendment claims. View "Patti Menders v. Loudoun County School Board" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was dismissed from the Univeristy of Virginia's doctoral program after receiving poor grades. Plaintiff sued, alleging national origin discrimination and retaliation based on interactions with his immediate supervisor. The district court granted the school's motion to dismiss and Plaintiff appealed.The Fourth Circuit affirmed, finding that although his supervisor made derogatory comments about Plaintiff's national origin, they were not made in close proximity to the school's decision to dismiss Plaintiff. The supervisor made a "handful" of comments over the course of four years, none of which were close in time to the Plaintiff receiving poor grades or being dismissed from the program. View "Andreas Alberti v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, who is serving a sentence for murder, filed a pro se § 1983 complaint in federal court, seeking damages for alleged constitutional violations committed by the State of South Carolina, various state entities and officials, and his defense attorney. Plaintiff, who was filing his first civil rights suit as a prisoner, moved for leave to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. Section 1915, and the district court granted his motion.A magistrate judge screened Plaintiff's case, finding it was barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), under which a § 1983 plaintiff seeking damages for an unconstitutional conviction must first show that his conviction was reversed or otherwise set aside. The court also found prosecutorial immunity and sovereign immunity precluded relief. The magistrate judge then recommended that Plaintiff's case be “designated a ‘strike’ pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1915(g).”The Fourth Circuit reversed, finding that the district court may not "contemporaneously rule that its dismissal of a complaint constitutes a strike." In so holding, the Fourth Circuit joined all other circuits that have considered the issue. View "Kevin Pitts v. State of South Carolina" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was on active duty with the United States Army. He bought a car from Select Cars of Thornburg in Fredericksburg, Virginia, and financed his purchase with a loan from United Auto Credit Corporation. The loan financed not only the car’s cost but also the cost of Guaranteed Asset Protection. Guaranteed Asset Protection is like extra insurance, covering any amount still due on the car loan after auto insurance is paid out if the car is totaled or stolen. Plaintiff’s claims arise from this single loan. This loan, Plaintiff alleged, violated the Military Lending Act because the loan agreement mandated arbitration and failed to disclose certain information. The district court dismissed the case, holding that the loan was not covered by the Act at all.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that a statutory provision must be given the ordinary meaning it had when it was enacted. Relevant dictionaries, carefully considered, sometimes shed light on that ordinary meaning. Yet here, dueling dictionaries provide more than one linguistically permissible meaning.  But by examining the relevant phrase in its statutory context. This context shows that while “the express purpose” can be used in different senses, it is best read in Section 987(i)(6) to mean the specific purpose. This loan was offered for the specific purpose of financing Plaintiff’s car purchase. And that satisfies Section 987(i)(6)’s relevant condition and the Act is inapplicable. View "Jerry Davidson v. United Auto Credit Corporation" on Justia Law

A superseding indictment charged two defendants, husband and wife, with conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to distribute one kilogram or more of heroin and five kilograms or more of cocaine and conspiracy to commit money laundering. To address safety concerns, prior to their trial, the district court ordered Defendants to file a joint position as to whether they were vaccinated against COVID-19 or intended to be by the start of the trial. The district court further ordered the government and Defendants to inform the court as to whether they would agree to strike unvaccinated individuals from the jury. Defendants responded that they were not vaccinated and did not intend to be vaccinated. However, they agreed they would test for COVID-19 and provide the test results to the court. Defendants objected to the court’s suggestion of striking unvaccinated jurors for cause. At issue on appeal is whether a district court’s sua sponte decision to strike unvaccinated prospective jurors for cause from a properly assembled venire during the COVID-19 pandemic violates the Sixth Amendment’s fair-cross-section requirement.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that Defendants do not have a Sixth Amendment fair-cross-section challenge. The court explained that the fair-cross-section requirement applies to jury venires, not petit juries. And the district court’s decision to strike unvaccinated jurors based on their perceived inability to serve without creating unnecessary safety risks affected the composition of the petit jury for this particular case, not the individuals represented in the venire from which the petit jury is selected. View "US v. Jose Colon" on Justia Law

Appellants challenged the appointment of Social Security Administration Acting Commissioner Nancy Berryhill under the Federal Vacancies Reform Act (FVRA). They argue that no one may serve as an acting officer under 5 U.S.C. Section 3346(a)(2), which allows acting service while a nomination is pending in the Senate unless that nomination occurred during the initial 210-day period of acting service allowed by 5 U.S.C. Section 3346(a)(1). Appellants assert that Section 3346(a)(2) serves only to toll Section 3346(a)(1)’s time limit and does not authorize an independent period of acting service.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court rejected Appellants’ argument because Section 3346(a)(1) and Section 3346(a)(2) are, by their plain text, disjunctive and independent. Because Berryhill was legally serving as Acting Commissioner, her appointments of the ALJs who decided Appellants’ cases were valid. The court explained that Appellants’ reading of the statute would shift the balance against the President. It would prevent him from designating anyone to serve as an acting officer if he submits a nomination after the 210-day period has elapsed, thus leaving the office vacant for as long as the Senate takes to consider it. View "Barbara Rush v. Kilolo Kijakazi" on Justia Law