Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs in this class action are a class of all West Virginia citizens who refinanced a total of 2,769 mortgages with Defendant Quicken Loans Inc. (now Rocket Mortgage, LLC) from 2004 to 2009, for whom Quicken Loans obtained appraisals from Defendant appraisal management company Title Source, Inc. (now Amrock Inc.) using a request form that included an estimate of value of the subject property. The district court certified the proposed class and granted summary judgment to Plaintiffs on three claims: unconscionable inducement under West Virginia Code Section 46A-2-121(a)(1); breach of contract; and conspiracy.   Previously the Fourth Circuit concluded that Plaintiffs had standing because all of the class members had paid “for independent appraisals that . . . they never received”. Three months later, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, which addressed Article III standing in the context of a class-action case. Having considered the parties' submissions, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the district court should apply TransUnion to the facts of this case in the first instance. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Phillip Alig v. Rocket Mortgage, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were injured in unspecified accidents and treated by South Carolina health care providers. Seeking to pursue personal injury lawsuits, Plaintiffs requested their medical records from the relevant providers. Those records—and accompanying invoices—were supplied by defendants Ciox Health, LLC and ScanSTAT Technologies LLC, “information management companies” that retrieve medical records from health care providers and transmit them to requesting patients or patient representatives. Claiming the invoiced fees were too high or otherwise illegal, Plaintiffs filed a putative class action against Ciox and ScanSTAT in federal district court.   The district court dismissed the complaint and the Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that South Carolina law gives patients a right to obtain copies of their medical records, while capping the fees “a physician, or other owner” may bill for providing them. However, the statutory obligations at issue apply only to physicians and other owners of medical records, not medical records companies. View "Tammie Thompson v. Ciox Health, LLC" on Justia Law

Defendant a member of the street gang in Newport News, Virginia, known as the “Dump Squad,” was charged in 2009 with counts of racketeering conspiracy, drug conspiracy, conspiracy to interfere with and interference with commerce by robbery, using a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, assault with a dangerous weapon in aid of racketeering activity, maiming in aid of racketeering activity, murder in aid of racketeering activity, and using a firearm causing death. The issue presented in this appeal is whether offenses under 18 U.S.C. Section 1959 (violent crimes in aid of racketeering activity, commonly referred to as “VICAR”) — in particular, VICAR assault and VICAR murder — must be committed with a sufficiently culpable mens rea to amount to “crime[s] of violence,” as necessary for conviction under 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c).   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling, but for different reasons. The court held that the elements of both VICAR assault and VICAR murder in this case include a mens rea more culpable than mere recklessness and that the mens rea of both VICAR crimes satisfies the mens rea element of a “crime of violence” in Section 924(c).  A defendant who, as part of his role in a racketeering enterprise, commits an assault with a dangerous weapon or that results in serious bodily injury or commits second-degree murder, commits a crime of violence, as he used or threatened to use force against the person of another. View "US v. Martin Manley" on Justia Law

Southern Farm Bureau Life Insurance Company (“Farm Bureau”) issued a term life insurance policy to S.M. S.M.’s husband, Plaintiff, who was the policy’s primary beneficiary. Farm Bureau received a notification from the Post Office indicating that S.M.’s address had changed. Farm Bureau sent its semiannual bill to S.M. at her South Carolina address, informing her that her payment was due on November 23, 2016. S.M. did not pay the bill. Plaintiff sued Farm Bureau in federal district court, seeking the policy’s coverage amount as well as excess damages for alleged unfair and deceptive trade practices on the part of Farm Bureau. He argued that Farm Bureau had not complied with a statutory notice requirement prior to canceling the insurance policy for nonpayment and he was therefore entitled to the policy’s benefits. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and the district court granted summary judgment to Farm Bureau.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed finding that Farm Bureau complied with the statute’s notice requirement. The court wrote that a literal interpretation of the statute’s language—referring to a notice being sent to the “last known post-office address in this State”—would not put S.M. on notice at all. Rather it would have Farm Bureau send “notice” to an address where it knows she no longer resides. Additionally, there is substance in Farm Bureau’s argument that a rigidly literal reading of the words “in this State” would require insurers to implement burdensome and nonsensical notice policies. View "Robert Whitmire v. Southern Farm Bureau Life Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his convictions for two drug-related offenses, asserting that his jury trial on those charges did not occur within the timeframe established by the Speedy Trial Act. He also challenged his sentence, arguing that the district court procedurally erred in calculating the drug weight attributable to him and by not orally announcing during sentencing the discretionary conditions of supervised release imposed upon him in the written judgment.
The Fourth Circuit agreed with Defendant that the record does not show that the district court complied with the Act’s procedural requirements for granting an ends-of-justice continuance for the period between July 22, 2019, and November 7, 2019. Because that 108-day period exceeds the Speedy Trial Act’s 70-day timeframe within which his trial had to occur, the court reversed the district court’s order denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss these two counts and vacate those convictions. The court further explained that vacating the convictions requires vacating Defendant’s entire sentence, which in turn moots his two sentencing challenges. Accordingly, the court remanded to the district court for further proceedings. View "US v. Enil Montoya Velasquez" on Justia Law

