Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff a deaf man, sought an interpreter to communicate with Novant Health Huntersville Medical Center during his wife’s childbirth there. After Novant Health failed to provide him with a live interpreter or a functioning Video Remote Interpreting device, Plaintiff filed this disability discrimination lawsuit. The district court dismissed his claim.   The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment finding that the district court applied an incorrect standard of law. The court held that under the proper standard, Plaintiff has plausibly pled enough under the Rehabilitation Act to survive a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) dismissal motion. The court explained that Patients often arrive at hospitals in pain, unconscious, or feeling intense stress. In these situations, which can be not only confusing but overwhelming, a patient’s companion, often a spouse or a family member, may be the only advocate available. Plaintiff, a hearing-impaired individual, was unable to communicate his wife’s complicated medical history to her doctors during childbirth, despite repeated requests for some effective means of doing so. The situation was a highrisk one for the couple, and the medical event one of the highest urgency and meaning. To have that single advocate barred from communication with a hospital and its staff is to leave the patient stranded. View "Neil Basta v. Novant Health Incorporated" on Justia Law

Less than a year after being released from federal prison, Defendant “engaged in an unjustified, merciless beating” of an unarmed, 72-year-old security guard that caused “permanent damage” to one of the victim’s eyes. The probation officer petitioned to revoke Defendant’s supervised release. In rulings not challenged here, the district court found Defendant committed the alleged offense and that it constituted first-degree assault and battery under South Carolina law. The primary issue on appeal was whether that offense is a “crime of violence” under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that the district court correctly determined that South Carolina Code Section 16-3- 600(C)(1)(b)(i) is a crime of violence under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. The court explained that even if it might be possible to imagine a case of first-degree assault and battery via a reckless offer, that would not change the court’s conclusion. To exclude a state offense under the elements clause, “there must be a realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility, that a state would actually punish that conduct.” But given the text of this statute—and “the total absence of case law” involving any such prosecutions—we conclude “there is not a realistic probability that South Carolina would punish” a reckless offer as first-degree assault and battery. View "US v. Sonny Mack" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a group of seventeen environmental organizations, sued the Council on Environmental Quality in July 2020 related to the Trump Administration’s promulgation of a final rule that affected how federal agencies would conduct reviews under the National Environmental Policy Act. On appeal the issue is whether the district court had jurisdiction to consider this particular challenge, as Plaintiffs have chosen to frame it, at this stage.   The Fourth Circuit agreed with the district court that it did not have jurisdiction. The court explained that Plaintiffs argue that forcing them to litigate their claims one project at a time will be time- and resource-intensive, for them and for the courts. Certainly, it would be more efficient for the parties and the courts if the court could adjudicate the 2020 Rule in one preemptive fell swoop. But such efficiency concerns cannot generate jurisdiction. They just will need to bring such a challenge under circumstances where they can present evidence sufficient to support federal-court jurisdiction. View "Wild Virginia v. Council on Environmental Quality" on Justia Law

Four years into Defendant’s prison term for a felony drug offense, the government transferred him to Mexico to serve the rest of his sentence. But after Mexican authorities released him from prison, Defendant returned to the United States in violation of his conditions of supervised release. The district court revoked his supervised release and sentenced him to another two years in prison. On appeal, Defendant claimed that a 1976 U.S.-Mexico treaty stripped the district court of its subject-matter jurisdiction to revoke his supervised release. And even if the district court did have jurisdiction, he argues, it erred in considering his “early” release from Mexican custody in imposing an upward variance.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court declined to vacate Defendant’s sentence finding that the Treaty doesn’t strip U.S. courts of their jurisdiction—and particularly not for transferees like Defendant, who return to the country before completing their original sentences. Further, the court explained that Defendant is incorrect in his claim that the district court based the sentence on its “disapproval of the transfer decisions and Mexico’s incarceration term.” Rather, the court disapproved of Defendant’s behavior after he was released. Defendant’s sentence wasn’t procedurally or substantively unreasonable, much less plainly so. View "US v. Escovio Rios" on Justia Law

Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company denied Plaintiff’s claim for long-term disability benefits after concluding that she was not “Totally Disabled” as defined by her disability insurance plan. Plaintiff brought an under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. Section 1132(a)(1)(B), arguing that the denial of benefits violated that Act. After conducting a bench trial under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52, the district court awarded judgment to Plaintiff. Reliance appealed, arguing that courts in the Fourth Circuit are required to resolve ERISA denial-of-benefits cases via summary judgment and that the district court erred in dispensing with this case through a bench trial. Reliance also argued that this Court must review the district court’s legal conclusions.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court first held that because the plan at issue here did not require objective proof of disability, the court rejected Reliance’s contention that Plaintiff’s claim fails for the lack of such evidence. Further, the court wrote that the record supports the district court’s determination that Plaintiff’s disability was not limited to a “specific locale.” Accordingly, the court agreed that Plaintiff was “totally disabled” under the terms of the plan. View "Anita Tekmen v. Reliance Standard Life Ins." on Justia Law

