Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Prior to Defendant’s criminal trial for transferring obscene material to a minor, the district court relied on Federal Rule of Evidence 403 to exclude evidence that the recipient of the allegedly obscene material was Miller’s fourteen-year-old sister. The Government appealed, asserting that the court abused its discretion in excluding the evidence because it relates to elements of the offense and is necessary for the Government to tell the complete story of how the crime occurred.   The court, in considering the evidence’s high probative value and minimal risk of unfair prejudice, found that the district court plainly abused its discretion in excluding the evidence. The court explained that for the Government to tell a complete story of Defendant’s crime that “satisfies the jurors’ expectations,” the Government must tell the jury how he knew the victim before presenting the allegedly obscene letter that resulted from his contact with her. The court concluded that the probative value of the Government’s evidence is not substantially outweighed by risk of unfair prejudice. Moreover, in view of the foregoing, the court held that the district court’s error in excluding the evidence warrants reversal as a plain abuse of discretion. View "US v. Darrin Miller" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, on behalf of the Estate of former federal inmate brought suit against the United States and several Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) officials after the decedent was allegedly beaten to death by fellow inmates. The Estate (“Appellant”) alleges that BOP officials violated the Eighth Amendment by failing to protect the decedent from the attack and failing to intervene to prevent his transfer to a “violent” facility. Appellant also sued the United States pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), alleging that prison officials had been negligent in their failure to intervene and protect the decedent. Appellant argues that its Eighth Amendment claims are cognizable under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) and its progeny.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that the Appellant’s Bivens claims arise in a new context and that several special factors, including separation-of-power implications and an increased burden on the federal prison system, counsel against an extension of Bivens in this new context. The court also concluded that the discretionary function exception to the FTCA applies to BOP officials’ decisions to transfer Bulger and place him in general population. View "William Bulger v. Hugh Hurwitz" on Justia Law

Appellants are a Swiss consortium, Interprofession du Gruyère (“IDG”), and a French consortium, Syndicat Interprofessionel du Gruyère (“SIG”) (together, “the Consortiums”), who believe that gruyere should only be used to label cheese that is produced in the Gruyère region of Switzerland and France. Seeking to enforce this limitation in the United States, the Consortiums filed an application with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) to register the word “GRUYERE” as a certification mark. Appellees, the U.S. Dairy Export Council, Atalanta Corporation, and Intercibus, Inc. (together, “the Opposers”), opposed this certification mark because they believe the term is generic and, therefore, ineligible for such protection. The USPTO’s Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (“TTAB”) agreed with the Opposers and held that “GRUYERE” could not be registered as a certification mark because it is generic. The Consortiums filed a complaint challenging the TTAB’s decision in the United States district court. The district court granted summary judgment for the Opposers on the same grounds as articulated in the TTAB’s decision.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed and concluded that that the term “GRUYERE” is generic as a matter of law. The court explained that the Consortiums have not brought evidence bearing on whether, at an earlier point in history, the term “GRUYERE” was in common use in the United States. But even assuming that was the case, this argument still fails. In sum, the Consortiums cannot overcome what the record makes clear: cheese consumers in the United States understand “GRUYERE” to refer to a type of cheese, which renders the term generic. View "Interprofession du Gruyere v. U.S. Dairy Export Council" on Justia Law

On March 20, Plaintiff, an inmate, experienced abdominal pain, nausea, and vomiting. He was transported to an outside hospital for evaluation and testing. The results were deemed “unremarkable,” and Plaintiff was returned to his home institution. Ultimately, Plaintiff was diagnosed with an abdominal infection due to a small bowel obstruction and alleged permanent injury.Plaintiff brought a claim of deliberate indifference against various prison officials ("Defendants"). The district court dismisses Plaintiff's claim under 12(b)(6). Defendants argued that Plaintiff's “generalized, conclusory, and collective allegations” fail to plausibly allege deliberate indifference on the part of each Defendant.The Fourth Circuit affirmed. Plaintiff's complaint made collective allegations against all “Defendants,” without identifying how each individual Defendant personally interacted with Langford or was responsible for the denial of his Eighth Amendment rights. View "Chad Langford v. Hector Joyner" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested for various sexual exploitation offenses related to photographs he took of his daughter after law enforcement executed a search warrant at his home, leading to the discovery of certain photographs. Defendant was ultimately convicted and appealed.On appeal, Defendant challenged the district court's denial of his motion to suppress, arguing that the warrant affidavit lacked probable cause because the conduct described occurred five to eight years earlier and that the good faith exception did not apply. Defendant also challenged the admission of video evidence of the complaining witness. Finally, he challenged the application of a sentencing enhancement under Sec. 4B1.5(b)(1) of the Sentencing Guidelines based on "a pattern of activity involving prohibited sexual conduct."The Fourth Circuit affirmed. Regarding Defendant's motion to suppress, the court held that the district court appropriately concluded that probable cause existed, given the nature of the allegations and the type of evidence that was the object of the search. Regarding the challenged evidence, the court explained that the videos were "inextricably intertwined" with evidence of the charged offense. Finally, the court rejected Defendant's claim of error regarding the sentencing enhancement, finding that the district court did not commit clear error in finding Defendant's conduct showed a "pattern of activity" of prohibited sexual conduct. View "US v. William Ebert" on Justia Law