Petitioner a native of El Salvador, filed this petition for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying her petition for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the U.N. Convention Against Torture (CAT). She contends chiefly that the BIA and immigration judge (IJ) erred in rejecting her claim of persecution on account of “membership in a particular social group”—a precondition for her asylum claim under 8 U.S.C. Section 1158(b).   The Fourth Circuit denied in part and dismissed in part. The court explained that it is unable to reverse the Board’s order on the basis of its treatment of Petitioner’s proposed social groups. Because her asylum claim does not prevail, her claim for withholding of removal does not either. The agency adjudicators correctly applied law and fact in denying Petitioner’s application, and the record before us does not compel a contrary conclusion. Further, because the Board rightly stated that Petitioner had not meaningfully presented her CAT claim, the court has no jurisdiction to evaluate arguments raised for the first time on review. View "Maria Morales v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law

In this consolidated appeal, defendants were convicted for drug-related murder under 21 U.S.C. Section 848(e)(1)(A), as well as distribution of crack cocaine under 21 U.S.C. Sections 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A)(ii). On appeal, the defendants argued that their drug-related murder conviction and their sentences of death and life imprisonment can no longer stand under the First Step Act. The defendants also claimed that their convictions under 21 U.S.C. Sections 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A)(ii) are "covered" offenses under the First Step Act and that their sentences should be reduced.The Fourth Circuit rejected the defendant's appellate issues, affirming their convictions and sentences. The court explained that 21 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1)(A) is not a covered offense under the First Step Act as its penalties were not modified by the Fair Sentencing Act and that the defendants' sentences for the distribution charges were substantively and procedurally reasonable. View "US v. James Roane, Jr." on Justia Law

Plaintiff s a disabled prisoner who walks with a cane, yet he was denied a handicap pass to access the first-floor library for seven months. Because of that denial, Plaintiff was forced to climb two flights of stairs to get to the general-population library. Plaintiff asserted that this exertion caused him serious pain, made his old injuries worse, and caused him new injuries. Plaintiff filed a pro se civil suit seeking compensatory damages for the aggravated injuries to his legs. The district court granted summary judgment to North Carolina on Plaintiff’s ADA claims because the ADA does not provide a remedy for negligence.   The district court granted summary judgment to Defendants. The court explained that under the Americans with Disabilities Act, plaintiffs can only get compensatory damages for intentional discrimination. What showing that requires is an open question in the Fourth Circuit, but it at least requires deliberate indifference to the prisoner’s federally protected rights. Because Plaintiff has failed to establish deliberate indifference, the district court was right to grant summary judgment to the State of North Carolina. View "Rodney Koon v. State of North Carolina" on Justia Law

Appellant appealed the district court’s denial of his motion for a reduced sentence pursuant to section 404 of the First Step Act of 2018 (the “First Step Act”), which makes retroactive the provisions of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (the “Fair Sentencing Act”) that reduced sentencing disparities between cocaine and crack cocaine offenses. Appellant contends that pursuant to United States v. Collington, 995 F.3d 347 (4th Cir. 2021), section 404 decisions must be procedurally and substantively reasonable, and the district court’s decision not to reduce his sentence was substantively unreasonable. In contrast, the United States (the “Government”) insists that Collington is distinguishable and limited to section 404 grants as opposed to denials. Therefore, the Government argues that the more circumscribed review for abuse of discretion applies to the district court’s denial of section 404 relief in this case.   The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s order denying Appellant’s section 404 motion and remand for reconsideration. The court concluded that the requirements outlined in Collington apply generally in the section 404 context -- that is, regardless of whether the district court grants or denies the motion. Here, although the district court’s order denying Appellant’s section 404 motion was procedurally reasonable, it was not substantively so. View "US v. Mitchell Swain" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted at a bench trial of receiving and possessing child pornography found on his phone. He appealed, making six arguments. The Fourth Circuit explained that based on the totality of the circumstances of Defendant’s questioning show Defendant was not in custody, so his Miranda rights were not violated. Although admitting the cellphone report into evidence violated Defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights, the court found that the error was harmless. And the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of past wrongs, in allowing the Detective’s lay-opinion testimony, or in fashioning its restitution order. But the lifetime ban on internet and computer usage is foreclosed by the Fourth Circuit’s caselaw. So the court reversed as to that condition and remanded to the district court. View "US v. Augustin Arce" on Justia Law