Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant challenged the admissibility of a handgun found in a rental car he had been driving that was parked outside of his hotel. Finding that Defendant had abandoned any legitimate expectation of privacy in the Charger, that Enterprise had given valid third-party consent to the search, and that the Government would have inevitably discovered the gun in the Charger, the district court denied Defendant’s motion to suppress.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court explained that in suppression hearings, criminal defendants have the burden of putting forward evidence to support all elements of their reasonable expectation of privacy. Here, Defendant did not introduce any evidence to support his lawful possession of the Charger. View "US v. Derrick Daniels, Jr." on Justia Law

First Data Technologies, Inc. (“First Data”), a credit and debit card processing company, employed Plaintiff as a call center representative. Plaintiff submitted a request pursuant to the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) as a result of back pain she was experiencing from an automobile accident that occurred 15 days earlier. After a series of contested events, Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination against First Data with the EEOC, alleging disability discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). Finding no evidence of an ADA violation, the EEOC issued a dismissal and notice of rights.   Plaintiff later filed a complaint in the district court and First Data moved to dismiss Cowgill’s FMLA retaliation claim as time-barred, as well as Plaintiff’s ADA retaliation claim because Plaintiff’s failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. Plaintiff appealed the district court’s dismissal of the ADA retaliation claim, as well as the grant of summary judgment as to the disability discrimination and failure-to-accommodate claims.   The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment because the court erred in holding that there are no genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment on the disability discrimination claim. The court explained that Plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of all inferences as the nonmovant, thus the court concluded that there is a genuine dispute as to whether Plaintiff met First Data’s legitimate expectations. Further, the court found that Plaintiff satisfied the final requirement of her disability discrimination claim because a reasonable factfinder could conclude that First Data’s proffered explanation served as pretext for an impermissible consideration. View "Terri Cowgill v. First Data Technologies, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff entered into a share purchase agreement with Defendants for the sale of her business, which agreement the parties later amended (the contract, or the amended agreement). Plaintiff filed suit in December 2019 in North Carolina state court, alleging that Defendants had not made interest and earnout payments as required under the amended agreement. Defendants removed the case to federal district court in the Middle District of North Carolina, where they argued that the state or federal courts in New York were the exclusive forums for Plaintiff’s complaint under the contract’s forum selection clause. Defendants also argued that Plaintiff’s claims were not yet ripe because, at the time the complaint was filed, all payments that were due under the contract had been made. The district court remanded the case to the North Carolina state court, and Defendants appealed.   The Fourth Circuit initially concluded that Plaintiff’s claims are ripe, both as originally pleaded and under the facts developed prior to the district court’s judgment. The court also agreed with the magistrate judge that Plaintiff’s claims do not relate to a setoff and that under the contract’s forum selection clause, the state or federal courts in New York are the exclusive forums for Plaintiff’s  claims. The court therefore vacated and remanded with instructions that the district court transfer this case to the Southern District of New York. View "Pamela Whitaker v. Monroe Staffing Services, LLC" on Justia Law

While working for a company that makes skin grafts, Plaintiff caught wind of a kickback scheme operating in a Veterans Administration hospital. The scheme involved the sale of skin grafts to the VA by commission-based salespeople who were paid based on how much they sold. If true, that would likely violate the Anti-Kickback Statute, 42 U.S.C. Section 1320a-7b, which would then make each commission-induced sale a violation of the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. Section 3729 et seq. So Plaintiff brought a qui tam suit as a False Claims Act relator on behalf of the United States government and an analogous state-law claim under North Carolina law.   After the United States declined to intervene in the suit, Plaintiff prosecuted it. Because he used conclusory language in his original Complaint, the district court dismissed the Complaint with prejudice for failure to state a fraud claim with particularity under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b).   The Fourth Circuit agreed with the district court’s dismissal of the original Complaint for a lack of particularity. Given that it is largely made up of conclusory allegations, the original Complaint may even have failed Rule 8’s lower standard of plausibility. The court also found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend for bad faith. Although the court affirmed the district court’s decision, because the district court did not take jurisdiction over the state-law claim, the court modified the decision to clarify that the state-law claim should be dismissed without prejudice. View "US ex rel. Haile Nicholson v. Medcom Carolinas, Inc." on Justia Law