The Employees’ Retirement System of the City of Baton Rouge and Parish of East Baton Rouge represents the class of persons and entities who acquired shares of common stock in MacroGenics, Inc. (“MacroGenics”) between February 6, 2019, and June 4, 2019 (the “Class Period”). Plaintiffs initiated an action against MacroGenics, its president and CEO, and its senior vice president and CFO (collectively “Defendants”) for alleged violations of sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) Rule 10b–5, and sections 11, 12(a), and 15 of the Securities Act of 1933. In their Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs alleged that after purchasing MacroGenics’ stock, they experienced economic harm proximately caused by Defendants’ material misrepresentations, misleading statements, or omissions concerning MacroGenics’ clinical trial drug, Margetuximab. The district court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss after concluding that Plaintiffs had failed to sufficiently allege any actionable misrepresentations or omissions that would give rise to Defendants’ duty to disclose and that most of Defendants’ statements were also immunized from suit.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate any materially false, misleading representations or omissions in Defendants’ statements. Because Plaintiffs’ Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) claims are inextricably intertwined with the alleged misstatements and omissions raised under their Exchange Act claims, their Securities Act claims cannot prevail. Further, because Plaintiffs have failed to plead a primary violation of the Securities Act, they have consequently failed to plead a Section 15 violation View "Employees' Retirement System of the City of Baton v. Macrogenics, Inc." on Justia Law

While on supervised release for a child pornography conviction, Defendant submitted to polygraph testing. During his polygraph exam, Defendant admitted to possessing adult pornography. In addition, his answers to other questions indicated possible deception. After the exam, Defendant’s probation officer asked him if he possessed child pornography. Linville admitted he did. Then, after he and the probation officer traveled to Defendant’s home, he turned the adult and child pornography over to probation. In addition to petitioning for the revocation of his supervised release, the government charged Defendant with possession of child pornography. Defendant moved to suppress his statement to his probation officer, admitting that he possessed child pornography and that the child pornography was at his home.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the special condition did not indicate invoking the Fifth Amendment would lead to the revocation of Defendant’s supervised release. Nor did Defendant demonstrate a reasonable belief that he would be punished for invoking his Fifth Amendment rights. The court explained that the government did not expressly or implicitly assert that it would revoke Defendant’s supervised release if he invoked his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. And even if Defendant believed invoking the Fifth Amendment would have risked revocation, his belief was not reasonable. View "US v. Eugene Linville" on Justia Law

Three months after Defendant was arrested for various child pornography offenses—his lawyer moved to have him declared mentally incompetent. The district court found Defendant incompetent and committed him to the custody of the Attorney General. The government requested an involuntary medication order, and the district court set a hearing. The district court concluded an involuntary medication order was appropriate and granted the government “four months within which to” restore Defendant’s competency. Defendant appealed the involuntary medication order and his continued detention.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court wrote that it understands that involuntary medication orders “carry an unsavory pedigree” and prolonged pretrial detention of a presumptively innocent person “is serious business.” However, given the deferential standards of review, the court concluded the district court committed no reversible error in deciding an involuntary medication order was warranted and found it appropriate to grant one final four-month period of confinement to attempt to restore Defendant’s competency. View "US v. Christopher Tucker" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted on one count of possession of a firearm by a person previously convicted of a felon. Defendant filed a motion to suppress this evidence, arguing that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion when they seized him. Following an evidentiary hearing, during which the two officers testified, the district court found the stop was valid and denied the suppression motion. Defendant then entered a conditional plea of guilty, preserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion.   The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s order, vacated Defendant’s conviction, and remanded. The court held that the officers lacked reasonable and articulable suspicion to justify seizing Defendant. The court reasoned that although the officers did not physically restrain Defendant until he lifted his shirt high enough for the officer to see the outline of a firearm, the officers did continue to seize Defendant without reasonable suspicion. It was only after “requesting” that Defendant lift his shirt at least fifteen times, inferring that Defendant should submit to a pat down two times, and mentioning that Defendant could be taken to jail for trespass two times that the officer observed “what appeared to be like the bulge or the outline of a muzzle of a pistol” below Defendant’s belt buckle. The court concluded that the Government’s factors—when weighed and assessed in the totality of the circumstances—do not constitute reasonable suspicion to justify the seizure. View "US v. Anthony Peters" on Justia Law

The Securities and Exchange Commission sued Defendant for trading Corporate Executive Board, Inc. (“CEB”) stock using inside information. The Commission alleged that Defendant aggressively traded CEB stock after he received inside information about a potential merger from co-Defendant, Defendant’s brother-in-law and CEB’s Corporate Controller. At trial, Defendant moved for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(a)1 at the conclusion of the Commission’s case. He argued the Commission failed to present evidence that co-Defendant possessed inside information about the merger at the time Defendant began the relevant trading. And if co-Defendant had no such information at that time, Defendant contended, co-Defendant could not have passed it on to Defendant The district court agreed and granted judgment for Defendant.   The Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded. The court explained the right to a trial by jury is enshrined by the Seventh Amendment. And the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that juries, not judges, decide cases so long as there is evidence from which a reasonable decision can be made. Here, evidence existed from which a reasonable jury could infer that Defendant engaged in prohibited insider trading beginning on December 9, 2016. View "SEC v. Christopher Clark" on Justia Law