Plaintiff’s estate sued the Virginia Department of Corrections (“Department”) and several prison officials under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and Virginia law, alleging that they violated the Eighth Amendment and state law by failing to provide Plaintiff treatment for his chronic hepatitis C until it was too late.   Defendants in this appeal are Dr. A and Dr. W. Plaintiff alleges that Dr. A designed treatment guidelines for inmates with hepatitis C that unconstitutionally excluded Plaintiff from receiving treatment. Plaintiff also alleges that Dr. W failed to follow those guidelines and committed both medical malpractice and Eighth Amendment violations in denying him appropriate treatment. Defendants unsuccessfully moved for summary judgment, alleging that they were protected by qualified immunity and, on Dr. W’s part, derivative sovereign immunity.   The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of sovereign immunity to Dr. W and denial of qualified immunity to Dr. A but affirm its denial of qualified immunity to Dr. W. The court declined to hold that Dr. A was clearly on notice that he should have ordered the Department’s primary care providers to prescribe this novel treatment rather than referring patients to specialists for treatment.  Further, the court explained a prisoner’s purported right not to be subjected to a treatment regimen that prioritized antiviral treatment to prisoners with the most advanced levels of fibrosis was not clearly established when Dr. A designed the Guidelines in 2015. Moreover, three of the four factors strongly weigh in favor of sovereign immunity, and one only moderately weighs against it. Therefore, the court concluded that the district court erred by rejecting Dr. W’s sovereign-immunity defense. View "Jacob Pfaller v. Mark Amonette" on Justia Law

Defendant was resentenced to a 188-month term of imprisonment, the district court denied his motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. Section 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) (authorizing district courts to “reduce the term of imprisonment” on finding “extraordinary and compelling reasons” to do so). In his Section 3582(c) motion, Defendant argued that he has significant health issues that place him at an elevated risk of serious illness were he to contract COVID-19 and that the relevant Section 3553(a) factors warrant his immediate release. The Government opposed Defendant’s motion, citing a number of measures that the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) has taken to protect inmates, like Defendant, from COVID-19. Further, it argued that the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. Section 3553(a) weigh against reducing Defendant’s term of imprisonment. On appeal, Defendant contends the district court abused its discretion by essentially applying a per se rule that individuals vaccinated against COVID-19 were ineligible for Section 3582(c) release.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the finding that both Defendant’s arguments misrepresent the record and are without merit. The court explained that the district court considered numerous Section 3553(a) factors, responding both to Defendant’s arguments for release and the Government’s arguments against release. Critically, Defendant’s resentencing and his motion for compassionate release both took place in front of the same district judge on the same day during the same hearing. Nearly all the considerations that Defendant claimed were absent from the court’s compassionate-release analysis were comprehensively addressed immediately prior during the hearing’s resentencing phase. View "US v. Rayco Bethea" on Justia Law

The North Carolina Insurance Guaranty Association (“Appellant”) to the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”) sought an advisory opinion about whether Appellant is required to reimburse Medicare for certain medical bills that Medicare pays on behalf of insured individuals. CMS declined to issue the requested opinion. Dissatisfied with this response, Appellant filed this action against Alex M. Azar, II, in his official capacity as Secretary of the United States Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”), HHS, and CMS (collectively, “Appellees”).   In this appeal, Appellant challenges the district court’s determination that Appellant lacked standing to bring this action because it failed to plausibly allege that it suffered an injury-in-fact. Additionally, Appellant challenges the district court’s conclusion that it did not possess jurisdiction over the action because Appellant failed to exhaust its administrative remedies.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Appellant’s complaint. The court concluded that the district court properly determined that it did not have jurisdiction over this case because 42 U.S.C. Section 405(h) precludes federal question jurisdiction for claims against the United States or its agents if such claims arise under the Medicare Act. The court further wrote that the existence of the administrative appeal is fatal to Appellant’s claim that it is completely precluded from seeking review of its argument that it is not a primary plan through the administrative process. Additionally, the court agreed with the district court that the ordinary exceptions to the exhaustion requirement are inapplicable here, particularly in light of the Supreme Court’s guidance in Illinois Council. View "North Carolina Insurance Guaranty Association v. Xavier Becerra" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an inmate at U.S. Penitentiary Lee in western Virginia, commenced this action pro se against officials and employees of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, seeking monetary damages and other relief against Defendants, based on the manner in which he was treated in prison and the conditions of his confinement. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing, as relevant here, that Plaintiff’s claims were not cognizable under Bivens. The district court granted Defendants’ motion and dismissed Plaintiff’s action.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that the inmate’s claim is, under the applicable standard, different from any Supreme Court decision finding a Bivens cause of action and that the relief he seeks in this new context should be provided by Congress, if at all. The court wrote its conclusion is based on the broad nature of the inmate’s claim and the separation-of-powers implications of recognizing a Bivens cause of action in the new context of his claim. View "Raymond Tate v. D. J. Harmon" on Justia Law

Defendant was resentenced to a 188-month term of imprisonment, the district court denied his motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. Section 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) (authorizing district courts to “reduce the term of imprisonment” on finding “extraordinary and compelling reasons” to do so). In his § 3582(c) motion, Defendant argued that he has significant health issues that place him at an elevated risk of serious illness were he to contract COVID-19 and that the relevant Section 3553(a) factors warrant his immediate release. On appeal, Defendant contended the district court abused its discretion by essentially applying a per se rule that individuals vaccinated against COVID-19 were ineligible for Section 3582(c) release. In addition, he argues the district court improperly based its Section 3553(a) analysis on one factor to the exclusion of others.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment and found that Defendant’s arguments misrepresent the record and are without merit. Rather, the district court considered numerous Section 3553(a) factors, responding both to Defendant’s arguments for release and the Government’s arguments against release. Critically, Defendant’s resentencing and his motion for compassionate release both took place in front of the same district judge on the same day during the same hearing. Nearly all the considerations that Bethea claims were absent from the court’s compassionate-release analysis were comprehensively addressed immediately prior to the hearing’s resentencing phase. In assessing the adequacy of its Section 3553(a) assessment, it is appropriate to consider the totality of the district court’s statements. Therefore, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant’s motion for compassionate release. View "US v. Rayco Bethea" on Justia Law