Pro se Plaintiff sought to pursue a civil action in the Eastern District of Virginia against several Commonwealth officials, alleging that the Old Dominion’s 2021 House of Delegates election contravened the federal and state constitutions. More specifically, Plaintiff alleged that Virginia was constitutionally required to use 2020 U.S. Census data to draw the legislative districts for the 2021 House of Delegates election. On October 12, 2021, the district court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against the Governor of Virginia and the State Board of Elections on grounds of Eleventh Amendment immunity.   On remand, the three-judge district court dismissed the entirety of Plaintiff’s complaint, ruling that he lacks Article III standing to sue. The court later reviewed the Standing to Sue Ruling, and found that the court possesses jurisdiction to review the Standing to Sue Ruling. The court then rendered an opinion to resolve both the Plaintiff’s Appeal and the Commonwealth’s Appeal.   The Fourth Circuit held that the three-judge district court properly ruled that Plaintiff does not possess the Article III standing to sue that is required to pursue this civil action. In making that determination, the court adopted the well-crafted and reasoned analysis of the Standing to Sue Ruling. Plaintiff cannot satisfy Article III’s injury in fact requirement, either as a voter or as a candidate for public office. However, the court modified the judgment of the three-judge district court to reflect that its dismissal of Plaintiff’s civil action is without prejudice. The court further, dismissed the Commonwealth’s Appeal as moot. View "Paul Goldman v. Robert Brink" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought a claim on behalf of thousands of West Virginia’s foster children challenging the State’s administration of child welfare services. Invoking Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the district court abstained from hearing the case in deference to parallel state-court proceedings. Plaintiffs alleged that a federal class action is the most—if not the only—effective way to achieve the kind of systemic relief they seek.The Fourth Circuit reversed holding that principles of federalism not only do not preclude federal intervention, they compel it. Plaintiffs bring federal claims, and federal courts “are obliged to decide” them in all but “exceptional” circumstances. The court explained that Younger’s narrow scope safeguards Plaintiffs’ rights, bestowed on them by Congress in the Judiciary Act of March 3, 1875, to present their claims to a federal tribunal. 28 U.S.C. Section 1331. The court further wrote For years, West 4 Virginia’s response to any foster-care orders entered as part of the individual state hearings seems to have been to shuffle its money and staff around until the orders run out, entrenching rather than excising structural failures. Thus, forcing Plaintiffs to once more litigate their claims piecemeal would get federalism exactly backward. View "Jonathan R. v. Jim Justice" on Justia Law

“Arabella Farm”, is bounded by three bodies of water—Clearwater Branch, Peach Orchard Branch, and an unnamed tributary of the Eastatoe River. Arabella Farm began clearing 20 acres of land to create its venue. The South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (Department) conducted an inspection to evaluate the farm’s compliance with the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) program. Defendants’ claimed its work fell within an agricultural exemption to the Clean Water Act’s requirements.   Naturaland Trust and Trout Unlimited (collectively “the conservationists”)—non-profit organizations dedicated to conserving land, water, and natural resources—sent a notice of intent to sue letter to Arabella Farm. As the statute requires, the letter detailed the alleged violations of the Clean Water Act. The district court dismissed the conservationists’ complaint.   The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling. The court held that the district court erred in concluding that the diligent prosecution bar precluded the conservationists’ federal claims. The court explained that the Department’s notice of alleged violation was enough to commence an action that was comparable to one brought under federal law. That notice invited Arabella Farm to an informal, voluntary, private conference with the Department to discuss allegedly unauthorized discharges. Thus, because the Department had not yet commenced an action when the conservationists filed their citizen suit, the diligent prosecution bar does not preclude them from pursuing a civil penalty action. Further, the court held that the district court erred in concluding that Plaintiff was not permitted to sue under the Clean Water Act. View "Naturaland Trust v. Dakota Finance LLC" on Justia Law

The Interim Secretary of the North Carolina Department of Public Safety (the “State”), appealed from the district court’s order granting state prisoner Petitioner’s 28 U.S.C. Section 2254 petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner’s sole claim in his Section 2254 petition is that his lead trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to withdraw and testify on his behalf to impeach one of the State’s key witnesses.   The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss Petitioner’s petition. The court explained that it is not free to reweigh evidence or interpose our own interpretations of the facts when reviewing a Section 2254 petition, even if we disagree with them or believe they are wrong. The court wrote that because the district court did just that, the court held that it must reverse its decision.   The court further explained that whether Sullivan or Strickland would supply the clearly established law, Petitioner has failed to carry his burden to secure habeas relief because he has no claim. He has failed to upend the state court’s conclusion that the alleged November 20, 2001, conversation between the key witness and his trial counsel never occurred, meaning he has not shown that she was operating under any conflict of interest during his trial. Nor has he demonstrated that his trial counsel possessed any information to impeach the key witness’s testimony had she withdrawn from her representation. In short, there is no factual support for the lone claim raised in Petitioner’s Section 2254 petition. View "Terrence Hyman v. Casandra Hoekstra" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued three defendants under 11 U.S.C. Section 362 for violating a bankruptcy stay by their participation in the foreclosure and sale of her home while her bankruptcy petition was pending. The district court dismissed the claims against the first defendant but not the other two, and Plaintiff appealed the dismissal order, even though it was interlocutory. While her appeal was pending before the Fourth Circuit, however, the district court dismissed the claims against the other two defendants and entered a final judgment in the case. That final judgment saved her appeal from dismissal in our court under the doctrine of “cumulative finality,” as the district court had at that point adjudicated all claims as to all parties in the case.   The Fourth Circuit reviewed the order dismissing the first defendant and remanded the case for further proceedings against that defendant. Because Plaintiff never appealed the dismissal of the other two defendants, however, the court never had those defendants before it. Thus the court concluded that it lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s appeal of the final judgment in favor of the other two defendants, as it was untimely. The court explained the fact that the February 2014 judgment was a final judgment sufficient to grant cumulative finality means that Plaintiff’s appeal of that judgment was subject to the time requirements of Section 2107(a), which she failed to satisfy. View "Diana Houck v. LifeStore Bank" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed from his convictions for conspiracy to commit fraud, conspiracy to launder money, and eight counts of mail or wire fraud. He argued that his trial was constitutionally defective, his indictment was constructively amended, his jury instructions prejudiced him, and his conviction for conspiracy to launder money must be reversed for lack of sufficient evidence.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed Defendant’s conviction, holding that his arguments—most of which were not properly preserved—are meritless. The court held that Defendant’s right-to-compel challenge falters, at minimum, at the third step of the plain error inquiry because he fails to show how the district court’s alleged Fifth Amendment error affected the outcome of his proceedings. 
 Further, even if the probable-cause finding for Count 2 were flawed, the Government would still have been well within its rights to seize Defendant’s properties based on the underlying and unchallenged probable-cause findings for these other counts.   Next, the court wrote that Defendant failed to show that his indictment contained an error, much less a plain error. It is well established that “[t]he allegation in a single count of conspiracy to commit several crimes is not duplicitous, for [t]he conspiracy is the crime, and that is one, however diverse its objects.” United States v. Marshall, 332 F.3d 254 (4th Cir. 2003).   Moreover, the court explained that even if it assumed that the district court’s concealment-money-laundering instructions were flawed, that error did not affect the outcome of Defendant’s proceedings because he was nevertheless convicted of conspiring to commit transactional money laundering. View "US v. David Miller" on Justia Law